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ABSTRACT AND THESIS CLAIM 
This study examines the problems we face in making a coherent theoretical link between the 
international law of piracy and the law of the sea in the context of the rise in maritime piracy 
in Africa over the past three decades. It focuses on four nations affected by piracy in the Gulf 
of Guinea and Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the international law of piracy is concerned with 
two types of jurisdiction: prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction. However, the 
law of the sea (UN Law of the Sea Convention) defines five types of jurisdiction: territorial 
seas, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the continental shelf, high seas, and seabed or seafloor 
outside the area of claims of territorial seas under the EEZ. The above implies that where a 
State that has enforcement jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to enforce prescribed 
international laws against piracy, recourse ought to be had to a State with jurisdiction under 
the law of the sea. The current thesis seeks to demonstrate that maritime piracy has 
substantially increased in north-eastern and western parts of Africa because, albeit the 
development of the law of the sea has transposed towards acknowledging the rights (and 
obligations) of coastal States in order to defend their territorial seas with reference to the 
piratical incursions, not enough attention has been given to the consequences flowing from 
the fact that the coastal states in question do not possess the requisite resources and systems 
to enforce international law and/ or prosecute pirates. 
It is submitted here that piracy in its modern form in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea is a 
transnational crime that may best be contained through a regional legal infrastructure. It is 
also argued that the multilateral approach of linking enforcement jurisdiction to Universal 
Jurisdiction is problematic since it translates into ‘relational statism’ that is, where States 
habitually pursue only their self-interests. As such, consistency and clarity in the international 
legal situation may best be achieved by recourse to a traditional ‘auto-limitation’ approach 
whereby jurisdiction is essentially territorial and can only be exercised by a State outside its 
territory where it obtains the consent of the territorial State (perhaps through Convention or 
Treaty) or in accordance with a permissive rule derived from international custom. Therefore 
the thesis of this study suggests the need for legal reform. Chapter 1 provides the background 
to the study as well as the framework for the research. The main research aims, objectives 
and research questions are addressed in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 7 concludes the 
research by presenting the findings and recommendations together with an outline of the 
research contribution. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
‘Many pirate attacks are hit-and-run robberies. In others, crew members are kidnapped for 
ransom, even tortured and killed. Countless vessels have been hijacked, their nameplates and 
paperwork swiftly changed, and turned into ghost ships used by syndicates for drug and slave 
smuggling.’1 
1.1 Background 
The history of maritime piracy can be traced to the advent of maritime trade and carriage of 
goods by sea.2 It was prevalent during the middle Ages given that it was often 
indistinguishable from warfare as princes were strictly responsible for the acts of piracy of 
their subjects.3 Over the centuries, commentators have consistently pointed to intractability 
of the practice.4 Thus although the world’s seas and common areas were rendered relatively 
safe for business during most of the 20th century, the decade of the 1990’s saw a sharp rise in 
1. John M. Glionna, 'A welcome voice  in a sea of chaos', Los Angeles Times 13 November 2006 
2. See Goodwin JM ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old Couple to Part’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 977; Jesus JL ‘Protection of Foreign Ships Against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: 
Legal Aspects’ (2003) 18 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 364. 
3. Lewis E ‘Responsibility for Piracy in the Middle Ages’ (1937) 19 Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law 77, p.77. 
4. Havet J, Les Courts Royales de Iles Normands Depuis le Treizieme Siecle Jusqu’a Nos Jours (Paris, 1878) 
231; Richmond CF, Royal ‘Administration and the Keeping of the Seas’, 1422-85 (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford 
University, 1963) 4. 
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maritime piracy to the point of adversely impacting upon global business. The past 20 years has 
witnessed a serious increase in maritime piracy in some war torn and economically depressed 
regions. Well-trained guerrillas experienced in armed warfare and equipped with modern 
technology, satellite telephones, powerful boats, and missiles, constitute the contemporary 
personnel of piracy.5 However, pirate assaults are not solely confined to war torn areas, but also 
occur across well-known trade and tourist routes. Assaults have been carried out across the Gulf 
of Aden or Gulf of Guinea for example. The rebirth of piracy is confirmed by statistical data from 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)6 and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)7 
that shows that the number of piratical attacks since the end of the Cold War in the Gulf of Aden 
and Gulf of Guinea increased on an exponential scale in the first decade of the 21st century. 
These are large coastal areas with small national naval forces and weak regional security 
cooperation mechanisms. Also, the laws of the littoral States within the inlet or those that have 
territorial jurisdiction are largely insufficient. This may be attributed to the absence of well-
established legal infrastructure or simply the lack of political will (see Appendix 4). There exists, 
in addition, confusion about the status of pirates captured at sea by non-coastal States, as well as 
the legality of their prolonged detention, trial or rendition to third countries for prosecution and 
sentencing. The taxpayers of the State that 
 
5. Weir EG ‘Fish, Family, and Profit: Piracy and the Horn of Africa’ in Elleman B, Forbes A, and Rosenberg D 
(Eds), Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies (Naval War College Press, Newport, 
2010) 213. 
6. See Abhyankar J, Piracy and Maritime Violence: A Continuing Threat to Maritime Industry (ICC – IMB, 
Hong Kong, 2002) 8. See also Bowden A et al ‘The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy’ (2010) One Earth 
Future Working Paper 1, 12; Chalk P ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, 
Dimensions, Causes and Responses’ (2010) 16 Brown Journal of World Affairs 89, 89-102. 
7. ‘International Maritime Organization, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’ (IMO, 
Paris, 2011). See also other IMO reports discussed in Chapters, 2, 3, and 4 infra. 
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detains the alleged pirates or imprisons them after conviction in a court of law have to bear 
the cost of prosecution and incarceration. This cost may even be higher where the pirate(s) 
seeks to remain indefinitely on the grounds that they fear persecution if returned to home 
countries. They are also entitled to protections against non-refoulement. 
It is submitted here that piracy in its modern form in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea is a 
transnational crime that may best be contained through a regional legal infrastructure. It is also 
argued that the multilateral approach of linking enforcement jurisdiction to universal jurisdiction 
is problematic because it translates into ‘relational statism’ that is, where States pursue only their 
self-interests. Moreover, it may provoke conflict between a non-coastal State that asserts 
jurisdiction and a coastal State with territorial jurisdiction in cases where the attack is carried out 
on the high seas but the hijacked vessel is moved into the territorial waters of the latter State. In 
agreement, Jan Klabbers recently reinforces the matter that it cannot be convincingly argued that 
the suppression against piracy is a matter of ‘Global law.’ He emphasises the fact that States 
preserve too much freedom, and maybe the term of ‘Global law’ or ‘Global governance’ are best 
seen as metaphors, and that legal approaches remain ‘decidedly local’8. Sofia Galani, in 
agreement states that sovereignty poses a problem in the nature of the term ‘piracy.’ She 
reinforces that universal jurisdiction ‘does not appear to be exercised as frequently as might be 
expected’, and that in fact over time piracy ‘has become the case that it is the nature of the act, 
rather than the lack of jurisdictional competence over actors’9. Douglas Guilfoyle talks of piracy 
not being a norm or criminal law as such but 
 
8. Klabbers, Jan , ‘Piracy in Global Law and Global Governance, The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea’ 
European and International Perspectives, edited by Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas, (2014), Oxford ; 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 329-342 
9. Evans Malcolm D, Galani Sofia, ‘Piracy and the Development of International Law’, The Law and Practice 
of 
Piracy at Sea : European and International Perspectives, edited by Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas, 
(2014), Oxford ; Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing, 343-365 
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rather a ‘jurisdictional device’10. Sofia Galani then refers to the idea that we should see our 
responses to maritime piracy ‘as a testing ground for evolution and innovation in developing 
the international order’ and with this line of though as such, I put forward that consistency 
and clarity in the international legal situation may best be achieved by recourse to a 
traditional ‘auto-limitation’ approach whereby jurisdiction is essentially territorial and can 
only be exercised by a State outside its territory where it obtains the consent of the territorial 
State (perhaps through Convention or Treaty) or in accordance with a permissive rule derived 
from international custom. (See Appendix 1 and 3) 
1.2 Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
This study seeks to propose an appropriate mechanism for the arrest, prosecution and 
sentencing of convicted pirates captured in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea. It endorses 
a multilateral approach but places particular emphasis on a cosmopolitan model whereby 
enforcement jurisdiction may only be asserted by the State with territorial or personal 
jurisdiction or by another State with the consent of the latter. The research will seek to 
provide answers to the following questions and/or concerns with the objective of shedding 
some light on the problems affecting this area of the law. Additionally, it is also the hope of 
the research that the answers will assist in further developing knowledge on the subject which 
may ultimately lead to the development of legal solutions which can be applied for the 
benefit of the maritime industry. There are three central questions that must be addressed in 
approaching these objectives. 
 
10. Ibid, 333. 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The first concerns the approach to the definition of the term ‘piracy’ in a maritime context for 
analytical purposes. Currently, there are legal issues related to what might be seen as an 
overly restrictive technical definition of the offence, and which have compromised the arrest 
and prosecution of alleged pirates in several instances. The concept appropriate to the critical 
commentary and to the empirical aspects of the research project takes the technical legal 
definition as part of its subject matter, and thus is important to propose a definition that is less 
ambiguous and does not rely on terms that are open to several interpretations. 
Secondly, given that the coastal States in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea are largely 
poor, weak, lacking in resources, and suffer from corruption in the public sphere, we must ask 
whether regional frameworks of littoral and landlocked countries facing the same challenges 
can be expected to prove effective in the attempt to implement anti-piracy policies. 
Thirdly, as is well known, in the event of a hot pursuit it is impossible to bring the pursuit to a 
close within the territorial waters of coastal States. In some cases ships are pursued across the 
high seas and across borders ending up in territories incapable of feasible arrest and 
prosecution. Further problems arise where the territorial waters of a weak State are 
handicapped by the absence of a navy and the lack of effective anti-piracy legislation. Some 
key international instruments provide for universal jurisdiction on the high seas to facilitate 
the arrest and prosecution of pirates in such cases. However, this raises the question of 
whether such jurisdictional shifts depart too dramatically from Westphalian principles of 
sovereignty, and whether such departures can be regarded as justified. These issues constitute 
the basis of the challenges in the development of international law that arise and confront the 
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States that act as the main players in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea in their attempt to 
deal with the problem of maritime piracy. 
The questions can be summarised as follows: 
1. Is there a need to propose a less ambiguous definition of ‘piracy’? 
2. Do regional frameworks of littoral and landlocked countries facing the same challenges 
prove effective in the attempt to implement anti-piracy policies? 
3. In assessing universal jurisdiction, does this depart too dramatically from Westphalian 
principles of sovereignty in the facilitation of arrest and prosecution of pirates in territorial 
waters? 
Aims and objectives can be summarised as follows: 
1. To assess multilateralism: Universal v Cosmopolitan in Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden 
2. To propose the rationale for a regional International Tribunal 
3. To review and appraise relevant cases, statutory instruments and academic literature on 
the subject. 
4. To make relevant recommendations and solutions based on the findings of the research. 
1.3 Methodology 
Writing a straightforward account of one’s methodological approach is extremely difficult 
unless one has a routinised, fixed, quasi-empirical, ‘quantitative or qualitative’ research task 
to pursue. In addition, the methodology section for a legal thesis presents a set of problems 
specific to the discipline. In a thesis such as this one, which might be described as a 
contextually jurisprudential examination of aspects of maritime criminality from the 
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perspective of international law, one must draw upon a range of approaches and technique 
and it would be wise from the outset to be candid about this methodological eclecticism. It is 
not an overtly empirical thesis but avails itself of empirical observations where appropriate, it 
is not overtly historical, but draws on historical data and narratives, and it is not purely 
doctrinal ‘Black Letter’ or case based, but draws on doctrine and cases where necessary. It 
draws comparisons of the law and political and economic context of various States but one 
would hesitate to announce it as a ‘comparative thesis’. In short the account of the issues 
presented is based on a variety of research methods that contribute to an analytical evaluation 
– i.e. an approach that attempts to give a critical assessment and appraisal of the way law 
relates to the set of social, economic and political phenomena that provides the context for 
maritime activity that will be described as piratical. Something should be said about what is 
useful –and what is not so useful - about labels such as ‘Black Letter’, ‘empirical’ and 
‘comparative’. 
A Black Letter approach is assumed to be a disinterested (objective) analysis of empirical 
legal materials: statutes, case reports, conventions, national legislation and so on. In the sense 
that these materials are objects which contain words of a certain kind and a certain amount 
and which can be photographed or reported, then they are empirical objects. We can look at 
them, count the words in a particular paragraph, state whose names are mentioned, who are 
the authors, or what date was it incorporated into law or published. This constitutes an 
analysis of sorts - but when we announce that we are ‘analysing a range of materials’ - what 
precisely do we do we mean? We can only mean that we aim to consider these case reports or 
conventions or newspaper articles or book chapters as being relevant to our research task. 
When we are prepared to be candid about why and how these materials are relevant, then we 
are coming close to what might be meant by ‘analysis’. For example, if we scrutinise a report 
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which talks about policy aims and about some form of intervention geared towards achieving 
them, and we think the aims or the intervention is controversial or unfair or immoral or, 
conversely, effective and entirely even handed, then we have already created an evaluative 
political dimension to the materials. In terms of our research task we are looking for pointers 
to some kind of solution or suggestion then we must be (will be) always critical of certain 
types of activity or certain types of thinking. So, the ‘Black Letter’ approach is much more 
than the Black Letter approach. A Black Letter approach cannot confine itself simply to the 
text of legislative documents, case reports or treaties: it must set these documents in at least 
an historical – even if narrowly contemporary – context, and that context will always be 
economic and political. Thus the narrowest conception of a Black Letter law approach to 
legal scholarship must incorporate commentary and analysis from secondary sources - even if 
these sources are one’s own attempts to merely ‘describe’ the context and related legislation. 
A review and analysis of the opinions of other scholarly parties will thus inevitably form the 
basis of the secondary research material. This secondary research can only be assumed to be 
designed to contribute and enrich the account of the particular area of research that has been 
selected. There is no way to avoid decisions about including or excluding secondary literature 
and no way of avoiding the process of dissecting, evaluating and synthesising the arguments 
one has chosen to include. Thus Black Letter law necessarily involves a theoretical dimension 
operating on a criterion of theoretical relevance. The range of resources used in any analysis 
that initially prides itself on being confined to Black Letter concerns must necessarily include 
the primary sources in question, and if, as is the case in the thesis in hand, the primary 
sources and primary activity is international by its very nature, that is, the very origin of these 
sources is international and ranges over several jurisdictions, then what started out as a Black 
Letter approach and became unavoidably theoretical and critical, now inevitably becomes 
‘comparative’ analysis in a very obvious sense.  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More specifically, this study adopts a comparative perspective in order to identify, analyse 
and compare the different ways of dealing with legal and security challenges in the Gulf of 
Aden and Gulf of Guinea11. Whilst one cannot avoid a discourse of comparison – in the very 
obvious sense outlined above - there is as much hidden depth to the idea of comparative 
analysis as there is to the idea of ‘Black Letter’ analysis. One cannot compare any object or 
process to another without an agenda.12 Lord Bowen described the comparative lawyer as ‘a 
man who knows little about the law of every country except his own.’13 Koopmans on his 
part argued that comparative law lacks a fixed method or technique of comparison.14 
Nonetheless, the comparative method requires the researcher to make two methodological 
choices. First, the comparison must be critical in accordance with a common set of criteria 
applicable to all elements under scrutiny and not limited to a description of the similarities or 
differences of the legal orders being compared.15 In this regard, emphasis must be placed on 
the practicability and justification of legal solutions in each system according to a criterion of 
propriety and success independent of all the elements under scrutiny. As such, this study 
discusses the merits of the particular solutions to the problem of piracy implemented in the 
Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea that suggests a set of normative criteria that makes some 
 
11. Muller-Graff P ‘Modern Comparative Law: The Forces Behind and the Challenges Ahead in the Age of 
Transnational Harmonisation’ in Engelbrekt AB and Nergelius J (Eds), New Directions in Comparative Law 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009) 255-261. 
12. See Siems M, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) 33-35. 
13. Schlesinger RB, Comparative Law: Cases – Text – Materials (3rd Edition, The Foundation Press, New York, 
1970) p.1-2. 
14. Koopmans T (Ed), Constitutional Protection of Equality (AW Sijhoff, the Netherlands, 1975) 8. 
 15. Zweigert K and Siehr K ‘Thering’s Influence on the Development of Comparative Legal Method’ (1971) 19 
American Journal of Criminal Law 215, 220. 
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claim to universality across all legal orders. This implies at very least that the laws of 
common law and civil code countries may be compared. In fact, comparisons between civil 
law and common law systems dominated the comparative law landscape for a while.16 
Nonetheless, what is important is the form of technique adopted, and whether the comparison 
is internal, external, inventive or historical.17 The Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea comprise 
both common law and civil law countries and their laws on piracy are compared. However, 
given the number of countries in both regions, an external comparison would not only have 
been an unwieldy task but would have distracted the researcher from focusing on the function 
of the laws in regard to the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of pirates. 
A functional approach to comparative analysis focuses on the effects of the laws rather than 
the specific provisions and doctrinal constructs.18 For the functional method, the function of 
the law is the tertium comparationis or the social purpose of the law.19 It has been described 
as the ‘principle’ to which the comparative method adheres.20 It is uncertain whether the 
functional method may be effectively called a ‘method’ or it is simply a ‘principle’ that 
guides the comparative method. The simple rationale of the functional method was deemed 
 
16. See Sitek B, Szczerbowski JJ, and Bauknecht AW (Eds), Comparative Law in Eastern and Central Europe 
(Cambridge Scholars, Newcastle, 2013) 1-2. 
17. Lasser M ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Literature: A Project in Progress’ (1997) Utah Law Review 
474, 474-480. 
18. Michaels R ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Reimann M and Zimmermann R (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 341-343. 
19. Brand O ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal 
Studies’ (2007) 
32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 405, 409; Bogdan M, Comparative Law (Kluwer, Deventer, 1994) 60. 
20. Kiikeri M, Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2001) 28. 
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appropriate for this study because it is suitable when comparing legal systems that face 
similar problems.21 One system might adopt similar but not the exact same measures from 
the other in order to solve the same problem, and both might be successful. A functional 
approach is concerned with achieving desirable ends even if not establishing homogeneity of 
means to be adopted by various systems. I was more interested in analysing the dicta of 
courts and provisions of statutes (including international conventions) as responses to similar 
situations faced by countries in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea. The dicta and statutes 
are understood in relation to the function they fulfil in society. Hence, the judicial decisions 
in courts of countries that have tried pirates from the Gulf of Aden or the Gulf of Guinea are 
set up to be functionally equivalent in their settings but may not always be successful given 
lack of legislature and so on. They set out to fulfil similar functions: deterring and punishing 
piracy. I therefore followed the advice by Zweigert and Kotz in that the methodological 
principle of comparative law is that of functionality.22 The effects of legal institutions set up 
in response to the threat posed by piracy are explained as functions and not as doctrinal 
constructs.23 
The thesis seeks to determine the function of the applicable laws in two different regions 
faced with a sharp rise in piratical attacks over the past couple of decades. Whilst 
acknowledging the relevance of the social and cultural body of non-legal norms that might 
plausibly be said to influence the increase of maritime piracy, the focus is upon what can be 
 
21. Michaels R ,Ibid.  fn. 18 supra p. 369. 
22. Zweigert K and Kotz H, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Trans by Weir T, 3rd Edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998) 34. 
23. Michaels, Ibid. fn. 18 supra  p.365. 
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reasonably distinguished as the formal, posited law. Non-legal norms can be critically 
analysed and assessed as part of a project in addressing how situations and characteristics in 
such territories can be improved in the long run as a measure to reduce piracy. This, however, 
is a longer term project to obtaining a higher level of sustainability in territorial States. But, 
notwithstanding the value of this type of study, the author maintains that a formal focus is 
neither precluded nor less valuable by way of its concentration of formal legal processes and 
materials. The study seeks to assess the scope for a feasible and timely response to the 
increase of attacks by building on current legislation. 
1.4 Philosophy 
The philosophy of law in the form of Jurisprudence subjects law and legal institutions to 
close conceptual scrutiny.24 It focuses on questions relating to the nature of legal systems and 
the alleged validity of laws posited in these systems. Depending on one’s perspective, it is a 
search for the authoritative essence of law as distinct from the claims of other normative 
systems, or an ideological critique of the claim to its essential distinction.25 Both these 
perspectives are thus ‘normative’ in the sense that neither can reach completion without moral 
judgment. In light of this one could say that the approach of the thesis is largely normative 
and prescriptive. I attempt to critically examine the challenges in enforcing piracy laws in the 
Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea and attempt to analyse the efficacy or otherwise principles 
of relevant legislation and compare them between legal systems. I do not seek, however, to 
achieve the chief aims of analytic jurisprudence which has been said to be that of 
 
24. See Finnis J, Philosophy of Law: Collected Essays: Volume IV (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 157- 
Also H.P.Olsen and S. Toddington Law in its Own Right (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) Chapter 1. 
25. Ibid. 
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explaining what separates law as a system of valid norms from other informal systems of 
norms.26 To explain the distinction other than by way of a simplistic appeal to officialdom, 
procedure and codification, demands a foundational specialism; for the serious debate is 
about the relationship between obligation and coercion and the reasons underpinning the 
justifications for imposing obligations and/or employing coercion in response to non-
compliance. An approach to legality in society can hardly avoid a simultaneously normative 
(moral), analytical, and critical approach and thus an appeal to a range of potentially 
problematic conceptual frameworks of description and explanation. Brian Leiter argued that 
‘the philosophy of law was one of the few philosophical disciplines that took conceptual 
analysis as its principal concern’ noting that most other disciplines had taken a 
‘naturalistic’ (by which, following Quine, he meant empiric-pragmatic) turn, incorporating 
the tools and methods of the natural and technological sciences.’27 
Conceptual analysis of law leads to the espousal or rejection of two types of theories: theories 
which confirm a relationship between law and morality, and theories which deny this 
relationship or the influence of morality on the development of the law. There are several 
ways of thinking about the philosophy of law in ways which support, rebut or at least revolve 
around these fundamental positions. Natural Law, Legal Idealism, Legal Positivism, Legal 
Realism, and Critical Legal Studies, spring to mind, and so does the outright rejection of 
law’s validity in Marx. My strategy has been to adopt an approach close to the flexibility of 
Hart’s ‘inclusive’ positivism in that, for the purposes of empirical, doctrinal and conceptual 
analysis, a plausible distinction between law on the one hand, and culture/politics/morality on 
 
26. Burke R, Criminal Justice Theory: An Introduction (Routledge, Abingdon, 2012) 59-60. 
27. Leiter B ‘The Naturalistic Turn in Legal Philosophy’ (2001) APA Newsletter on Law and Philosophy 142, 
142. 
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the other, can be coherently drawn without recourse to a complete and indefinitely lengthy 
immersion in the depths of moral epistemology and the philosophy of method. In this 
research, I placed a reliance on broadly positivistic assumptions because the bulk of analysis 
is confined to the applicable statutes and judicial decisions as responses to the problem of 
piracy. 
1.4.1 ‘Modest ‘Legal Positivism 
Legal Positivism since Hart is based around the idea that the only valid sources of law are those 
that can be traced to an empirical rule of recognition, and that the identification of this rule of 
recognition does not require the exercise of moral judgement. 28 This, as John Gardner points out, 
is better regarded as a ‘source thesis’ than a ‘separation thesis, although the issue of the separation 
between law and morals is in any event unavoidable. For the most part the idea of a ‘rule of 
recognition’ coincides with a common-sense understanding of law as a body of enshrined legal 
principles and a superstructure of usually codified rules developed and put in place by a national 
government or an international governmental organisation.29 The device is the answer to the big 
question in Legal Positivism, ‘what is law?’ This is an important question in this context given 
that the nature of piracy is largely undefined in the laws of most States in the Gulf of Aden and 
Gulf of Guinea. Thus, it is often uncertain which law governs violent attacks against vessels at 
sea and it is uncertain whether international instruments may be said to be the law in cases where 
there is no local law criminalising those particular types of attacks. The empirical (Empiricist) 
origins and sympathies of Positivism in general and Legal Positivism in particular focuses on 
 
28. Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law (Oxford. Clarendon) 1961. 
29. See Segal JA and Spaeth HJ, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1993) 33-55. 
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the confirmation of the observable facts of existence. It tries to define the law by giving 
empirically grounded accounts of the applications of parliamentary enactments or judicial 
decisions which allow society to be regulated. If a rule or judgment is acknowledged by a 
State’s parliament or court, it will be admitted as law in the eyes of Legal Positivists. On the 
other hand, if a norm is affirmed by anyone other than legislators or judges, it will not be 
admitted as law by the positivists, even where a particular norm is heralded as desirable or 
indispensable in popular demands for legitimacy.30 However, this is not dispositive of the 
issue: it must be noted that ‘customary’ international law or ‘peremptory norms’ are treated as 
law irrespective of the fact that they have not been incorporated into the laws of a State. This 
implies the adoption of the ‘cosmopolitan’ theory of law in a bid to reconcile the universality 
of customary international law and the partiality of positive law.31 It has been argued that 
cosmopolitan law supplements both national and international law by remedying their 
deficiencies. This is because in the case of countries such as the UK, the legal norms that 
qualify as cosmopolitan are not just parts of international law or regional customs but 
actually form part of the ius gentium that is integral to the common law.32 This may be 
distinguished from legal ‘statism’ that asserts that the only law is the State’s law, or that the 
prescription by a State is the only legal order valid and effective in a defined territory.33 
 
30. See generally, Raz J ‘Authority, Law and Morality’ (1985) 68 The Monist 295, 296-324. 
31. Post R, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 3. 
32. Walters MD ‘The Common Law Constitution and Legal Cosmopolitanism’ in Dyzenhaus D (Ed), The Unity 
of Public Law (Hart, Oxford, 2004) 451. 
33. La Torre M, Law as Institution (Springer, New York, 2010) 108. 
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Legal Positivism is thus not a restrictive theory of law; it is open to an expansive range of 
putatively valid regulation because, importantly, it admits of a wide range of potentially 
recognizable sources.34 However, there are three principles of Legal Positivism that give it 
some disciplinary boundaries. The first is the ‘social fact’ dimension that holds that legal 
34. Despite the Positivist demand for a firm rule of recognition, the astoundingly wide range of possible sources 
of law is in fact Hart’s second longest footnote in the entire text of The Concept of Law (See the endnote to page 
98, Chapter VI, at p.246 of the 1961 edition). 
[... ] Sources of law. Some writers distinguish ‘formal’ or ‘legal’ from ‘historical’ or ‘material’ 
sources of laws (Salmond, Jurisprudence, 11th ed., chap.v). This is criticized by Allen , Law in 
the Making, 6th ed., p.260, but this distinction, interpreted as a differentiation of two senses of 
the word ‘source’, is important (see Kelsen, General Theory, pp. 131-2, 151-3). In one sense 
(i.e. ‘material’, ‘historical’) a source is simply the causal or historical influences which 
account for the existence of a given rule of law at a given time and place: in this sense the 
source of certain contemporary English rules of law may be rules of Roman law or Canon law 
or even rules of popular morality. But when it is said that ‘statute’ is a source of law, the word 
‘source’ refers not to mere historical or causal influences but to one of the criteria of legal 
validity accepted in the legal system in question. Enactment as a statute by a competent 
legislature is the reason why a given statutory rule is valid law and not merely the cause of its 
existence. This distinction between the historical cause and the reason for the validity of a 
given rule of law can be drawn only where the system contains a rule of recognition, under 
which certain things (enactment by a legislature, customary practice, or precedent) are 
accepted as identifying marks of valid law. 
But this clear distinction between historical or causal sources and legal or formal ones may be 
blurred in actual practice and it is this which has led writers such as Allen (op.cit.) to criticize 
the distinction. In systems where a statute is a formal or legal source of law, a court in 
deciding a case is bound to attend to a relevant statute though no doubt it is left considerable 
freedom in interpreting the meaning of the statutory language (see Chapter VII, s. 1). But 
sometimes much more than freedom of interpretation is left to the judge. Where he considers 
that no statute or other formal source of law determines the case before him, he may base his 
decision on e.g. a text of the Digest, or the writings of a French jurist (see, for example, Allen, 
op.cit., 260 et seq.) The legal system does not require him to use these sources, but it is 
accepted as perfectly proper that he should do so. They are therefore more than merely 
historical or causal influences since such writings are recognized as ‘good reasons’ for 
decisions. Perhaps we might speak of such sources as ‘permissive’ legal sources to distinguish 
them both from ‘mandatory’ legal or formal sources such as statute and from historical or 
material sources.’ 
See also Leiter, Brian, ‘Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered’ (2001) 111 Ethics 278, 278. 
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validity is a matter of facts – not moral judgment; the second is the conventionality 
dimension that advocates that society paves the way to legal validity through social 
convention or generally accepted standards; and thirdly there is what we can refer to as a 
‘separability dimension’  that contrasts  Positivism to  Natural  Law  and  holds  (at least  in 
‘inclusive’ forms of Positivism) that although moral principles may be expressed in and 
through law, morality is not an essential or necessary component of the concept of legal 
validity.35 The Positivist themes developed in this study adopt in this sense, a separability 
dimension. This is, however, a modest separability thesis to the effect that law and morality 
are plainly distinct ideas. This modest approach is in contrast to ‘Hard positivism’ that seeks 
to prohibit the incorporation of moral constraints on legal validity in a legal system. Joseph 
Raz famously insists, in keeping with a source thesis approach, that the existence of the 
content of law is determined by reference to its sources without the need to consider or refer 
to moral argument.36 In addition, ‘hard’ positivists have the view that in certain 
circumstances moral constraints and standards can be deliberated upon; however, they cannot 
be regarded as law or incorporated in to law. But there is something unsatisfying about the 
‘hard’ positivist account of the relationship between law and morality. 
The law on a question is settled when legally binding sources provide its solution. In 
such cases judges are typically said to apply the law, and since it is source-based, its 
application involves technical, legal skills in reasoning from those sources and does 
not call for moral acumen. If a legal question is not answered by standards deriving 
 
35. Hart HLA ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 593-594; 
Klaus F ‘Farewell to “Legal Positivism’: The Separation Thesis Unravelling’ in George RP (Ed), The Autonomy 
of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) 119, 120. 
36. Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1979, p. 47) 
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from legal sources then it lacks a legal answer - the law on such questions is unsettled. 
In deciding such cases courts inevitably break new (legal) ground and their decision 
develops the law.... Naturally, their decisions in such cases rely at least partly on 
moral and other extra-legal considerations.37 
If an issue can be resolved by a judge by merely applying previous court decisions, then it is 
clear to say that the issue is settled by law. If this is not the case, then the issue is simply 
unsettled. Where the judge may look to moral standards here, she is simply going beyond the 
law. But in what sense are we to understand the ‘development’38 of the law? 
It is true that ‘soft’ positivists such as Hart would countenance the incorporation of morals 
within laws. That is why he argued that ‘the rule of recognition may incorporate as criteria of 
legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values … such as the Sixteenth 
or Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution respecting the establishment of 
religion or abridgements of the right to vote.’39 Hence, although the separability dimension 
produces a tension here, it must be acknowledged that there are moral pressures that create 
the need for legal validity.40 Indeed, Klaus tells us that a separability thesis which holds that 
law must be strictly unburdened by moral ideas will entail immense problems for any viable 
discourse. Any mention of morality in the operation of law would not be compatible with the 
basic tenets of Positivism. But this should not lead us to infer that identifying and assessing 
 
37. Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid, 250. 
40. Ibid. 
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legal reasoning and the operation of legal institutions cannot be seen as a qualitatively 
distinct investigation from the study of morality and culture bearing upon legislation – after 
all, the weather has a bearing on the development of legislation. 
The motivation, therefore, for adopting a ‘modest’ separability thesis’ is to avoid the artificial 
imposition of philosophically generated semantic restrictions on a discourse that is, in other 
than ‘hard’ positivist terms, plainly coherent and understandable. My remit is simply to 
identify the documented responses of legislators and courts to the threat posed by piracy and 
relate these to an empirical account of the plausibly related consequences. Normatively 
speaking, the recommendations in this study are intended to relate to the nature and operation 
of the piracy laws, and one must acknowledge not only that this will inevitably touch upon 
moral considerations extraneous to legal materials, but that some of these considerations 
might relate more or less directly to the particular and contingent cultural norms of the 
regions dealing with the phenomenon of piracy. I have already acknowledged that the 
exploration of the cultural context of laws is a valuable aspect of social and legal research; 
but I am not primarily aiming to propose a better system of non-legal norms. Hart noted that 
the separation or separability thesis is no more than the ‘simple’ contention that, ‘It is in no 
sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in 
fact they have often done so.’41 Thus, although this study accepts that piracy laws are 
culturally embedded, and that it would be foolish to imagine that one could quarantine one’s 
inquiries in respect of pristinely distinct realms of legal and cultural (moral) phenomena, by 
the same token, it is surely possible to speak coherently and specifically about one, rather 
than the other. The research does not focus, prioritize or even give equal weight to the 
 
41. Hart HLA, The Concept of Law (2nd Edition, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994) 181-182.  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influence of culture and morality, given that the courts do not enforce the culture, but do seek 
to enforce enacted laws. 
1.5 The Lacuna in the Literature 
We noted earlier that there is a gap in the literature and in the thinking about the effect of 
piracy on the littoral States and on the user states in the Gulf of Guinea. The problem arises 
from the contradiction between acknowledging the enforcement rights of littoral states, yet 
failing to acknowledge the discrepancies between these states in respect of the resources 
required for enforcement of these rights. This detachment in thinking leaves space for new 
and innovative research to assess the most efficient and effective ways to balance the 
responsibilities of securing the Gulf of Guinea. This could lead to a better mode of 
cooperation based on the common perception of threat that is shared amongst the littoral 
States and further between the littoral and user States. This thesis argues that such a situation 
could be managed in a way where the security issue could be resolved in the Gulf of Guinea 
without violating the national sovereignty of the littoral States. 
The concept of multilateralism is assessed on two levels, one on the principle of universality 
and the other on the cosmopolitan theory. The thesis adopts the cosmopolitan theory in a bid 
to reconcile the universality of customary international law and the partiality of positive law. 
Thus a multilateral approach, whereby utilising a cosmopolitan approach supplements both 
national and international law by remedying its insufficiencies. 
This implies that an exclusive focus on the State with territorial jurisdiction would be 
ineffective in combatting piracy where they lack enforcement or prescriptive jurisdiction, and  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it is imperative that a multilateral approach is adopted. Nonetheless, this does not imply that 
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction is more appropriate. Thus it supports the argument to the 
effect that piracy may be effectively contained where extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited 
only to cases where the crime allegedly committed constitutes a clear violation of a 
peremptory norm or jus cogens and where the State with territorial jurisdiction or the flag 
State consents to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by another State. It also 
reinforces the argument in favour of adopting a doctrinal or positivist approach, as well as 
cosmopolitan, whereby the flag State or home State of the company that owns the vessel 
would have jurisdiction if the attack occurred in a place where no other State has jurisdiction. 
Further, universal jurisdiction does not provide any credible solution to the problem of piracy 
as the court system is a problem. 
Analysing this from a contextually jurisprudential approach means that it narrowed down to 
the applicable statutes and judicial decisions as responses to the problem of piracy, and 
therefore only the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction is analysed through the 
legislative approach. The effects of the laws and focused upon than the provisions and 
constructs. In addition, discussions surrounding the rationale of a regional International 
Tribunal to punish the offenders of piracy have been put forward, in order for a consistent 
approach being used when hearing such cases. In summary, identifying the gap in the 
literature points to the need for a re-contextualization of an existing technique (doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction in Somalia) in a new setting (Gulf of Guinea). 
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1.5.1 Table: Mapping of Original Contribution 
In line with the doctoral assessment guidelines which requires an original contribution as one 
of the outcomes of the research, the table below is intended to provide a mapping of the areas 
where original contribution to the debate occurs in this dissertation. 
 
 
Original contribution to knowledge in the Chapter of contribution 
field 
 
Adopts a cosmopolitan theory in a bid to             Chapter 3, 4 
reconcile the universality of customary 
international law and the partiality of positive 
law 
 
Proposes the rationale for an International Chapter 6 
Tribunal 
 
Recommendations based on research findings Chapter 7 
 
1.6 Conceptual Framework and Research Design 
The conceptual framework of the research is represented below in a diagrammatic form 
illustrating the link between the dissertation aims and objectives, the research questions, the 
methodology and the research contribution. These four aspects of the research are then 
plotted against the various chapters showing where each aspect occurs in the dissertation.  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1.7 Chapter Outline 
This report is divided into chapters, sections and subsections. The table below provides a 
summary of the various issues discussed in the constitutive chapters of the report. 
Chapter Outline
I. Introduction • Discusses the theoretical background of the 
study 
• Introduces the objectives of the study and 
questions that the researched sought to 
answer 
• Outlines the gap in literature and maps out 
the original contribution 
• Provides a chapter outline
II. The Evolution of Maritime Piracy: Legal 
and Historical Analysis
• Discusses the history and causes of piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea 
• Shows the link between the ambiguity of 
the term ‘piracy’ and the confusion about 
the status of the pirates captured at sea 
• Demonstrates the importance of the 
positivist approach and cosmopolitanism in 
prosecuting
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III. Maritime Piracy under International Law: 
The Question of Jurisdiction
• Critically analyses the concepts of universal 
jurisdiction and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
• Examines the risks associated with 
undermining the Importance of Westphalian 
principles to jurisdictional frameworks 
• Determines the limits of national criminal 
jurisdiction under public international law as 
regards prosecuting pirates 
• Reinforces the argument that the strict 
doctrinal or positivist approach must be 
adhered to as a prerequisite for arresting an 
prosecuting pirates
IV. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea • Explains the high level of piratical attacks 
in the Gulf of Guinea and identifies security 
challenges facing States in the region 
• Critically analyses the multilateral approach 
that has been adopted by States in the 
region to contain piracy
V. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden • Explains the high level of piratical attacks 
in the Gulf of Aden and identifies security 
challenges facing States in the region 
• Critically analyses the multilateral approach 
that has been adopted by States in the 
region to contain piracy
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VI. The Prosecution of Pirates and the Case 
for an International Tribunal
• Discusses the impediments to the 
prosecution of pirates in Staes with 
territorial jurisdiction 
• Examines international efforts at enhancing 
the prosecution of pirates 
• Develops the argument for the establishment 
of an International Tribunal
VII. Conclusion • Concludes the study by showing how the 
objectives were achieved and questions 
answered 
• Provides a summary on the discussion of 
the structure and functioning of the 
International Tribunal proposed as a 
solution to the problem of the prosecution 
of pirates
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EVOLUTION OF MARITIME PIRACY: A LEGAL AND 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
‘For most of their history, pirates had to be the enemies of some before becoming the enemies 
of all.’42 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite longstanding efforts to develop strategies and legal instruments to counter the 
phenomenon, it remains a major concern to stakeholders of the maritime industry, including 
coastal States. Different types of piracy exist in different regions of the world, creating 
different types of victim and different effects on economies. This heterogeneity of the 
phenomenon hinders the attempt to establish international strategies aimed at consistent and 
coherent prosecution and sanctioning of pirates across the globe. This Chapter undertakes a 
legal and historical analysis of the evolution of maritime piracy in order to explore the major 
factors that compromise the enforcement of international law. The objective is to work 
towards an appropriate response to maritime piracy that takes account of the sovereignty of 
the coastal State, yet which does not deny the international community the right to intervene 
when and where coastal States are either unwilling or unable to arrest and prosecute pirates. 
I turn first to an account of the problems arising from the attempt to define piracy for the 
purpose of stabilising the legal conception of the offence. I will show that the unduly 
 
42. Lauren Benton, 'Toward a New Legal History of Piracy: Maritime Legalities and the Myth of Universal 
Jurisdiction' (2011) XXIII(1) International Journal of Maritime History, 240 
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restrictive definition has hampered the efficacy of the legal response. This theoretical point 
introduces some historical observation on late mediaeval piracy in the Aegean and 
Mediterranean seas to the present day in the Horn of Africa. I then discuss attempts to codify 
the rules of customary international law on piracy, placing an emphasis on the provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
In summary Chapter 2 aims to: 
• Discuss the history and causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea 
• Shows the link between the ambiguity of the term ‘piracy’ and the confusion about the 
status of pirates captured at sea 
• Demonstrate the importance of a positivist (‘modest separability’ thesis) approach and 
cosmopolitanism in prosecuting pirates
In pursuing these aims, Chapter 2 seeks to address the following question and concern of the 
dissertation as stated in Chapter 1 supra; i.e.: 
[...] the approach to the definition of the term ‘piracy’ in a maritime context 
for analytical purposes. Currently, there are legal issues related to what might 
be seen as an overly restrictive technical definition of the offence, and which 
have compromised the arrest and prosecution of alleged pirates in several 
instances. The concept appropriate to the critical commentary and to the 
empirical aspects of the research project takes the technical legal definition as 
part of its subject matter, and thus is important to propose a definition that is 
less ambiguous and does not rely on terms that are open to several 
interpretations.  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2.2 Conceptualising the Offence of Piracy 
The sea is both a highway and an international border, and violence that occurs in this setting 
often falls in the grey area between military combat and civilian conflict. Thus there is a 
natural uncertainty about how to characterise actions and their perpetrators at sea. An attack 
on a ship originating in one country in the maritime territory of another country could be an 
sovereign act of defending territory – or of initiating military aggression against another 
country, or an intervention by enforcement officers on a vessel (home or foreign) suspected 
of committing some offence prohibited by that State, or simply a commercially criminal 
assault upon a vessel and the persons operating it regardless of its or their origins, purposes, 
nationality or territorial location. This latter seems to be closer to the idea of piracy, but even 
in these few permutations we can see the source of uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding 
decisions relating to legality per se, and in particular, to issues of detention, trial, or rendition 
of persons and property apprehended to countries making claims to jurisdiction over the types 
of actions and events just described. Over the years national courts, parliaments and 
international bodies have defined the term in many different ways. Todd notes that the word 
‘piracy’ has been applied to a variety of unlawful acts over the centuries, including plunder, 
robbery and murder; although it is mostly used today to describe an attack without lawful 
authority against a vessel at sea for the purpose of plunder.43 Kelley also notes that although 
the term ‘piracy’ bore many definitions over the centuries, it has generally been regarded as 
crimes on the high seas that were punished swiftly and harshly.44 
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What distinguishes piracy from other crimes that might be committed on the high seas (such 
as terrorism) is the motive of the attacker. However, there is a fine line between piracy and 
terrorism given that they are both unlawful activities that require States and other geostrategic 
entities to harmonise their interests and approaches to policy.45 Some international 
instruments that deal with violence on the high seas such as the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988 (SUA) 
focus on ‘terrorism aboard or against ships.’46 However, terrorism is a more specific notion 
and presents a bigger challenge as regards the implementation of international legal norms. In 
the case of United States v Yousef, the Court held that 47 
Customary international law currently does not provide for the prosecution of 
“terrorist” acts under the universality principle, in part due to the failure of 
States to achieve anything like consensus on the definition of terrorism. 
There is scope for more clarity and certainty in defining piracy as a particular type of 
unlawful attack not least because it should be possible to avoid the impasse of wrangling over 
the legitimacy of instances of political violence from a plurality of ideological perspectives. 
Kontorovich, perhaps formalistically, therefore describes piracy as ‘the paradigmatic crime 
for which international law authorizes and even requires universal enforcement and 
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punishment.’ Nonetheless, piracy is the not only the concern of international law. Fakhry 
argues cogently that the definitional problem stems from the fact that there are two sources of 
our legal understanding of definitions, one based on international law and one based on 
municipal law.48 He says that that international law restricts the concept since it does not 
apply to attacks perpetrated in territorial or internal waters.49 On the other hand, municipal 
laws where piracy laws have been incorporated, whether criminal or private (carriage of 
goods by sea and insurance), emphasise the traditional approach to piracy that is, punishing 
attacks on a vessel irrespective of the vessel, location and perpetrator. However, this 
conception of municipal law is generic or at least focused on English law, and does not help 
in the examination of the problem of piracy in countries with insufficient laws such as those 
in the Horn of Africa or Gulf of Guinea. It is true that the international law of piracy does not 
extend to maritime terrorism (since it is restricted to acts committed for private ends); 
however, ideological attacks perpetrated in internal or coastal waters are still within the 
jurisdiction of Coastal and flag States. 
When talking of ‘international law’ the definition often referred to is that of Article 101 of 
UNCLOS, which is to the effect that ‘piracy’ comprises ‘any illegal acts of violence or 
detention, or any act of deportation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers 
of a private ship or a private aircraft.’ This definition was taken with only minor changes 
from Article 15 of the High Seas Convention 1958, which in turn was taken from the articles 
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of the International Law Commission on the law of the sea.50 The Commission’s articles 
were also based on Article 3 of the Harvard Research in International Law Draft Convention 
on Piracy.51 
It has been argued that the term ‘private ends’ is not restrictive as generally contended when 
examined in context. The argument here is that the term was used to refer to ‘gains or other 
private ends of the doers’52 which simply implies the ‘piratical intent to plunder.’53 Thus, 
what is important is that violence was perpetrated on the high seas without a government 
commission or letter of marque. This implies that the permission of a State and interpretation 
by courts (usually domestic courts) actually determines whether an act constitutes piracy. 
Hence, maritime piracy is a transnational and international problem that is resolved from a 
national perspective. Nonetheless, some countries have simply integrated the provisions of 
UNCLOS in their domestic legislation. For example, Article 101 of UNCLOS was integrated 
in Section 26 of the UK Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997. Where such an 
integration has not been done, it is expected that the term ‘piracy’ under a municipal law will 
be much broader. The Privy Council for example defined piracy as ‘any armed violence at sea 
which is not a lawful act of war.’54 Such a broad definition certainly overlaps with the 
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scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA) which focuses on maritime terrorism. 
From a legal viewpoint, the definitional problem is also related to the fact that modern pirates 
tend to operate in regions with large coastal areas, small national naval forces, and weak 
regional security cooperation mechanisms, where the laws of the coastal or territorial States 
are largely insufficient.55 Sometimes the governments are either too weak or non-existent, 
corruption is rampant, and impoverished coastal communities act autonomously.56 In this 
regard, Article 100 of UNCLOS is important given that it provides a mechanism for maritime 
piracy suppression that requires the participation of more States than the coastal or territorial 
States in providing navigation security or safety. In fact, all the States that have ratified the 
Convention have the obligation to participate and cooperate in efforts to combat maritime 
piracy. Article 14 provides that ‘All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State.’ 
In light of the above, it may be said that according to UNCLOS, which is deemed to be a 
codification of customary law,57 only the occupants of a ship who commit a violent act 
against the occupants or cargo of the other ships may be called pirates. Thus, if the crew of a 
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ship or the passenger of the ship takes some kind of action against their own ship they would 
not be called pirates. Also, piracy is deemed to be an international crime that requires an 
international solution. This contention is based on the thesis by Cicero which is to the effect 
that a pirate is not included in the list of lawful enemies, but is the common enemy of all; and 
pirates and other men there ought to be neither mutual faith nor binding oath.”58 He then said 
pirates ought to be regarded as hostis humani generis, which may be translated as ‘common 
enemies of mankind’. 
What is problematic is the fact that States that are not flag States and do not have a territorial 
claim may have enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction. It is important to note that a State 
generally has jurisdiction only within its territory. In the landmark Lotus Case (France v 
Turkey), the ICJ held that a State ‘jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by 
a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international 
custom or from a convention.’59 This is no doubt a ‘positivistic’ (although pre-Hart)60 
approach that is essentially deferential to the traditional understanding of State consent. As 
shown in subsequent chapters, the opinio juris has since evolved to the point where 
international law is said to be neutral on the international lawfulness of certain acts or 
omissions. It is argued here that it has evolved beyond the clarity provided by the positivist 
approach. Thus, consistency and clarity may best be achieved by returning to the positivist 
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approach whereby jurisdiction is essentially territorial and can only be exercised by a State 
outside its territory if it obtains the consent of the territorial State (perhaps via a Convention) 
or it is in accordance with a permissive rule derived from international custom.61 This implies 
that the term ‘piracy’ ought to be defined in accordance with the laws of the territorial State or 
States with enforcement jurisdiction, and the provisions of UNCLOS (where the territorial 
State is a signatory). It is difficult to envisage an approach that ensures more clarity and 
consistency. In order to understand the importance of this approach, it is important to analyse 
the historical development of maritime piracy as a special type of crime. 
2.3 Some Historical Observations 
The history of maritime piracy, as noted, is co-extensive with maritime trade. Seafaring 
raiders from southern Europe threatened the Aegean and Mediterranean seas in the 14th 
century BC.62 Pirates attacked Roman ships and seized their cargoes, grain and olive oil. In 
this period the Phoenicians were also specialized in kidnapping boys and girls on their 
voyages who were then sold as slaves. Piratical acts were also frequent in the 8th Century BC, 
which was known as the Classical Antiquity period of piracy, where the Illyrians, 
Tyrrhenians, Greeks, Romans, and Phoenicians attacked and plundered vessels in coastal 
waters and on the high seas.63 By the 3rd century BC, the most notorious pirates were the 
Illyrians who regularly raided the Adriatic Sea. They were then confronted by forces of the 
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Roman Republic that conquered Illyria in 168 BC, and as a result the unlawful practice was 
eradicated from the area.64 As such, from the perspective of the leaders of the Roman 
Republic, they had enforcement jurisdiction owing to their territorial claim of Illyria. Thus, 
they arrested and sanctioned the Illyrian pirates on the grounds that they perpetrated unlawful 
acts within the Roman territory. This implies that piracy was only eradicated because of the 
link between State authority and the State’s claim over a particular geographical territory. 
In the 1st century BC, an important contingent of pirates began to operate in Cilicia along the 
Anatolian Coast and threatened the trade of the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean. This 
was outside the Empire’s territorial jurisdiction. Prior to the establishment of a sophisticated 
pirate network along the Anatolian Coast, Julius Caesar who was 25 years old at the time and 
travelling to Rhodes, was captured by Cilician pirates on the Aegean Sea.65 The pirates 
demanded 20 talents of silver (620 kg of silver or 600,000 in today’s US dollars). After the 
ransom was paid and Caesar freed, he captured the pirates, took all their possessions, as well 
as the fifty talents of silver. He then delivered the pirates to the authorities at the prison in 
Pergamum and travelled to meet the proconsul of Asia, Marcus Junius, to petition to have the 
pirates executed. The proconsul objected. Caesar travelled back to Pergamum and ordered 
that the pirates should be crucified under his own authority. Although the insurgents became 
aware of the penalty of such criminal activities, Caesar had exercised criminal jurisdiction of 
an extraterritorial nature. However, given that ever increasing size of the Roman Empire no 
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sovereignty problems concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction were raised until after the fall of 
the Empire and the rise of smaller European kingdoms with recognised boundaries.66 
There were several prominent piratical attacks in the ensuing centuries. During the period of 
258-264 AD, towns along the Black Sea coast and Aegean coast, and towns reaching into 
Cyprus and Crete were looted by Gothic pirates. In 286 AD, a military commander was 
appointed by the Romans to eliminate the Frankish and Saxon pirates. In 450 AD, Irish 
pirates captured and enslaved the famous Irish saint St. Patrick. Thus, the motivation of the 
pirates had evolved from simply plundering or stealing cargo. Between 700 AD and 1100, a 
period known as the medieval ages of piracy, the Vikings were notorious for attacking and 
plundering vessels at sea.67 The name ‘Viking’ comes from a language called 'Old Norse' and 
means ’a pirate raid.’ When the Germanic Norse seafarers went off raiding ships, it was 
known to be said that they were ‘going Viking’. However, the motivation was not always to 
steal. For more than one century, the Vikings carried on with the piratical activities of stealing 
treasure and fighting, whilst many of them settled in the new lands as farmers, craftsmen or 
traders.68 
The period between 1620 and 1720 saw piracy flourish into its ‘golden age’.69 Different 
categories of personnel emerged during this period: privateers, buccaneers and corsairs. 
However, privateers were classed as being lawful pirates authorized by their governments 
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through a licence known as a ‘letter of marque’ which allowed for enemy ships to be attacked 
and pillaged. The licence was to grant a form of immunity because punishment for such an 
offence was death. Privateer’s profits were shared with the government. The most famous 
privateer of this time was Sir Francis Drake. Buccaneers on the other hand were a 
combination of pirates and privateers who operated from a base in the West Indies. These 
buccaneers were known for attacking Spanish ships in the Caribbean.70 Corsairs were either 
Muslim or Christian pirates active in the Mediterranean. Barbary corsairs were Muslim 
pirates operating solely from the North African States of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and Morocco 
given authority by their government to attack the ships of Christian countries. On the other 
hand, the Maltese Corsairs were Christian and were granted a licence by the Christian 
Knights of St John to attack the ‘barbarian’ Turks.71 
Some historians such as Von Martens sought to distinguish between ‘privateers’ and ‘pirates’ in 
the 18th Century. He wrote that the privateer operated in a context of war and captured ships with 
a commission or letter of marque from a State, unlike the pirate that had no authority and 
plundered regardless of war or peace.72 He however conceded that both terms were used 
indiscriminately prior to the 18th Century and many privateers became pirates.73 As such, piracy, 
whether by independent or State-sponsored criminals, was prevalent during that 
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time because the acts of these varied ‘pirates’ were often indistinguishable from warfare as 
princes were strictly responsible for the acts of piracy of their subjects.74 The princes were 
for example required to protect seaborne trade by defending the coastal areas. Their duties in 
this respect became known as ‘keeping the sea’ or the ‘safeguard of the sea’. Fulfilling these 
duties at the time was particularly challenging given the level of technology. The fact many 
economies depended on the revenues of coastal trade made it pressing for governments to 
provide security at sea against both pirates and foreign armies. As such, the word ‘piracy’ as 
understood then was not restricted to the unlawful acts of plunderers on the high seas. Rodger 
therefore noted that the word is applied with caution in the medieval context given that the 
high seas were generally deemed to be ‘a lawless realm beyond the frontiers of all nations, 
where neither law nor truce nor treaty ran.’75 Piracy was simply deemed to be synonymous 
with disorder. The English Offences at Sea Act 1536 for example made piracy a felony but 
did not define the term. Thus, the statute was enforced against any violence at sea not deemed 
to be a lawful act of war.76 
From the above, it may be said that the authority of the State played an important role in 
shaping the concept of piracy, given that some of those who attacked and plundered vessels 
on the high seas had a mandate from their government. These pirates were not self-funded 
criminals that sought to achieve only private ends. The activities that might have been linked 
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to piracy moved further afield from the Mediterranean when, in the early 19th century, 
Chinese pirates emerged. They were active in the waters of Strait of Malacca, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Malaysia.77 Piracy became a global phenomenon and a major problem for 
international commerce although it was difficult to fix a meaning to the term that was 
accepted across the board. 
Today, there are several hot spots for piracy including the Gulf of Aden, the Somali coast 
(Horn of Africa), the Gulf of Guinea, Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean. This study 
focuses on the causes of the rise in maritime piracy in these distinct areas of Africa. 
Although, as I have explained earlier, we face challenges in reaching a precise legal 
conception of piracy, there is in a sense less ambiguity surrounding contemporary activity 
than was the case in earlier times. Pirates no longer set out to plunder ships on the high sea 
for private profit with a commission from their home States. However, tackling this problem 
remains a major international security challenge because of the question of jurisdiction. From 
the historical development, it is clear that most States favoured what we can refer to as the 
pre-Hartian positivist approach of linking enforcement jurisdiction to territorial jurisdiction. 
However, the severity of the crimes committed by pirates and the inability or unwillingness 
of territorial States to arrest and sanction pirates has led to the shift towards expanding the 
jurisdictional reach of States that do not have territorial jurisdiction. This is how the Supreme 
Court of the United States justified the State’s assertion of jurisdiction of an extraterritorial 
nature in United States S v Smith: 
So that, whether we advert to writers on the common law, or the maritime law, 
or the law of nations, we shall find that they universally treat piracy as an 
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offence against the law of nations, and that its true definition by that law is 
robbery upon the sea. And the general practice of all nations in punishing all 
persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this offence 
against any persons whatsoever, with whom they are in amity, is a conclusive 
proof that the offence is supposed to depend, not upon the particular 
provisions of any municipal code, but upon the law of nations, both for its 
definition and punishment.78 
In line with this, the US Congress in 1909 passed an Act: To Codify, Revise and Amend the 
Penal Laws of the United States which provided that: 
‘Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law 
of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall 
be imprisoned for life.’ 79 
The implementation of this approach of universal jurisdiction is however confronted with two 
problems, namely ascertaining the definition of the ‘law of nations’ and requiring the United 
States to arrest the pirate and bring him to the United States for trial. Thus, the law of nations 
in this case are said to be the provisions of UNCLOS upon the high seas. In such an instance, 
it is difficult to ascertain the approach that will be adopted where the territorial State has not 
ratified the Convention. Also, as regards States exercising universal jurisdiction, it is 
uncertain whether the accused pirate who is tried in a foreign State may challenge the legality 
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of the process in his home State. Where emphasis is placed on universal jurisdiction, several 
States may assert legal jurisdiction depending on the specifics of the attack. One State may 
assert jurisdiction due to the location of the attack, another due to the nationalities of the 
victims (i.e. crew), another due to the country of registry of the vessel, and another on the 
basis of Article 14 of UNCLOS requiring all signatory States to participate in the arrest and 
prosecution of the pirates. 
Piracy will thrive in a permissive political environment. Such an environment would exhibit a 
lack of resources of the local State’s security forces, cultural acceptability, and the 
opportunity for reward. Maritime piracy is inherently dangerous, but it remains a profitable 
activity and worth the risk for thousands of unemployed people living in desperately poor and 
often instable countries.80 Thus, piracy stems from internal problems and shortcomings, and 
it may be argued that for acts of piracy to be supressed, the solution must come from within 
the coastal State. This reinforces the contention that the obligation to act should be on the 
coastal State. The historical background above shows that although cooperation between 
States was imperative, piracy was effectively suppressed because the coastal States asserted 
jurisdiction. The next section examines some key international instruments in order to 
determine the effectiveness of the current positive international law. 
2.4 Codification Efforts in the International Arena 
During the era of the League of Nations there was an attempt to provide a general agreement 
on maritime piracy. An Assembly Resolution of 1924 was passed and the League appointed a 
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sub- committee of its Committee of Experts for the progressive codification of International 
law. In a report named the Matsuda Report, the subcommittee stated that ‘according to 
international law, piracy consists in sailing the seas for private ends without authorisation 
from the government of any State with the object of committing depredations upon property 
or acts of violence against persons.’ However, this definition did not deal with an armed 
rising of the crew with the object of seizing the ship on the high seas, and as a result was not 
deemed to be an adequate definition of piracy.81 
A questionnaire on piracy consisting of the Matsuda Report and the Matsuda’s draft 
provisions for the suppression of piracy was submitted to a number of States. Many of them 
did not acknowledge the desirability or the possibility of a convention on the question. Some 
criticized the Report and even the transmission of Report to States because of ‘the present 
immature stage’, not of the subject in itself, but of the Report. 
Efforts by the League ultimately fizzled out and the subject was dropped from conferences 
for two reasons: first, piracy seemed not to be an urgent problem, and secondly, it was not 
likely that an agreement would be reached. As a result, from this point onwards until the 
development of any codified law, prosecutors had to rely on practice and identify the ‘proper 
law’ under consideration whether it was municipal or international law. Eventually, the 
customs observed by many States found their way into the modern law of the sea sometime 
in the 20th century. Customary international law as regards piracy was established by Article 
15 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and Article 101 of UNCLOS. They created a 
unique framework for an international regime for the suppression of piracy by adopting the 
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doctrine of universal jurisdiction requiring all signatory States to capture and prosecute 
pirates they find on the high seas. Articles 3 and 56(1) of UNCLOS define the high seas as all 
parts of the sea, excluding the internal or territorial waters of a State, which extend out 12 
nautical miles and the EEZ, which extends out 200 miles. Thus, the high seas include the 
EEZ as well for the purposes of piracy under UNCLOS. 
As noted, the provisions enshrined in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas were based on 
the International Law Commission’s (ILC) draft convention and later inserted into UNCLOS. 
The latter is the most recent legislation that deals with the crime of maritime piracy and has 
been signed by 157 States. Thus, it is generally considered to be reflective of customary 
international law. This is based on the multilateral recognition of the customs enshrined in the 
Convention. It is akin to multilateralism or the ‘international governance of the many’.82 
Although this has the advantage of minimising ‘bilateral discriminatory arrangements that [are] 
believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international 
conflict,’83 the fact that many States endorse a particular approach does not necessarily make it 
just. This is especially the case where facts are assessed with a cosmopolitan view of global 
justice whereby international institutions are deemed to be at the service of moral ideals rather 
than the interests of States.84 It follows from here that those that endorse multilateralism also 
favour relational statism whereby emphasis is placed on States pursuing their self-interests in a 
reasonably fair manner. On the other hand, those that believe 
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that multilateralism does not always provide the most apposite solutions to international legal 
problems, favour cosmopolitanism and the positivist approach of territorial jurisdiction. The 
arguments put forward in this thesis are more in line with the latter stance. The shortcomings 
of multilateralism and statism are seen in the implementation of international conventions 
that have been ratified by most States across the globe such as UNCLOS 
2.4.1 The Implementation of UNCLOS 
The definition of piracy in section 101 of UNCLOS raises problems in regard to the arrest 
and prosecution of alleged pirates. An important ingredient of the act of piracy is the 
contribution of ‘any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation.’ Whilst 
violence constitutes an essential part to be proved, there remains a problem as to what types 
of violence may amount to piracy. It may be argued that murder on board a vessel alone could 
suffice.85 However, violence can be directed to persons or property on board. Also, an 
attempt to commit an illegal act is not included in the definition of piracy.86 As such, there is 
much confusion as regards the implementation of the provisions of UNCLOS by municipal 
courts. In United States v Said,87 for example, the government attempted to prosecute 
individuals who had unsuccessfully attacked a US Navy dock ship for acts of piracy 
committed in the Horn of Africa, and the court held that ‘piracy’ as defined by ‘the law of 
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nations’ (UNCLOS) requires a robbery on the high seas. Thus, the individuals could be 
prosecuted only for the offence of committing violence against a person on a vessel. 
However, in United States v Hassan,88 the court held that the definition of ‘piracy’ according 
to the law of nations (UNCLOS) does not require an actual robbery at sea; thus, the 
defendants who had unsuccessfully attacked a US Navy frigate could be prosecuted for 
piracy. 
Despite this, it may be said that courts would generally lean towards the idea that piracy 
includes both violence and an attempt to commit violence. In Ahmed v Republic,89 the 
Kenyan Principal Magistrate noted that piracy under Article 101 of UNCLOS consists of 
‘violence, detention, and the causing of harm or damage’ amongst other acts. However, it is 
uncertain why the term ‘piracy’ as defined by UNCLOS has to be interpreted broadly. As 
noted above, the delegates at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea did not 
intend the definition to include attempts given that a proposal from the British delegation to 
this effect was defeated. Equally, in United States v Said, the court noted that the accused 
could be tried for other offences such as attack to plunder a vessel (punishable by a prison 
term of 20 years in the United States), acts of violence against persons on a vessel (also 
punishable by an imprisonment term of 20 years in the United States), and conspiracy to 
perform acts of violence against a person on a vessel. The divergent decisions of the US and 
Kenyan courts above shows that customary international law is sometimes ambiguous, and 
reliance on multilateralism and universal jurisdiction may be dangerous. This is because the 
courts of the coastal State and home State of the vessel may interpret the customary 
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international law rule differently, leading to challenges of the legality of their decisions. 
However, where emphasis is on territorial jurisdiction there is room for less confusion since 
precedent will be set by the most superior court of the coastal State. 
The implementation of UNCLOS is also problematic as regards the ‘private ends’ 
requirement.90 Unlawful acts must be ‘committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or private aircraft.’ It is uncertain what constitutes an illegal act 
being committed for ‘private ends.’ This is particularly difficult as the money gained from the 
piratical act could be attached to many political aspects such as financing terrorism. As such, 
the simple distinction between the two different but related concepts is that in order for 
marine terrorism to occur it needs to be committed with a ‘political motive’, while maritime 
piracy must be committed for ‘private ends.’91 
This implies that private ends do not include any illegal acts carried out for political purposes 
and motives. Political motive in this context may be defined as ‘of or relating to the 
government or public affairs of a country.’92 As a result, in order to understand if an act has 
been committed for private or political purposes the motives of the offender must be 
ascertained. Given that the term ‘political’ is rather broad; the drafters of the Convention 
intended that a violent act on board a vessel should be deemed piratical if it was not backed 
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by any authority.93 This means that the acts of privateers in the 18th and 19th centuries would 
not be considered piratical since they carried a letter of marquee and their profits were shared 
with the State. This is reasonable on the grounds that the State that issues a letter of marquee 
to a privateer ought to be held responsible. 
The legislation confines piratical acts ‘by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or 
private aircraft.’ A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if the dominant person 
in control intends it to be used for the purposes of committing acts referred to in the definition 
of piracy set out under 101 UNCLOS as any ‘acts of violence.’ These vessels and aircraft on 
military or government service or insurgents are in support of a political cause. Thus, if a 
military or governmental ship or aircraft is taken over and operated by pirates, or if the crew 
of these types of ship decide to mutiny and employ the ship or aircraft for piratical purposes, 
then, it might be argued, legal stipulations of what constitutes piracy do extend to this 
situation as set out under Article 102 UNCLOS. On the other hand, there has been much 
debate in this regard about the actions of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. This is a 
non-profit organization that seeks to protect marine life. Its vessels seize, scuttle or disable 
whaling vessels solely for the conservationist purpose of preventing whaling and seal 
hunting. One would not automatically regard this as a piratical act, but this raises two issues 
in relation to the deficiencies of drafting in this regard. One is that we would assume that 
piracy (as plunder) suggests unlawful gain or profit, whereas the environmentalists can be 
seen as self-less, unpaid guardians of our environmental well-being. This is contentious either 
way as we shall see below. But, from an entirely different perspective, unilateral acts of 
environmental activism (even if it is action against persons or companies breaking pollution 
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or conservation laws enacted by a state) runs close to the notion of terrorism. Also, it is 
uncertain whether anything not sanctioned by a government may be said to constitute private 
ends. Sea Shepherds do not fit in to the traditional paradigm of piracy because it may be 
argued that their goals are political, viz., protecting marine animals and the environment. 
Nonetheless, they do not act on a mandate from a government. 
In the Belgian case of Castle John v NV Babeco,94 Greenpeace, an environmental group, took 
action against two Dutch Vessels on the high seas. The Dutch vessels released toxic waste 
into the sea. Greenpeace employees boarded, occupied and caused damage to the Dutch 
vessels. The Court of Cassation ruled that the acts committed by Greenpeace were for ‘private 
ends’ and therefore constituted an act of piracy. In other words, Greenpeace had attacked and 
damaged a private ship in order to achieve private gain.95 
In a subsequent case of Cetecean v Sea Shepherds96 in the United States, activists working for 
Sea Shepherds targeted and attacked Cetecean, a whaling research ship of Japan’s Institute of 
Cetacean Research that was conducting studies in the Southern Ocean. Judge Kozinski held 
that Sea Shepherds had satisfied the “private ends” requirement of UNCLOS. He noted that 
that Sea Shepherds may be considered pirates under international law, regardless of their 
political and non-pecuniary motivation: 
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You don’t need a peg leg or an eye patch. When you ram ships, hurl glass containers 
of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage propellers and rudders; 
launch smoke bombs and flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at other 
ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no matter how high-minded you believe your 
purpose to be.97 
Kontorovich, in echoing Kozinski’s view argues that the relevant distinction under UNCLOS 
is between on the one hand, private ends committed by private parties, and on the other, acts 
committed by governments. Kontorovich says: 
It does not turn on whether the actor’s motives are pecuniary, political, operating 
under mistake of fact, or simply insane. Private ends are those ends held by private 
parties. The converse is also true: a government-owned ship in government service 
cannot commit piracy even if it attacks another vessel solely to enrich itself. 
Kontorovich’s argument is that as long as Sea Shepherds were acting as private parties - and 
not governmental agents - their actions satisfy the “private ends” requirement of UNCLOS 
irrespective of the fact that their goals might be purely political. However, this argument was 
rejected by Heller. He argued instead that the “private ends” requirement of UNCLOS 
excludes all politically motivated acts, not simply those committed by governments or 
governmental agents. This is because historically politically-motivated violence on the high 
seas has not always been considered piracy under international law. Rather it has been 
regarded as criminal on the grounds that the perpetrator breached the laws of the State that 
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had jurisdiction to prosecute him. This implies that as long as the Sea Shepherds were acting 
toward a political goal their actions could not satisfy the “private ends” requirement, and thus 
could not be considered pirates under UNCLOS. Kontorovich and Heller both appear to 
agree, however, that the acts perpetrated by Sea Shepherds could be considered acts of 
maritime violence under the SUA, the Convention that provides a framework for prosecuting 
maritime crimes on the sea. They both disagree as regards the scope of UNCLOS. The 
problem with Kontorovich’s argument is that it leads to the contention that UNCLOS and 
SUA overlap, although the latter Convention was not intended to replace the former. Despite 
this, the simple question that needs to be answered is, ‘What constitutes ‘private ends’ in the 
international law of piracy?’ It has been noted that proving animus furandi (the intention to 
steal for personal pecuniary gain) is not required to satisfy the private ends requirement under 
UNCLOS, and neither is violence committed on the high seas under the authority of a State. 
There is much scope between these extremes to interpret the actions akin to those of Sea 
Shepherds and Greenpeace. For example, if the term ‘private ends’ is to be given a narrow 
meaning and the prosecutor in each case required to establish the perpetrator’s subjective 
intent (whether it was private/pecuniary or political), then the acts of pirates off the coast of 
Somalia or in the Gulf of Aden might be excluded from piracy under UNCLOS because their 
alleged motivation was the protection of their waters from illegal fishing exploitation and 
environmental dumping. On the other hand, it is difficult to conclude that the actions of Sea 
Shepherds fit the traditional paradigm of piracy. This is because the goals of the Sea 
Shepherds are certainly political and non-pecuniary. The Ninth Circuit Court in Cetecean v 
Sea Shepherds may have adopted a formalistic approach and adopted a wide interpretation of 
Article 101 of UNCLOS in holding that they were pirates. A more flexible approach in 
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interpreting the provisions of UNCLOS would certainly prevent the injustice of treating 
environmental activists as pirates. The Ninth Circuit Court noted that in the past the issue of 
whether a politically motivated act was a piratical act drew substantial support from many 
governments. The laws of piracy were stretched in their interpretation and application by 
some national courts to cover other unlawful, politically related acts against ships and 
persons on board, such as terrorist acts. The Court then argued that since the adoption of 
UNCLOS and SUA Conventions, national courts are less likely to consider politically-
motivated acts as piracy. This is because these acts are covered by Article 3 of the said SUA 
Convention. It is therefore logical that the ‘private ends’ criterion of Article 101 of UNCLOS 
excludes acts of violence and depredation perpetrated by environmental activists in relation 
to their quest for marine environment protection. As such, the Court adopted a narrow 
interpretation of UNLCOS and declined to treat the anti-whaling activists as ‘pirates’.  
UNCLOS gives us a further problem in that for an act to be defined as piracy it must be 
carried out ‘against another ship or aircraft.’ This is considered as ‘the two vessels 
requirement’, viz., the pirate vessel and the victim’s vessel. This implies that the attack or 
taking over of a ship by its own crew or passengers is not a piratical act. This was the subject 
of the case of Achille Lauro. Four members of a Palestinian liberation group aboard an Italian 
vessel hijacked it and demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners.98 Given that they had 
already boarded the vessel, this was designated as hijacking and not piracy. This is consistent 
with the argument above that the acts of violence perpetrated by Sea Shepherds and 
Greenpeace do not constitute ‘piracy’ but maritime crimes. 
 
98. For the facts and commentary, see Pancracio JP ‘L’Affaire de Achille Lauro et Le Droit International’ (1985) 
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UNCLOS also requires acts of piracy to be committed ‘[o]n the high seas, against another 
ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship.’ Figure 1 below shows 
what constitutes the high seas in this context. 
Figure 1. Diagram showing delineation of the maritime sea zones 
The high seas constitute ‘the open ocean which is not within the territorial waters or 
jurisdiction of any particular State.’ In other words the high seas are free from the jurisdiction 
of any State with regard to any pirate attacks that take place. That is why it is stated that ‘All 
States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas 
or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.’99 In order to understand where the  
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high seas zone begins and ends, it is important to explain and ascertain the other sea zones, 
working from the nearest ashore to further outwards. 
With regard to the territorial sea, Article 2 of UNCLOS states that ‘The sovereignty of a 
coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an 
archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the 
territorial sea.’ The territorial waters of coastal States measures out at 12 nautical miles from 
the land, which is confirmed in Article 3 of UNCLOS. Within this distance the coastal state 
has sovereign rights to adjudicate over any pirate attacks that take place here. However, given 
that piracy must be directed on the high seas, this implies that where an attack takes place on 
the territorial sea, UNCLOS will not apply since this is not ‘outside the jurisdiction of any 
State.’ 
The above does not apply, however, in the EEZ. Article 55 of UNCLOS states that ‘The 
exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the 
specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant 
provisions of this Convention.’ If we refer to Figure 1. above we can see that that it follows 
on immediately after the territorial sea. Article 56 provides that ‘The exclusive economic 
zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured.’ Article 56 further provides that there are certain duties 
regarding this zone that lay within the jurisdiction of the coastal state. The rights of the 
coastal State include ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to 
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the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds.’ It then provides that in exercising its rights and performing its 
duties in the EEZ, ‘the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.’ 
Some care in interpretation is required here given that Article 101 states that piracy must be 
directed on the high seas in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State, yet it makes no 
mention of the EEZ. Article 56 then provides that duties regarding this zone lay within the 
jurisdiction of the coastal State. There is also the contiguous zone which does not extend 
beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines as shown in Figure 1. above. Article 33 of 
UNCLOS provides that in this zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to 
prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations. 
Thus, seemingly illegal acts of violence committed in the EEZ may also be qualified as 
piracy under the corresponding cross-reference set out in Article 58(2) of UNCLOS. This 
Convention seems to favour the positivist approach whereby the coastal State is required to 
assert jurisdiction in territorial waters unless the attack takes place on the high seas where any 
State may exercise its right to repress piracy. It is argued above that this approach ensures 
consistency, although it may be problematic where the coastal State has neither the resources 
nor the political will to stop attacks not only within the EEZ or the contiguous zone but the 
high seas as well as its own internal waters. Also what might prove problematic is that even 
though UNCLOS authorizes states to act upon piracy in the EEZ, states may be reluctant to 
do this as a fear of interfering with the rights of the state claiming the EEZ. 
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2.5 UNCLOS and Modern Piracy 
Ghosh’s analysis of modern piracy suggests that the problem is a manifestation of several 
underlying socio-political issues that affect a given region.100 This implies that piracy in one 
area is often unique and unrelated to piratical attacks in other regions of the world. This might 
explain why it is difficult to define the term ‘piracy’ in a manner that can be accepted by all. 
It also explains the dangers of universal jurisdiction given that what may be considered 
‘piracy’ by the courts of the vessel’s home State might be said to be a simple criminal act by a 
court of the coastal State. As such, it is important to ascertain the factors affecting different 
regions by categorising or classifying the various types of piracy that are in existence today.
101 Piracy has been categorised by commentators in differing modes. While some have 
categorised such acts on a regional or geographic basis, others choose to classify them 
according to the intensity or the kind of acts of piracy that are committed. There are for 
example the ‘Asian’,102 'South American',103 'West African'104 and 'Somalian' or ‘Horn of 
Africa’105 types of piracy. This in line with piracy being classified according the regional and 
geographical approach. 
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Piracy can be explained in terms of greed and bureaucratic corruption in the coastal State or 
as a survival strategy arising from high unemployment. Either way, significant increases in 
the quantity of goods transported across oceans by the world’s merchant ships create lucrative 
targets for bandits.106 In addition, environmental damage caused by the oil industry has 
adversely affected the lucrative fishing and agricultural industries, thus limiting legitimate 
options for local youths to enter the economy.107 The fact that the cause of piracy can be 
attributed to factors that are endemic in the coastal States makes it difficult to provide 
solutions from a multilateral perspective. This again shows that universal jurisdiction is less 
likely to be as effective as the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State. In line with the 
intensity approach of the acts committed it can be stated that Somalian piracy is distinctly 
different from the rest in that it that it involves hijacking merchant cargo vessels, ocean liners 
or luxury yachts exclusively for collecting ransom from the concerned shipping company. 
The use of violence has until recently been minimal with the hostages normally being treated 
well. A comprehensive analysis of the Somalian case is carried out in Chapter 5. This study 
thus focuses on piracy in East and West Africa. It discusses the factors that are peculiar to 
each region and shows how their piratical acts differ. East Africa piracy involves hostage-
taking and seizing vessels which transit through the Gulf of Aden. With the lack and 
ineffective patrol and control of State actors in Somalia, the pirates roam over the vast 
expanse of the undefended coastline and tow boats back to the their hiding place whilst 
awaiting large ransom payments for the crew and cargo. 
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I intend to show in Chapter 4 that the operational context in West Africa is altogether 
different. State authority and control over the far shorter and multiple coastlines are 
significantly more robust. There are a large number of anchored vessels at berth, or waiting 
for a space at the port for the collection of crude oil or the delivery of refined fuel. Attacks 
often occur in the port loading or unloading. Attacks on vessels here are successful because 
of weak law enforcement and policing, corrupt local officials and a burgeoning informal 
economy centred on the illicit trade in oil and hydrocarbons. Ships are not generally seized in 
West Africa as they cannot be kept at anchor for too long given that there is no space and 
government laws only allow ships to be held for only a short period of time, to load or unload 
cargo. Hence, West African pirates sometimes loot tankers of their valuable cargo for quick 
resale on the lucrative and sizeable black market. The attackers rarely engage in hostage-
taking. They are more concerned with the valuables rather than the wellbeing of ship 
personnel, which results in a higher prevalence of violence against crew who are considered a 
disposable asset.108 
2.6 Summary 
The ambiguity of the term ‘piracy’ is at the root of the confusion about the status of pirates 
captured at sea, as well as the legality of their prolonged detention, trial or rendition to 
countries with territorial jurisdiction. The term ‘piracy’ bore many definitions over the 
centuries, although focus is now placed on the definition in Article 101 of UNCLOS. This 
definition is shown to be quite ambiguous given that it uses terms that are open to several 
interpretations in different States. Piracy must for example be carried out on the ‘high seas’ 
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and for ‘private ends’. Also, only the occupants of a ship who commit a violent act against the 
occupants or cargo of another ship may be called pirates. Thus, if the crew of a ship or the 
passenger of the ship takes some kind of action against their own ship they would not be 
called pirates. It is then submitted that the Convention seems to favour the positivist approach 
whereby the coastal State is required to assert jurisdiction unless the attack takes place on the 
high seas where no State has obligatory jurisdiction. However, the fact that recourse is had to 
the Convention adopted by 157 States may be said to reflect the multilateral recognition of 
the customs enshrined in the Convention, and this is akin to multilateralism or the 
‘international governance of the many’ or ‘relational statism’. 
It was however argued that a broadly positivist approach and cosmopolitanism are more 
coherent and ensure consistency. This is because piracy in one area is often unique in itself 
and unrelated to piratical attacks in other regions of the world. Thus, modern day piracy has 
been categorised by commentators in differing modes. While some have categorised such 
acts on a regional or geographic basis, others choose to classify them according to the 
intensity or the kind of acts of piracy that are committed. The fact that the cause of piracy 
may be attributed to factors that are endemic in the coastal States makes it difficult to provide 
solutions from a multilateral perspective. This also shows that universal jurisdiction is less 
likely to be as effective as the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State. 
. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MARITIME PIRACY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
‘An investigator finds that instead of a single relatively simple problem [defining piracy], 
there are a series of difficult problems which have occasioned [at different times] a great 
diversity of professional opinion.’109 
3.1 Introduction 
What is entailed by the legal term “Jurisdiction”?110 Colangelo in his illuminating research 
article titled as “What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?” defines the antecedent term as 
connoting a legal term for “power”, or alternatively, to “speak the law”. The antecedent 
literature also propounds the fact that jurisdiction is not a monolithic concept and enfolds 
under its ambit three distinctive yet overlapping conceptualisations, namely; prescriptive 
jurisdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction and also enforcement jurisdiction. Akin to the term 
jurisdiction the notion of the term extraterritorial does not conjure as a monolithic term. In 
common parlance the term is indicative of “something…beyond territorial limits”.    Since 
the year 2000 there has been an increased tendency of national courts to assert universal 
jurisdiction in the prosecution of piracy and other crimes against customary international law. 
This essentially challenges Westphalian principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and 
equality amongst States that set the foundation of modern jurisdictional law and the 
prevailing world order. This Chapter examines the risks associated with the shift away from  
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the Westphalian principles and a possible undermining of their importance to jurisdictional 
frameworks. In respect of this I want to defend the view that an orthodox ‘consent’ or auto-
limitation approach should be adhered to, whereby jurisdiction is essentially territorial and 
can be exercised by a State outside its territory only where it obtains the consent of the 
territorial State in question. This consent might arise via a Convention or perhaps in 
accordance with a permissive rule derived from international custom relating to the 
prerequisite for arresting and prosecuting pirates. It begins with an overview of the concept of 
universal jurisdiction. It shows how universal jurisdiction and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
have been exercised by different courts in different countries in the prosecution of pirates. 
This is followed by the critical examination of the exercise of international criminal 
jurisdiction. The objective is to determine the limits of national criminal jurisdiction under 
public international law with regard to the prosecution of crimes that are deemed to violate 
peremptory norms. In light of these limits, the exercise of jurisdiction to prosecute piracy is 
then analysed. 
In summary, Chapter 3 aims to: 
• Analyse the concepts of universal jurisdiction and extraterritorial jurisdiction
• Examine the risks associated with undermining the importance of Westphalian principles to 
jurisdictional frameworks
• Determine the limits of national criminal jurisdiction under public international law as 
regards prosecuting pirates
• Defend the argument that a ‘consent’ or ‘auto-limitation’ approach to jurisdiction should be 
adhered in approaching the authoritative arrest and prosecution of pirates
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In pursuing these aims, Chapter 3 seeks to address the question and concern of the 
dissertation as stated in Chapter 1 supra; i.e.: 
[…] as is well known, in the event of a hot pursuit it is impossible to 
bring the pursuit to a close within the territorial waters of coastal States. In 
some cases ships are pursued across the high seas and across borders ending 
up in territories incapable of feasible arrest and prosecution. Further 
problems arise where the territorial waters of a weak State are handicapped 
by the absence of a navy and the lack of effective anti-piracy legislation. Some 
key international instruments provide for universal jurisdiction on the high 
seas to facilitate the arrest and prosecution of pirates in such cases. However, 
this raises the question of whether such jurisdictional shifts depart too 
dramatically from Westphalian principles of sovereignty, and whether such 
departures can be regarded as justified. These issues constitute the basis of the 
challenges in the development of International Law that arise and confront the 
States that act as the main players in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea in 
their attempt to deal with the problem of maritime piracy. 
3.2 Universal jurisdiction 
Universal Jurisdiction as a premier concept has been explored by several academicians in the 
field of Law and Jurisprudence. Universal Jurisdiction as deductively induced after an in-
depth analysis of a plethora of literatures, trespasses from the rubric of national jurisdiction 
and over to the domain of international or global jurisdiction.111 Within the boundaries of 
universal jurisdiction, several academicians have noted that international law (Randall, 1998) 
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has introduced several principles to determine the exercise authority (by a particular state) on 
matters which affect the interests of other states. Having argued thus, a poignant question can 
be posed within the domain of the present research, how effective can universal jurisdiction 
prove within the scope of Maritime piracy? In tandem with the same it can be argued that, As 
stated in Chapter 2, UNCLOS [United Nation Convention of the Laws of the Sea] adopted the 
aforementioned doctrine of universal jurisdiction through which any State is imbued with the 
power to deal with particular crimes on the high seas without the need for a connection 
between the criminal acts and the State.112 Article 105 of UNCLOS therefore empowers 
State signatories to ‘seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and 
under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.’ This 
follows from the tradition under international law wherein a pirate was treated as a hostis 
humani generis or an enemy of all mankind.113 As noted in Chapter 2, universal jurisdiction 
in this context is intrinsically linked to relational statism and multilateralism. Thus, all 
relations and ideas are determined by States acting in a multilateral forum. In the Kenyan case 
of Republic v Chief Magistrates Court, Mombasa Ex-Parte Mohamud Mohamed 
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Hashi & 8 Others,114 the applicants were arrested in the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean by 
a German Naval Vessel with the help a U.S. helicopter. They were then taken to Mombasa in 
Kenya and placed in the custody of the Kenyan police. Later, they were charged with the 
offence of piracy contrary to sections 69(1) and 69(3) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63 of the 
Laws of Kenya, for attacking the sailing vessel named MV Courier while armed with three 
AK 47 Rifles, one Tokaley pistol, one RPG-7 portable rocket launcher, one SAR 80 rifle and 
one Carbine rifle, and putting the lives of the crew in danger. 
The applicants filed a judicial review application in the High Court of Kenya challenging the 
charges on the basis that the alleged offence took place on the high seas of the Gulf of Aden. 
The High Court noted that Kenyan courts did not have the jurisdiction to try the applicants 
since ‘the offence alleged was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Kenya and 
outside the Kenyan waters…neither a Kenyan citizen or Kenyan property was involved…the 
arrest was made by the German Navy taking part in operations in the Gulf of Aden.’ The 
High Court further held that: 
The High Seas are not and cannot be a place in Kenya or within the territorial 
waters of Kenya. In fact, by definition, they are strictly deemed to be outside 
the jurisdiction of all States in the world or on earth unless some law in the 
state brings it into their local jurisdiction whether through Municipal Law or 
an International Convention.115 
It then concluded that the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it took the pleas of the 
applicants and entertained the case up to the close of the prosecution’s case. The whole 
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process was therefore null and void, ab initio. The High Court of Kenya had ignored the 
provisions of UNCLOS providing for universal jurisdiction for the crime of piracy. Thus, the 
Court of Appeal found little difficulty in overturning the High Court’s decision. The Court of 
Appeal held that the High Court had failed ‘to appreciate the applicability of the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction in reference to the case at hand.’ Hence, States that have ratified 
UNCLOS are required to cooperate in arrests and prosecution of persons that allegedly 
commit piracy attacks on the high seas. 
Prior to delving into the intricate as well as the nuanced links between customary 
international law in tandem with the prosecution of pirates in the high seas, it is pertinently 
significant to clarify the conceptual bearings of the aforementioned concept. First and 
foremost, it becomes inimically significant within the ambit of the present study to clarify the 
theoretical and also the pragmatic scope of customary international law since the antecedent 
concept forms the foundational bedrock whose violation atones inimically atones for the 
prosecution of individuals or groups associated with maritime piracy. What then, is connoted 
by customary international law? Customary international law, also commonly referred to as 
CIL, refer to those facets of international law which relegate themselves to an in-depth 
analysis of custom. However, in exploring the ideologue of Customary International Law 
takes into account the theory of the same propounded by Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. 
Posner116 in their path-breaking research article titled as, “A Theory of Customary 
International Law” divulge from the usual explanations associated with the elucidation of 
CIL, which are essentially based on Opinio Juris, Legality, Morality  and other related 
concepts. The aforementioned authors opt for an explanation in the rubric of various logical 
structures rooted in historical contingencies. According to the authors of the antecedent 
literature, it can be decreed that a wide ambit of rules associated with CIL thus, reflect pure 
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coincidence of interest, rather than international cooperation. Thus it can be deductively 
argued that Customary International Law is not a homogenous term and is susceptible to 
interpretation from a plethora of approaches. For instance, according to Anthea Elizabeth 
Roberts, in her essay titled as “Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation” argues that over the numerous span of academic years, 
the concept of customary international law has been examined through numerous vantages, 
be it a traditional approach,117 wherein CIL is examined through the pertinent state practice, 
or be it the modern approach, which emphasizes upon the concept of opinio juris. 
Furthermore, in the context of exercising universal jurisdiction, it is primarily significant to 
undertake a vivid examination of the laws or the primary theoretical principles namely, aut 
dedere aut punir as well aut dedere aut judicare. A pertinent question which may be 
prudently posed at this juncture is, what is the inimical requirement of universal jurisdiction 
in the wake of the existence of sovereign laws as practiced and implemented by numerous 
nations? The root idea of exercising universal jurisdiction is to prosecute or extradite (aut 
dedere aut judicare) those individuals or groups of individuals who are privy to have 
committed grave crimes outside the territory of their nations be it in any form of international 
wrongdoing, it could manifest in the form of the the emergent “borderless cyber-crimes”118 or 
the currently discussed omnipresent forms of maritime piracy,119 a form of borderless crime 
that not only primarily affects the  largest and widest transport networks but also the global 
economic development due to the “borderless nature” of the antecedent form of crime. In 
congruence with the aforementioned proposition, the researcher quotes verbatim Bassiouni et 
al (1995)120 in their poignant research endeavour titled as, “ Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: the 
duty to extradite or prosecute in international law” 
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                              “…...An obligation to prosecute or extradite appears in various 
forms in a number of multilateral conventions and other instruments dealing with the 
suppression of particular international offences. The implication of that obligation 
with respect to these offences bespeaks widespread ( or increasing) recognition of the 
principle that states are bound to act either through prosecution or through extradition 
to ensure that individuals who perpetrate harm inimical to fundamental interests of the 
international community are brought to justice.”  
The aforementioned quotation, thereby, highlights or elucidates the preponderant justification 
of the existence of the principles of Aut Derere Aut Judicare, as well as Aut Derere Aut Punir, 
Both the terms have Latin origins etymologically wherein the former implies, a duty to 
extradite or prosecute an obligation which is not predominantly imposed by any treaty in 
particular, rather by the customary or the general international law subsequently. One might 
ask a prudent question at this juncture, as to what is the ideological backing behind the 
aforementioned legal principles. According to Bassiouni (1995) et al as they explicate in their 
anterior research work, in contradistinction to the concept of the “pluralistic society” 
associated with the Westphalia conception of sovereignty, the idea of general international 
jurisdiction which provides the theoretical as well as practical justification for the 
implementation of the two aforementioned principles, is based on the concept of a world 
community. Quoting the anterior author verbatim, the above stated proposition is brought into 
a starkly explicative light, “Similarly, it might be said that an obligation on the part of state 
officials to cooperate in assuming the repression of offences harmful to the international 
community as a whole is a basic postulate inherent in the concept of a world community.”(pp. 
15). Moreover, the term aut deder aut judicare refers to a modern adaption of the 
archetypical term put into usage by Grotius, aut deder aut punir (either extradite or punish) . 
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In consonance with the antecedent proposition it was conceded by Grotius that there is in 
existence a general “obligation” to extradite or punish in tandem with those junctures or 
spheres of offences wherein another state suffers.  
As discussed above, the universal jurisdiction as well as extraterritorial jurisdiction has been 
used in a synonymous manner in innumerable contexts by a plethora of academicians, legal 
theorists as well as practitioners. As can be conceded from the aforementioned proposition, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a homogenous terminology and incurs various components 
that are inimical to its implementation; namely, principles of active personality, passive 
personality and protection. The term “passive personality jurisdiction”121 essentially refers to 
the inimically controversial component of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction wherein under 
the particular procedure, the state can exercise criminal jurisdiction solely based on the 
nationality of the victim. Why is the aforementioned legal term then susceptible to 
controversy and deliberation? In response to the antecedent interrogative proposition, it 
would be prudent to quote verbatim Watson, in his illuminating work titled as, “Passive 
Personality Principle” 
“…..Passive personality jurisdiction is probably the most controversial form of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Many countries, including the United States, 
have traditionally opposed this theory of jurisdiction. These states have argued that it 
would be unfair for state A to prosecute a foreign national for a crime committed on 
foreign soil solely because the victim is a national of state A.”122.  
The root causes of the substantial criticism of passive personality jurisdiction is based on the 
assumption of three causes, according to Watson, namely; firstly, passive personality 
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jurisdiction is said to be deeply intrusive or impinge on the sovereignty of the states involved. 
Secondly, it also has been empirically argued that Passive Personality jurisdiction deprives 
the potential defendants of the notice that their conduct can be construed as criminally 
tainted, since the applicable rule of criminal law will futuristically or retrospectively be based 
on the national background of the victim. And lastly, critics of passive personality jurisdiction 
imply towards the impracticality of the antecedent component of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
In tandem with its coexistent component, the active personality principle is closely associated 
with the ethos of nationality. Quoting Deen- Racsmany verbatim in order to substantiate the 
aforementioned proposition which is put forth as follows, 
“……The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) attributes a central 
role to the nationality of the accused. It provides that unless the situation in which the 
crime was committed was referred to the court by the Security Council under the 
chapter VII of the United Nations Charter…. The court may exercise its jurisdiction of 
one or more of the following states are parties to the this statute or have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the court 
a. The state on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred for, if the 
crime was committed on board a vessel or an aircraft , the state of registration 
of the vessel or the aircraft  
b. The state of which the person accused of the crime is a national."123 
It can be deduced with respect to the tenets of active and passive personality jurisdiction that 
those are inimically based upon the notion as well as the criterion of nationality. Under the 
tenet of active personality jurisdiction, the state incurs a fundamental right to apply its laws 
in order to prosecute the illegal conduct committed by its citizens overseas. And lastly within 
the ambit of Protective Jurisdiction, it is unequivocally accepted that every country is 
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competent to take any measures that are compatible with the law of nations in order to 
safeguard its national security interests.   
Similar observations have been made in courts of other countries. In the case of United States 
v Yousef,124 the Court also recognised its right to exercise universal jurisdiction. It noted that 
the doctrine was adopted under international law in regard to piracy because ‘of the threat 
piracy poses to orderly transport and commerce between nations.’ Thus, apart from seizing or 
destroying cargo and inflicting bodily harm on merchants and the crew of vessels, their 
attacks often lead to an increase in the price of goods thereby causing more than just the 
victims of the attacks to suffer.125 Equally, the interests of several States are affected by a 
single attack since one State often hosts the company that owns the vessel, while the vessel 
flies the flag of another State, and the port of unloading the cargo may be in a third State. 
Rogo argues that since the high seas may be viewed as a ‘no man’s land’, it is only logical 
that criminal acts that are perpetrated there should not be left unpunished just because there is 
a lack of national or territorial jurisdiction by any given State.126 In fact, one of the 
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justifications of universal jurisdiction is that all States must ensure that acts that are contrary 
to customary international law must be punished. Randall also suggests that the definition of 
piracy is best dealt with universally by all on the high seas as a cooperative measure.127 Even 
with the case of privateers, when they acted outside of their letters of marque, their home 
States did not support them. Thus, where one State arrests pirates on the high seas and 
prosecutes them, the home States of the pirates are less likely to protest. This may be 
contrasted with cases where one State arrests and prosecutes former military officers or 
political leaders of another State on grounds of war crimes, human rights violations or torture. 
Nonetheless, the argument for the expansion of universal jurisdiction to include other crimes 
against customary international law such as war crimes and genocide is that universal 
jurisdiction was never about piracy specifically, but simply about allowing all States to punish 
the most horrible of offences.128 Even Kissinger had argued that ‘The doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction asserts that some crimes are so heinous that their perpetrators should not escape 
justice by invoking doctrines of sovereign immunity or the sacrosanct nature of national 
frontiers.’129 Equally, just after the Second World War, Wright had argued that although 
piracy was the ‘classic illustration of offences against universal law’ the latter concept could 
be extended to ‘other offences … inherent in the conception of a world community.’130 
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What these justifications show is that the doctrine of universal jurisdiction is a double-edged 
sword that was largely limited to piracy on the high seas because it was the least harmful 
option politically or diplomatically in combating the phenomenon. This explains why the 
doctrine is readily abandoned where its invocation would raise tensions between States.131 
The case of United States v La Jeune Eugenie,132 illustrates this: enforcement of jurisdiction 
by the United States over a then important ally (France) would have damaged relations. 
Aware of this, Justice Story refused to exercise such jurisdiction stating that ‘rarely was there 
a case more likely to ‘[...] excite the jealousies of a foreign government zealous to assert its 
own rights.’133 
The Kenyan Court of Appeal in Republic of Kenya v Chief Magistrates Court, Mombasa Ex-
Parte Mohamud Mohamed Hashi & 8 Others on its part invoked the communal spirit 
recommended by UNCLOS in the exercise of universal jurisdiction in order to overturn the 
High Court’s decision that Kenyan courts had no jurisdiction because the attack occurred 
outside Kenyan water and neither a Kenyan citizen nor Kenyan property was involved. It is 
arguable whether the Kenyan Court of Appeal would have readily exercised universal 
jurisdiction if that meant undermining the interests of a key ally. In other words, it is 
uncertain whether the Kenyan Court of Appeal would recommend the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction where the exercise of such jurisdiction would be interpreted by an ally State as 
undermining its sovereignty. It is at best speculation to contend that the Kenyan Court of 
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Appeal would not be disposed to apply UNCLOS if such application would raise tension 
between Kenya and a key ally. Nonetheless, it has been contended that States often exercise 
universal jurisdiction if they do not fear retaliation by the defendant’s home State.134 Also, as 
shown in United States v La Jeune Eugenie, courts of signatory States have wide discretion in 
determining whether universal jurisdiction should be exercised in a given case. Strapatsas 
defined universal jurisdiction as that which may be exercised by all States ‘even against the 
wishes of the State having territorial or any other form of jurisdiction.’135 This suits the 
multilateral approach and relational statism but, as shown below, universal jurisdiction may 
sometimes lead to a dangerous encroachment on the sovereignty of a State and create conflict 
given that it is not premised on the idea of State consent. This is especially so with the 
prosecution of broadly defined offences such as ‘piracy.’ 
3.3 International Criminal Jurisdiction 
The scope of national sovereignty under public international law generally determines the 
limits of national criminal jurisdiction. This is linked to the three central principles of 
Westphalian sovereignty: first, that states are to be regarded as equal under international law, 
that each State has sovereignty over its territory and internal affairs, and that states should 
refrain from interference in another State’s internal affairs.136 It follows therefore that 
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Westphalian philosophy must accept a ‘territoriality’ principle whereby a sovereign State is 
exclusively entitled to prosecute crimes committed within its borders. These principles 
generally set the foundation of modern jurisdictional law and the prevailing world order. In 
the landmark Hague lectures of 1964, Mann described jurisdiction as follows: 
If a State assumed jurisdiction outside the limits of its sovereignty, it 
would come into conflict with other States which need not suffer any 
encroachment upon their own sovereignty …the connection between 
jurisdiction and sovereignty is, up to a point, obvious, inevitable, and 
almost platitudinous, for to the extent of its sovereignty a State 
necessarily has jurisdiction.137 
As such, the concepts of territory, sovereignty and jurisdiction are interrelated and constitute 
core features of a State.138 However, due to the complexity of cross-border transactions 
sometimes involving several States, it is questionable whether a State’s jurisdiction should be 
determined by territorial factors exclusively. Certainly, more than one State has an interest in 
regulating such transactions. This creates the potential for conflict since the different 
interested States may adopt different jurisdictional approaches. One such approach is 
‘extraterritoriality’. The national courts of various States have to entertain cases with many 
international elements and may be forced to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to 
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resolve the disputes. Thus, the way they apply their domestic laws may impact upon relations 
with other interested States.139 
UNCLOS provides that any State may have jurisdiction as regards incidents that occur on the 
high seas. The jurisdiction of the flag State can be considered to be an extension of the 
Westphalian territoriality principle, since vessels may be ‘treated as islands of a nation’s 
territory outside its primary borders.’140 However, where the offence occurs in an EEZ or 
contiguous zone, it is difficult to argue that the exercise of jurisdiction by any State of whom 
the alleged offender is not a national is an usurpation of the sovereignty of the State with 
territorial jurisdiction. This then intensifies conflict between States and threatens the stability 
of the international legal order.141 Brownlie argues that conflict might be avoided if the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is made through policies such as non-intervention, 
proportionality, mutuality and accommodation.142 But he notes that there must be a sufficient 
nexus or bona fide connection between the State exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction on the 
one hand, and the State to whom the offender in the incident in question is alleged to be a 
national. This implies that the State must be able to invoke one of the following principles: 
nationality, passive personality or protective. In the latter instance, the criminal activities 
committed abroad have harmful consequences on the prosecuting State. 
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The above avenues for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction may still deepen conflict 
between States given that it would be difficult to justify the protective or passive personality 
principle in cases where the crime committed is a violation of a peremptory norm or jus 
cogens. The courts of the State with territorial jurisdiction may decide that harm caused by 
the activities is diffuse or indirect, while the courts of the State asserting extraterritorial 
jurisdiction may hold that the interests of the State have been affected adversely. As such, 
there is good reason to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction only to cases where the crime 
allegedly committed constitutes a clear violation of a peremptory norm or jus cogens and 
where the State with territorial jurisdiction or the flag State consents to the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by another State. This reinforces the importance of adopting a 
‘consent’ approach, as well as cosmopolitanism perspective on, which is said in Chapter 2 to 
be the most practicable approach. 
This involves returning to the simple and yet unambiguous definition of jurisdiction which is 
‘the right to prescribe and enforce rules against others.’143 This implies that in each case the 
question about jurisdiction requires determining which State has the right to prescribe and 
enforce rules against the alleged perpetrators of the crime. The argument here is that the most 
suitable State to assume responsibility in this regard is the one entitled to assert a form of 
sovereignty. A State may have prescriptive jurisdiction, which is the right to enact laws that 
apply in a given area. It may also have adjudicative jurisdiction, which is the right to subject 
persons to its laws. It may also have enforcement jurisdiction, which is the right to compel 
compliance with its laws. Each of these types of jurisdiction is governed by a complex set of 
 
143. Lowe VA, International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 171. 
!90
international laws, which include both hard and soft law.144 With regard to international 
criminal law, the most important question concerns which State should exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction. This is because many of the rules are enshrined in international agreements or 
enacted by established international institutions. As such, extraterritorial jurisdiction may be 
deemed to be the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in the territory or jurisdiction of 
another State.145 As noted above, where the law is an ‘empty recommendation’ if force is not 
included by the competent authority, this is a potential cause of conflict between States as 
Kant famously pointed out in his doctrines of ‘perpetual peace’.146 Thus, it is imperative to 
limit the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by allowing only States with territorial 
jurisdiction to exercise enforcement jurisdiction or where such a State does not have the 
requisite resources, it must be exercised with its consent. 
3.4 The Question of Piracy 
The term “pirate” derives its root from the Latin word “pīrāta” within whose ambit the 
notion of ‘sea robber’ originated and from the Greek word “peirātés”147 which means 
‘attacker’ or ‘marauder’ as a noun originating from the verb “peiran” signifying ‘attempt’ or 
‘attack’ .In consonance with the aforementioned etymological roots, a pirate etymologically 
refers to an person who undertakes an attempt of attack or an actual attack on someone. 
Based on its origin, the notion of attempt and the actual perpetration of the preponderant act 
have been embedded within the notion of pirate in a prior fashion. Furthermore, the definition 
of the word “Piracy”, encompassing the pertinent acts committed by pirates, has evolved 
throughout the due course of the history basing itself on the occurrence of the act itself and 
also on the modus operandi of the perpetrator and as an addendum the particular era. Dating 
back to a particularly dated span of temporal epoch, the notion of piracy has solely been 
related to the pertinent sea transportation and maritime activities; subsequently the usage of 
!91
the aforementioned term has been extended to the realm of the air transportation sector, to the 
domain of intellectual property and other fields such as broadcasting. Maritime piracy as well 
as armed robbery with water borne transports relegated to the high seas forms one of the 
contemporary challenges of the maritime industry. The aforementioned two phenomena 
impinge globally on the maritime trade and security. In the contemporary epoch, it can be 
empirically stated that the Gulf of Aden  And the Indian Ocean is considered within the ambit 
of high risk areas in terms of piracy and armed robbery against ships activities. With 
pertinence to the aforementioned empirical statements,, both the international community as 
well as the coastal States of the pertinent regions have deployed a plethora of effort in order 
to decipher a manner in which to address the antecedent problem. Relevant statistics state 
that the Resurgence act of Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf region has been established 
since the year 2008. Statistics have recorded 45 attacks in 2010, 58 attacks in the first 10 
months of 2011 from January to September 2012, 34 attacks has been reported (2016). In 
tandem with the aforementioned discussion, as depicted in Chapter 2, States have generally 
been made aware to exercise universal jurisdiction in the cooperation to arrest and 
prosecution of pirates due to international customs established in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
as well as UNCLOS. This is largely because most pirates targeted vessels in the high seas, 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of States. Nonetheless, it may be argued that the vessels 
were still within the flag jurisdiction of the States in which they were registered. Also, the 
victims on board the vessels were citizens 
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of specific States. Thus, some jurisdictional rules still applied as regards piracy owing to the 
fact that States could justify the arrest and prosecution of pirates on the grounds of flag 
jurisdiction and passive personality jurisdiction. As such, it may be said that although piracy 
shows the limits of territorial jurisdiction, it does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in 
accordance with established international law rules. The latter instance is tantamount to the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by any State. It is shown above that some States may assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to arrest and prosecute pirates. Nonetheless, following the 
strict doctrinal or positivist approach, the flag State ought to have jurisdiction if the attack 
occurred in a place where no other State has territorial jurisdiction. It is argued here that this 
approach enhances consistency by being in line with state sovereignty, unless express consent 
is put in place, and thus no encroachment of sovereignty. 
Notwithstanding, universal jurisdiction has been legitimised over the past centuries as regards 
piracy. In United States v Smith, the Court described this stance as ‘the general practice of all 
nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this 
offense against any persons whatsoever.’148 Nonetheless, at the time, there were no 
established international rules on what constitutes piracy and how it ought to be prosecuted. 
Despite the guidance provided by UNCLOS, there is still much uncertainty in this regard. In 
Chapter 2, it is shown that much confusion stems from the lack of a precise definition of the 
term ‘piracy’ and tendency of the national courts of signatory States to rely on their own 
subjective interpretations. Moreover, in some cases such as privateers, the attackers set out 
with a mandate from their governments. These uncertainties raise questions about the 
rationale of universal jurisdiction. In United States v Smith, the Court held that ‘Piracy, 
according to the law of nations, is incurred by depredation on or near the sea, without 
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authority from any prince or state.’149  About a century earlier, the Court had argued that 
‘piracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a robbery committed while in the 
jurisdiction of the admiralty.’150 Then two decades after United States v Smith, it was held 
that ‘robbery on the high seas is piracy under the law of nations by all authorities.’151 Towards 
the end of the 20th century, a Court in the UK noted on its part that ‘the essential elements of 
this crime are no more and no less than those which are requisite to a relevant charge of 
robbery where that crime is committed in respect of property on land and within the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the High Court.’152 
This shows that States have exercised universal jurisdiction over piracy only to the extent of 
their courts’ delineation of the content of piracy under ‘the law of the nations’. In other 
words, whatever constitutes piracy under the law of the nations from the perspective of a 
court guides the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Rubin was able to demonstrate that 
universal jurisdiction in the context of piracy has always been a question of theory rather than 
of practice. This is because the vast majority of prosecutions for piracy did not rely on the 
universal principle.153 He found only five cases in more than a century.154 It must be noted 
that universal jurisdiction is not mandatory but optional and the courts of each State decides 
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whether to exercise such jurisdiction or not. At the beginning of last century, Barbour 
deplored the fact that the UK and Spain often overlooked piratical attacks when it suited their 
interests.155 Thus, they would refrain from arresting pirates where the attacks of the pirates 
were directed at vessels of rival States.156 However, when the Israeli Supreme Court decided 
to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute foreign nationals for crimes against 
humanity, they relied on the piracy cases as precedent.157 What is intriguing is that the Israeli 
case then became the precedent for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over non-piratical 
crimes. Thus, in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet,158 
the Court cited the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision in Attorney-General of Israel v 
Eichmann to focus on the international and universal character of crimes against humanity 
and noted that courts have an independent source of jurisdiction derived from customary 
international law, which is part of the unwritten law of Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court 
however had noted that whenever a State arrested an offender, it had to first offer to extradite 
him to the State in which the offence was committed in order to prevent the violation of the 
latter State’s territorial sovereignty. As such, the Israeli Supreme Court was cautious and 
recommended the positivist approach as the first step. Its decision may be distinguished from 
that of the Court in R v Bow Street, Ex Parte Pinochet that concluded that English courts have 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction as regards crimes of universal jurisdiction. This was 
certainly a leap from the rather cautious position adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction must be a function of the operation of national 
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sovereignty under public international law; else the fundamental principle of Westphalian 
sovereignty may be fall into disrepair. The license to assert extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction is given by the sense of outrage vis-à-vis crimes against humanity or other crime 
that is believed to constitute a violation of peremptory norms. In Demjanjuk v Petrovsky159 
for example, the Court held that States may exercise universal jurisdiction over torture 
wherever it has been perpetrated due to the jus cogens nature of the international crime of 
torture. 
In fact, since the end of last century, courts in many Western States (Western Europe and 
North America) have increasingly exercised universal jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes. 
Some countries such as Belgium have been enacted laws that specifically grant their domestic 
courts universal jurisdiction. In 1999, it enacted the Law of 10 February 1999 governing the 
punishment of serious breaches of international humanitarian law. Other Western States such 
as Denmark arrested and indicted Iraqi senior military officers with genocide against Iraqi 
Kurds in Iraqi territory.160 However, it is uncertain whether there is universal consensus on 
the content of these crimes and the legitimacy of the assertion of universal jurisdiction by 
courts in Western States in the specific circumstances in which they have. Reydams therefore 
observed that the establishment of International Tribunals that exercise universal jurisdiction 
is ‘not a policy choice, but rather a cultural preference, more akin to a dietary taste or a 
religious choice than an argument deduced from empirical reason.’161 What remains true is 
that States tend to take into account the likelihood of the defendant’s home State retaliating 
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before asserting extraterritorial or universal jurisdiction. Thus, it is less likely that universal 
jurisdiction is exercised against the interests of powerful States. This once again shows the 
importance of the strict doctrinal or positivist approach. 
3.5 Summary 
This Chapter has analysed the increased tendency of national courts to assert universal 
jurisdiction in the prosecution of pirates. It showed that the pirate has traditionally been 
treated under international law as a hostis humani generis or an enemy of all mankind. Thus, 
any State has the power to deal with piracy on the high seas without the need for a connection 
between the piratical acts and the prosecuting State. UNCLOS adopted the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction in this regard empowering State signatories to seize pirate vessels and 
arrest the persons and seize the property on board. It was shown that the courts in different 
countries however assert universal jurisdiction not necessarily because of the license given by 
UNCLOS but because piracy is deemed to pose a serious threat to orderly transport and 
commerce between nations. The interests of several States may be affected adversely by a 
single piratical attack. However, if this attack occurs on the high seas, and none of the 
affected States would have territorial jurisdiction then universal jurisdiction is important 
because it is only logical that piratical acts that are perpetrated there should not be left 
unpunished just because there is a lack of national or territorial jurisdiction by any given 
State. Also, piracy is best dealt with by universal jurisdiction since the acts of pirates are not 
endorsed by any State. In the same vein, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been 
expanded to include crimes against customary international law in order to enable States to 
punish the most horrible offences. 
!97
However, it was noted that universal jurisdiction is a double-edged sword that may 
sometimes lead to a dangerous encroachment on the sovereignty of a State and create 
conflict, given that it is not premised on the idea of State consent. This explains why the 
doctrine is readily abandoned where its invocation would raise tension with influential States. 
This is the same problem caused by the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It challenges 
Westphalian principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and equality amongst States that set 
the foundation of modern jurisdictional law and the prevailing world order. Thus, it is 
submitted that there is good reason to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction only to cases where the 
crime allegedly committed constitutes a clear violation of a peremptory norm or jus cogens 
and where the State with territorial jurisdiction or the flag State consents to the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by another State. This reinforces the argument in favour of 
adopting a strict doctrinal or positivist approach, as well as cosmopolitanism. Where this 
approach is adopted, the flag State would have jurisdiction if the attack occurred in the 
territorial waters where that specific State lacks territorial jurisdiction. This enhances 
consistency by being in line with state sovereignty, unless express consent is put in place, and 
thus no encroachment of sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
“Piracy is defined as happening `outside the jurisdiction of any state’, so outside 12 miles is 
piracy. If it’s inside 12 miles we classify that as armed robbery against ships. The difference 
is jurisdiction. Piracy is a universal crime and states have an obligation to intervene. Inside 
12 miles it is the coastal state’s responsibility.”162 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines the phenomenon of piracy in the West coast of Africa, with emphasis 
on the Gulf of Guinea. It seeks to explain the high level of piratical attacks and identify the 
security challenges confronting the States in the region. It also seeks to determine whether the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction may be appropriate in combating piracy in the region. This 
follows from Chapter 3 where it was shown that the doctrine is a double-edged sword in that 
because it is not unequivocally based on consent, might sometimes lead to encroachment and 
fuel conflict between States. In pursuing these misgivings this chapter attempts to determine 
whether it would be beneficial to adopt instead the explicitly consensual and cosmopolitan 
approach suggested hitherto. This proposes a system whereby the flag State that is the victim 
of a piratical attack would have automatic jurisdiction only if : 
(a) the attack occurred in a place where no other State has territorial jurisdiction, 
 
162.  Trelawny Chris, deputy director of the Maritime Safety Division at the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), sourced at Irin News ‘Defining Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea’, London, 10 
December 2012  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or, in a situation where consent is obtained from the State which does have territorial 
jurisdiction in some sense,163 yet lacks the requisite enforcement resources. 
It begins with an analysis of the paradigm of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, setting the 
background with a discussion of the statistics on piratical attacks over the past decade. The 
enclaves and trouble spots in the region are identified, as well as the primary actors 
responsible for the sharp rise in the number and level of the attacks. It concludes with a 
discussion of the multilateral approach that has been adopted by the affected States to contain 
piracy. It explains why the approach has not been effective and what needs to be done. 
In summary Chapter 4 aims to: 
• Explain the high level of piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea and identifies security 
challenges facing States in the region
• Analyse the multilateral approach that has been adopted by States in the region to contain 
piracy
In pursuing these aims, Chapter 4 seeks to address the question and concerns listed and 
outlined in Chapter 1, namely, that ... given that the coastal States in the Gulf of Aden and 
Gulf of Guinea are largely poor, weak, lacking in resources, and suffer from corruption in the 
public sphere, we must ask whether regional frameworks of littoral and landlocked countries 
facing the same challenges can be expected to prove effective in the attempt to implement 
anti-piracy policies.164 
 
163. i.e., at least in a prescriptive sense of jurisdiction – e.g., Liberia and Togo have piracy laws 
164. See Chapter 1 supra p.20, para 2 
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4.2 The Gulf of Guinea 
The world’s number two continent both in terms of size and in context of population is 
Africa. With an approximate stretch of 30.2 million km², measuring around 11.7 million 
square miles inclusive of adjacent islands, it covers 6 percent of the Earth's surface area and 
20.4 percent of the total land area globally. Its population is currently 1.1 billion people 
according to the 2013 statistics and accounts for around 15 per cent of the global population. 
The Mediterranean Sea is on the northern coast of continent, the Suez Canal on the 
northeastern coast, the Red Sea along the Sinai Peninsula; the Indian Ocean on its 
southeastern coast and the Atlantic Ocean on the western coast. The Gulf of Guinea is in the 
north-eastern-most part of the Atlantic Ocean. It extends from Cape Lopez in Gabon to Cape 
Three Points in Ghana and its coastline includes the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Bonny. 
The origin of the Gulf’s name is uncertain. It is one of the oldest and most widely used 
geographical terms in that part of Africa.165 Some have argued that it is a mangled form of 
the name Ghana, used by Portuguese explorers in North Africa,166 while others have noted 
that although the modern application of the name dates from the 15th century with the 
Portuguese explorers in the Gold Coast region, it was used in the 14th century by Genoese 
cartographer, Giovanni di Carignano.167 
 
165.  Hale TA ‘From the Griot of Roots to the Roots of Griot: A New Look at the Origins of a Controversial 
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Edition, Princeton: Wiener, 1995) 116. 
167. Ortiz F, Glosario de Afronegrismos (El Siglo XX: Habana, 1924) 245. 
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The region remains the world's poorest inhabited continent. The main sectors in the economy 
are agriculture and mining, while tourism plays a crucial role in some areas. For some time 
now, the Gulf of Guinea in West and central Africa has been one of the world’s main oil and 
gas exploration hotspots. There are eight oil producing States in the Gulf with a tenth of all 
oil reserves in the world and producing more than 5 million barrels of crude oil per day.168 
The production sector has shown rapid growth and is big enough to export goods across the 
globe; further the oil export revenues of Angola and Nigeria have the possibility to alter the 
lives of millions of individuals. The largest producer, Nigeria, boasts of 150 million people, 
about 15 per cent of the continent’s population. It is also the 12th largest oil producer in the 
world with 2.4 million barrels produced per day. However, it ranks very low in the Failed 
States Index. Most of its large population are impoverished, especially those of the Niger 
River Delta region, where most of the oil fields are located. The local officials are very 
corrupt and largely rely on the profits from foreign oil and gas producers. This has caused 
resentment in the region with the local people believing the foreign oil companies and corrupt 
officials collude in despoiling them of their natural resources. This feeling of resentment 
coupled with the region’s lawlessness has sustained the armed struggle waged by local 
militias, which in turn has led to several piratical attacks against vessels in the area.169 The 
local Islamic terrorist group, Boko Haram, has also benefited from the disorder and confusion 
caused by the frequent piratical attacks by militias.170 As such, in 2004, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) rated the Gulf of Guinea second in the world in respect of the 
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number of piracy attacks, the first being the Strait of Malacca.171 The number of attacks only 
increased since then and in 2011, the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee elevated the Gulf to the 
same risk category as Somalia and classified it as ‘a war risk zone for shipping.’172 The re-
emergence of pirate attacks across African waters is therefore a matter of crucial significance 
to both the African States and the global society. However, piracy in African waters over the 
past ten years has chiefly been limited to three areas viz. the Somali coast/the Gulf of Aden 
along the East African Coast; Nigeria’s territorial waters and the Gulf of Guinea in West 
Africa; and the Mozambique Channel/Cape sea route in Southern Africa. The Gulf of Guinea 
has witnessed a sharp rise in the number of violent attacks of vessels at sea by armed gangs. 
4.3 Overview of Piracy Statistics 
As shown in Chapter 2, the term ‘piracy’ has not been defined with precision. Under 
UNCLOS, it is deemed to be depredation on the ‘high seas’ including contiguous zones and 
EEZ.  The term EEZ or Exclusive Economic Zones refers to that particular sea zone 
prescribed by UNCLOS, over which the state wields special rights pertaining to the 
exploration and use of marine resources, using energy production from water and wind. On 
the other hand, Contiguous Zone refers to the seaward area of the territorial sea within which 
the coastal sea may exercise the pertinent control in a rudimentary manner with an aim to 
prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and 
regulations that occur within its territory or territorial seal. For instance, O.S. Stokke, 2007, in 
his poignant research work based on the similar field of interest titled as, “A legal regime for 
the Arctic?: Interplay with the Law of the Sea Convention” poignantly argue that The Law of 
the Sea Convention173  acts as a constraint with respect to the regional environmental 
regimes, especially with respect to navigation beyond the territorial sea. In tandem with 
the same, the existing soft-law institutions, predominantly the Arctic Council,  have in the 
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contemporary times strengthened the nuances of the environmental governance in the 
pertinent region by firstly, improving upon the knowledge base, secondly,  enabling practical 
guidance with relevance to risk reduction, subsequently, highlighting in broader regulatory 
manner the Arctic dimension of shortfalls such as the long-range transported hazardous 
compounds and lastly supporting the capacity of Arctic States to implement existing 
commitments. However, the latter (Exclusive Economic Zone) comprise a substantial part of 
a State’s territorial waters. Thus the two distinct zones are contextually governed by the 
axiomatic domain of territorial waters, precisely and dominantly the contiguous zones.   In 
addition, the same pirates sometimes operate within internal waters and on the high seas. This 
is often the case with attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus it is more pragmatic to use the term 
‘piracy’ to describe armed robbery against vessels in the Gulf of Guinea, whether in internal 
waters or the EEZ.  
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Armed attacks against vessels in this area over the past century are relatively well documented.174 
There were for example many cases of armed attacks against vessels by armed groups of rival 
coastal kingdoms seeking control over influential commerce and trade routes.175 However, over 
the past couple of decades, the attacks have been linked to the carriage of oil and the scale of the 
social, environmental and economic scale effects of oil production in the Niger Delta region. As 
noted by Tepp, the factors that have caused the sharp rise in piratical attacks over the past two 
decades in the region include ‘legal and jurisdictional weakness, favourable geography, conflict 
and disorder, underfunded law enforcement, inadequate security, permissive political 
environments, cultural acceptability, and promise of reward.’176 Thus, the occurrence of piracy is 
not simply due to lack of security at sea but an incidental product of state failure and corruption. 
Neethling points out that it is a ‘culmination of years of inattention, desperation and 
lawlessness in the area bordering the globally vital shipping route.’177 Also, other States in 
the region have paid less attention to the issue since the attacks are largely perpetrated by 
armed militias based in Nigeria and the victims have equally been foreign companies 
producing oil and gas in the country.178  
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This demonstrates the futility of universal jurisdiction in cases where only the interests of a 
single State are adversely affected by the piratical attacks. Thus, other States are not willing 
to exercise universal jurisdiction under UNCLOS where they are not directly affected by the 
attacks. This also shows that an exclusive focus on territorial jurisdiction may be problematic 
given that the State that has jurisdiction over the waters wherein the attacks are perpetrated 
may be reluctant to enforce the jurisdiction due to a political stalemate, corruption or 
incompetence. Nonetheless, it is argued in Chapter 3 that the flag State jurisdiction is an 
extension of territorial jurisdiction. In this regard, the State in which the vessel is registered 
or the home State of the company that owns the vessel may be entitled to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction. That is why the European Union, China and the US have been 
deeply involved in developing and implementing counterpiracy strategies in the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
The IMO has compiled several reports of piratical attacks (using the broad definition of 
‘piracy’ discussed in Chapter 2) in the Gulf of Guinea between 2005 and 2013179. The 
analysis in this Chapter is largely based on the statistics in these reports and those of the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB). They show that there were 23 recorded attacks in 2005, 
60 in 2007, and 64 in 2012; thus increasing in nature. The IMB has noted that only about half 
of the piratical attacks in the area are actually reported by the masters of the vessels and 
charterers.180 This may be due to the fear of subsequent reprisals or the exponential increase 
of premiums by maritime insurers. The latter may even stop insuring vessels where the  
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attacks remain unchecked. The IMO has also noted that there were 5 armed attacks against 
vessels in internal waters in 2005 and 31 attacks in 2007. The most remarkable attack was 
that of a Russian crude oil tanker, Shkotovo, in 2006 well within the EEZ, about sixty nautical 
miles off the Guinean coast. The attackers used automatic rifles and rocket-propelled 
grenades and successfully took over the tanker. This showed the vulnerability of vessels in 
the region and the inclination of the pirates to use high levels of violence. What is most 
troubling is that very little has been done by the States with territorial jurisdiction to contain 
the piracy. Thus, in 2012 alone, 17 out of 25 attacks were successful.181 
As noted above, not all regions or States in the Gulf of Guinea have been affected by piracy. 
Also, the nature of the various attacks is not always similar. Some areas are enclaves or 
trouble spots while other areas are low risk. Examples of low risk areas include Cape Verde 
and Angola. In fact, despite the high level of traffic of oil tankers in Angolan waters, there are 
seldom any reported attacks in the area. In fact, the first reported major attack there was that 
on the oil tanker, Kerala, in February 2014.182 The lower level of corruption in the country 
and the absence of armed groups seeking a share of the profit of oil production may explain 
why Angola is low risk. Other low risk areas include Gabon, Ghana, and Sao Tome Principe. 
However, the level of traffic off the coasts of these countries is relatively low. Also, attacks in 
the waters of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea drastically reduced between 2009 and 
2014.183 Thus, most of the incidents reported are theft from vessels in anchorages and ports. 
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The enclaves are the areas from which the pirates operate, while the trouble spots are areas 
where attacks are common. The enclaves include Guinea and Nigeria. Many of the pirates 
operate from Guinea and attack vessels off its coast. Examples of major violent attacks 
include the attack on Shkotovo and Maersk Belfast in 2006, Isola Verde in 2009 and Songa 
Emerald in 2010,184 and Constanza in 2012.185 However, the primary enclave is the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria. The swampy coastal areas in the Niger Delta are among the richest oil and 
gas regions on the planet,186 but also host a very impoverished community. This has 
engendered an armed struggle against the national and local authorities and foreign oil 
companies. The key players in this struggle are described in the next section. The attacks and 
clashes with forces of the federal government are quite common that they have become 
routine. Hence, Guinea and Nigeria are not only enclaves but also trouble spots. Nigeria is 
both the primary enclave and the most dangerous trouble spot given that in 2008 it accounted 
for about 80 per cent of all piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea.187 Other trouble spots 
include Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone where violent attacks are frequently perpetrated 
against vessels. 
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4.4 Primary Actors Responsible for the Attacks 
4.4.1 MEND 
The most notorious militant group in Nigeria is the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND). It is actually an umbrella association for many armed groups that 
engage in activities against the local and federal governments and foreign oil companies. 
They generally seek a share of the oil revenue.188 This is coined as ‘community interests’, 
although they mostly perpetrate criminal activities to protect or secure these interests. 
Initially, they kidnapped foreign workers of oil companies for ransom. The operation was 
directed by the local MEND leader or commander of an Okrika (semiautonomous area within 
MEND’s jurisdiction).189 They are also notorious for destroying oil pipelines and attacking 
offshore oil platforms. Despite the response from the government in hastily creating a joint 
task force of security agencies, the influence of MEND continued to grow towards the end of 
last decade, extending their activities to kidnapping and killing naval personnel.190 Following 
the attacks on a mobile drilling rig, Bulford Dolphin, in April 2007, the tankers, Mystras and 
Trident VIII, in May 2007, and the floating production, storage and off-loading unit, Bonga, 
in 2008, the federal government were forced to negotiate with leaders of MEND.191 These 
incidents supported fears that the sophisticated installations of oil companies were not safe  
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from the attacks by local militia population. MEND released a subsequent statement to the 
effect that it sought to disrupt oil export operations. It boasted about humiliating the Nigerian 
military and claimed it would even step up the attacks.192 Nigeria recorded the highest 
number of attacks against offshore platforms and the attacks impacted the operation of the 
platforms and floating storage facilities. The federal government then came to an 
arrangement with these local groups whereby the latter ceased attacking oil installations in 
exchange for a monthly allowance and training. A formal amnesty was offered in June 
2009.193 
MEND’s forces were demobilised and piracy attacks reduced in 2009 to 46 from a high of 60 
in 2007. The IMB reported that the attacks continued to reduce in 2010. However, not all 
groups within MEND were happy with the arrangement. It was alleged that the allowances 
were not shared equally or some groups were not satisfied with their share. As such, in 2010, 
some splinter groups announced that they will resume the armed struggle. Piratical attacks 
therefore became once more prevalent, and in 2011 there were more than 60 attacks in the 
Gulf of Guinea. This clearly shows that the State with territorial jurisdiction is usually best 
placed to deal with piracy despite the fact that other States such as the flag States and the 
home State of the oil companies and expatriates may have more resources. Thus, even where 
the political leaders of the State with territorial jurisdiction are corrupt and incompetent as it 
is the case with Nigeria, the issue of piracy may not be effectively tackled without their input. 
Nonetheless, the arrangement soon fell through as splinter groups complained that MEND 
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commanders were kept in luxurious hotels and mansions while the majority of the fighters 
remained in poverty. The IMB reported that there were only 3 attacks between April and June 
2009, and 7 attacks between October and November 2009.194 Thus, the number of attacks 
began to rise by the end of 2009 as many of the MEND fighters became frustrated and 
disillusioned with the distribution of the allowances allocated by the federal government and 
oil companies. It has been intimated that there was a sharp divide between the younger 
fighters and the older leaders or commanders.195 
4.4.2 The Bakassi Pirates 
Although Nigeria is the primary enclave in the Gulf of Guinea, piratical attacks have been 
perpetrated in Nigerian internal waters as well as within the EEZ by two groups based in 
neighbouring Cameroon. They include the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF), and the Africa 
Marine Commando (AMC). The BFF is a group of Nigerians living in the peninsula of 
Bakassi at the extreme Eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea that was returned to Cameroon by 
Nigeria. The BFF opposes the transfer of sovereignty to Cameroon which was based on a 
decision of the International Court of Justice.196 In 2008, they attacked a supply vessel, the 
Sagitta, within Cameroon’s territorial sea, kidnapped and kept the crew for 11 days until a 
ransom was paid. The AMC on its part attacked a Chinese fishing vessel in 2010, and 
kidnapped and held the crew until a ransom was paid. However, unlike the Nigerian 
government, the Cameroonian government has reacted very forcefully to the piratical attacks 
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and has succeeded in dismantling the groups within its territory. Thus, there have been very 
fewer attacks perpetrated by these groups in Cameroon. Nonetheless, it is claimed that the 
AMC was involved in the kidnapping of workers of oil companies in 2011.197 
4.4.3 Pirates in Benin 
Benin is the second most volatile area after Nigeria. The aforementioned groups operating in 
the Niger Delta expanded their enclave in Benin and carried out several attacks off the coast 
of Benin in the middle of 2011. The pirates entered port areas of Benin and hijacked vessels. 
They even took the vessel, Aristofanis, to sea and discharged its cargo. This was followed by 
the hijacking of the oil tanker, Duzgit Venture, off the coast of Gabon. The pirates operating 
from Benin seized the vessel and ordered the captain to sail towards a barge where they 
planned to transfer the oil. However, they were unable to meet the barge. The pirates then 
disembarked and kidnapped the captain and another crew member and sailed four kilometres 
away to their enclave.198 What was worrying was that the pirates were able to sail across the 
coastal waters of five different States without any navy attempting to stop them. Thus, this 
incident raised questions about the ability of the States with territorial jurisdiction in the Gulf 
of Guinea to contain piracy in the region. This in turn raises questions about the practicality 
of limiting the enforcement jurisdiction to States with territorial jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, the president of Benin showed political willingness by entreating the secretary-
general of the United Nations to request the support of the international community. He also 
called upon the Nigerian government to help Beninese forces in combating piracy in its 
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waters. This led to the launching of Operation Prosperity that involved a joint patrol of 
Beninese and Nigerian forces patrolling the Benin seas. Benin had the operational command 
and Nigeria had the tactical command. It was reported a few months after Operation 
Prosperity was launched that the number of attacks off the coast of Benin had decreased 
drastically.199 This demonstrated that a multilateral approach may be more effective in 
combating piracy, especially in cases where the State with territorial jurisdiction does not 
have sufficient resources to contain piracy off its coast. Interestingly enough, as the piratical 
attacks reduced following the launching of Operation Prosperity, the number of attacks off 
the coast of neighbouring Togo increased. There were attacks not only off the Togolese coast 
but also in ports. The IMB also reported that Togo had suddenly become a major trouble spot 
with as high as 15 attacks in 2012. As such, the pirates had simply moved their enclave from 
Benin to neighbouring Togo. This is due to the short distance between the coasts of Benin and 
Togo. Nonetheless, it is uncertain why the joint forces under Operation Prosperity did not 
also treat both coasts as a single operational area. 
The  worst  attacks  were  perpetrated  in  September  2011.  Two  tankers,  Mattheos  I  and 
Northern Bell, involved in a tanker to tanker shipment were hijacked about sixty nautical 
miles off the coasts of Benin and Togo.200 The crew of the latter vessel were able to 
overpower the pirates and take control once again. However, the pirates on the Mattheos I 
sailed it to an unknown port. The pirates who lost control of the Northern Bell returned to 
Togo and attacked and hijacked a chemical tanker, Abu Dhabi Star, flying the Singaporean 
flag. The pirates soon moved further into the Gulf of Guinea and hijacked Orfeas in October 
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2012 off the coast of Cote d’Ivoire. They were able to take the Orfeas to the Niger Delta, 
about two thousand kilometres away. They then unloaded the cargo and released the vessel. 
The expansion of the enclave to Togo and Cote d’Ivoire demonstrates the transnational 
character of the crime of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. It also shows why it has been very 
been difficult for a single State to contain the pirates. They operate from different States and 
attack vessels on the high seas; or they hijack vessels in ports and sail them across the high 
seas to the Niger Delta. The pirates therefore have a good grasp of the geography and 
shipping profile of the Gulf of Guinea since they have been able to take the hijacked vessels 
out of the reach of the forces of the State with territorial jurisdiction. This makes it imperative 
for other States affected to intervene. As such, a multilateral approach is the only effective 
way of containing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Nonetheless, this does not imply that all 
States must exercise universal jurisdiction simultaneously or be able to arrest and prosecute 
suspected pirates. As shown in Chapter 3, this approach causes confusion and engenders 
anarchy. The multilateral approach adopted by the Beninese government is more appropriate 
given that it involved setting up a joint force with the State with territorial jurisdiction having 
operational command, and the State (whose interests have also been adversely affected) with 
more resources having the tactical command. Also, if the consent of the State with territorial 
jurisdiction is not obtained, it is uncertain how another State may justify the arrest and 
prosecution of the pirates where the crime was committed within the internal waters of the 
State with territorial jurisdiction. 
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4.5 The Multilateral Approach 
Member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), an initiative 
geared towards promoting collective autonomy and harmonious cooperation between central 
African States, adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security in 2009. A joint force was created 
and ECCAS was divided into zones facilitating the monitoring of the Gulf of Guinea. Joint 
patrols are required to act in accordance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Member States 
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an organisation that seeks 
to achieve collective self-sufficiency for West African States, adopted the Protocol and set up 
a pilot Zone E that comprises the States most affected by the piratical attacks: Benin, Niger, 
Nigeria and Togo. However, several problems have been encountered in the implementation 
of the Protocol including poor communication between the armed forces of the respective 
States, lack of funding, and maritime boundary disputes.201 These have made the joint patrol 
in Zone E especially very ineffective. 
Apart from the efforts of West and central African States, the United States has also been able 
to help. In 2007, it set up the Africa Partnership Station that harbours swift and dock landing 
ships that are continuously present in the Gulf of Guinea. It also facilitates joint exercises 
between US forces and those of the affected States in the area, and helps in capacity building. 
It has also enhanced the implementation of the strategic goals of the US Africa Command 
(AFRICOM). The latter is a combatant command that was created for Africa in 2007 by the 
Bush administration. It is responsible for the military relations between the US and all 
African States, except Egypt. It took over the responsibilities of the US European 
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Command for West Africa (EUCOM), the US Central Command for East Africa 
(CENTCOM), and the US Pacific Command for islands off the coast of East Africa and the 
Indian Ocean (PACOM). It built upon the Pan Sahel Initiative of 2004 that was focused on 
counterterrorism and arms and drug trafficking.202 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies at 
Fort McNair in the US also seeks to meet non-military maritime security needs in the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
Boots notes, however, that the counterpiracy measures implemented at a multilateral level 
may only be successful if the States within the Gulf of Guinea are able to effectively 
prosecute the pirates and keep them in appropriate prisons. However, this may only be 
possible if the international community provides the necessary support to ensure that there 
are sufficient resources for the prosecution of the pirates, while corruption and 
mismanagement of local resources are minimised.203 This is because piracy in the area is 
delocalised with many splinter groups, and they are able to expand their enclave to other 
States. In this light, the European Union set up in January 2013 the Critical Maritime Routes 
in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project with the goal of improving the safety and security 
off the coasts of seven States in the Gulf of Guinea. In May 2014, the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army Navy carried out joint antipiracy drills with military forces of Cameroon in 
the Gulf.204 As noted above, these efforts are not sufficient where the States with territorial 
jurisdiction do not show the requisite commitment. For example, of all the States in the 
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region, only Liberia and Togo have the appropriate piracy legislation. These States are 
signatories of UNCLOS and as shown in Chapter 2, they are required by the latter 
Convention to enact laws that cover all aspects of piracy. However, only Liberia and Togo 
have been able to do so, and they are not even trouble spots. The primary enclave and main 
trouble spot, Nigeria, only began the process of enacting legislation to fight piracy and other 
maritime crimes in January 2013. 
Also, of all the States in the region, only Cote d’Ivoire is a party to all the instruments under 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 1988 (SUA). This has been only since 2012. The oil producing States in the 
region (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Cameroon, and Congo) have not ratified the SUA Fixed 
Platform Protocol. The States that have ratified the SUA Convention (not all its Protocols) 
such as Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire are yet to incorporate the terms of the 
Convention into their national laws. This explains why States may patrol the high seas and 
their coasts but are unable to fully prosecute suspected pirates since they do not have the 
requisite judicial and prosecution structures. Even when they arrest the pirates, they cannot 
charge them with the criminal offences in the penal laws since the latter do not provide for a 
broad definition of piracy. Despite the lack of requisite commitment, the international planned 
crime of piracy is more harmful to these States.205 Interference of maritime transportation 
and access lower financial investment in specific areas, limit energy flows, international 
business, essential infrastructure, and the safeguarding of marine assets in addition to 
impeding security, law enforcement and humanitarian functions. The Gulf of Guinea is also 
one of the biggest sources of fossil fuels, in addition to being the area’s chief 
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consumer market. The States in this area export minerals (like diamonds), timber and 
agricultural products (including cacao and sorghum) via the Gulf of Guinea, which make the 
waters of the Gulf very important to the economic survival of the States. Incidents in the 
maritime sphere also impede access to undersea areas and assets, like fibre optic cables and 
energy and mineral reserves for oil and gas. 
As such, it is incumbent upon States in the Gulf of Guinea to devise and fully implement a 
multilateral strategy. The intelligent norm has been that ‘failed States’ or ‘ungoverned spaces’ 
are requisite breeding grounds for illegal actions such as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms 
smuggling, and piracy. Furthermore, commentators such as Stewart Patrick have contended 
that illegal players may actually discover that ‘vulnerable but operative’ States are more 
feasible surroundings to function in than weakened States, given that the vulnerable States, in 
spite of their issues, are related with the international economy and provide more 
opportunities in terms of cargo vessels sailing across their waters.206 The main enclaves and 
trouble spots in the Gulf of Guinea are vulnerable but operative States. 
4.6 Summary 
This Chapter has examined the phenomenon of piracy in the West coast of Africa, with 
emphasis on the Gulf of Guinea. It has explained the high level of piratical attacks and 
identified the security challenges confronting the States in the region. It was stated that for 
some time now, the Gulf of Guinea has been one of the world’s main oil and gas exploration 
hotspots with eight States producing a tenth of all oil reserves in the world, and more than 5 
million barrels of crude oil per day. It was also noted that most of the populations in these 
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States are impoverished, especially those of the Niger River Delta region, where most of the 
oil fields are located. This is because the local officials are corrupt and largely rely on the 
profits from foreign oil and gas producers. This has caused resentment in the region with the 
local people which, coupled with the region’s lawlessness, has sustained the armed struggle 
waged by local militias. This in turn has led to several armed attacks against oil tankers on 
the high seas, in internal waters, and in ports. Thus, the occurrence of piracy is not simply 
due to lack of security at sea but an incidental product of state failure and corruption. 
However, piracy in the area is delocalised, with many splinter groups that are able to expand 
their enclave to other States. This implies that an exclusive focus on the State with territorial 
jurisdiction would be ineffective in combating piracy and it is imperative that a multilateral 
approach is adopted. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction is more appropriate. 
It was shown that despite several international counterpiracy strategies, including AFRICOM 
involving the US, and EUCOM and CRIMGO involving the European Union, piracy may 
only be successfully contained if the States within the Gulf of Guinea are able to effectively 
prosecute the pirates and keep them in appropriate prisons. Thus, piratical attacks are still 
relatively high because the States in the Gulf do not show the requisite commitment. For 
example, of all the States in the region, only Liberia and Togo have the appropriate piracy 
legislation; only Cote d’Ivoire is a party to all the instruments under the SUA Convention; 
and the oil producing States in the region (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Cameroon, and Congo) 
have not ratified the SUA Fixed Platform Protocol. It was then shown that the multilateral 
approach adopted by the Beninese government is more appropriate given that it involved 
setting up a joint force with the State with territorial jurisdiction having operational 
command, and the State with more resources having the tactical command. This supports the  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argument developed in Chapter 3 to the effect that piracy may be effectively contained where 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited only to cases where the crime allegedly committed 
constitutes a clear violation of a peremptory norm or jus cogens and where the State with 
territorial jurisdiction or the flag State consents to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
by another State. It also reinforces the argument in favour of adopting a doctrinal or positivist 
approach, as well as cosmopolitanism, whereby the flag State or home State of the company 
that owns the vessel would have jurisdiction if the attack occurred in a place where no other 
State has territorial jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN 
Certainly, the agreements in to which states enter with multinational corporations may be 
viewed as an exercise of their sovereignty and not as an impairment of it. If many countries 
prefer to provide multinational corporations with access to their territory because of 
advantages they believe it brings them in providing capital, employment or an infusion of 
technology, this is because they choose to do so.’207 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines the unique case of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It places emphasis on 
piratical attacks off the coast of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Somalia is a failed State after 
decades of civil war, political stalemate, and international terrorism. Pirates have onshore 
support from corrupt officials or terrorist organisations in order to secure safe access to ports. 
As such, this is the case of a State with territorial jurisdiction that does not have the capacity 
to arrest and prosecute pirates. This Chapter seeks to determine whether the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction may be appropriate in combating piracy in such a case. It follows from 
Chapter 4 where it was shown that universal jurisdiction is not a suitable alternative given 
that it provides for a dangerous encroachment on the sovereignty of the State with territorial 
jurisdiction. 
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This Chapter begins with a brief description of the Gulf of Aden and the paradigm of piracy 
in the area. It then discusses the proximate and root causes of piracy and identifies some of 
the key actors. It concludes with an analysis of international efforts both within and outside 
the formal framework of UN resolutions. The successes and shortcomings of these efforts are 
analysed in light of the question of the most appropriate type of jurisdiction. 
In summary Chapter 5 aims to: 
• Explain the high level of piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea and identifies security 
challenges facing States in the region
• Analyse the multilateral approach that has been adopted by States in the region to contain 
piracy
In pursuing these aims, Chapter 5 seeks to address the following question and concern of the 
dissertation research as stated in Chapter 1 such that ... given that the coastal States in the 
Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea are largely poor, weak, lacking in resources, and suffer from 
corruption in the public sphere, we must ask whether regional frameworks of littoral and 
landlocked countries facing the same challenges can be expected to prove effective in the 
attempt to implement anti-piracy policies.208 
5.2 The Gulf of Aden 
Historically known as the Gulf of Berbera, this Gulf was named after a seaport city in Yemen 
whose natural harbour was used as the transhipping point for trade via the Red Sea in the 1st 
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century BC.209 Since the Iron Age many rulers have sought to possess the city given its strategic 
position on the sea route between Europe and India.210 As such, the city and the Gulf have seen 
attacks against vessels throughout history. The Gulf is located between Somalia in the Horn of 
Africa, and Yemen on the south coast of the Arabian Peninsula. As noted above, it connects with 
the Red Sea via the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. The strait has been described as a maritime 
‘chokepoint’211 serving as a strategic shipping route between the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal. Traffic in the Gulf is high and has been 
estimated at about 21,000 vessels each year.212 It is therefore one of the most important sea lanes 
on the planet and gateway for marine transport between the United States, the Middle East and 
Asia.213 Eight percent of world trade passes through the Suez Canal and about three million 
barrels of crude oil pass through the Gulf each day.214 
The high level of traffic in the Gulf and the high-value cargoes may therefore explain why it 
is a piracy hotspot. Equally, the prevalence of automated vessels with very few people on 
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board explains the sudden rise in the number and severity of piratical attacks over the last 
decade. Onuoha and Ezirim note that the attacks increased from 8 in 2004 to 116 in 2009. 
Also, 177 hostages were taken in the Gulf in 2007, and 857 in 2009.215 In 2012 alone, 212 
hostages were taken.216 Ploch et al estimate the cost of piracy on the global economy at 
between 7 and 12 billion US dollars.217 They state that losses are being sustained by many 
businesses because many commercial carriers have decided to circumnavigate the Cape of 
Good Hope in a bid to avoid the Somalian coast. The World Bank gives a good example of 
the options facing vessels that intend to sail from Liverpool in the UK to the Mombasa port in 
Kenya.218 If they have to use the shortest route of 6,363 nautical miles, they would have to 
go through Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. This exposes their cargo and crew to piratical 
attacks in the Gulf of Aden. Thus, they would be forced to employ the longer route of sailing 
around the Cape of Good Hope which is 8,981 nautical miles. This in turn causes delays and 
increases the cost of fuel.219 
Pirates also prevent the transportation and distribution of humanitarian aid, especially to the 
millions of Somalians affected by drought that rely exclusively on food aid.220 Also, the 
tourism industry in the Horn of Africa has been adversely affected with the World Bank 
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noting that visitor arrivals in affected countries (including East African countries) declined by 
6.5 per cent between 2006 and 2013.221 This concerns mostly high-income visitors from 
Europe and North America. 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) noted in 2009 that most of the attacks in the Gulf 
take place off the Somalian East coast in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Oman. The 
pirates, however, are mostly based in Somalia. Figure 2 below shows the location of these 
key areas. It also shows that the Gulf of Aden is a key world trading route allowing access to 
and from the Suez Canal. It is, therefore, a vital and important waterway integral to the world 
economy as regards the transportation of Persian (Iranian) oil. 
Figure 2. Map showing the vital maritime shipping routes surrounding Somalia 
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5.3 Historical Background 
Although there were occasional piratical attacks reported in the Gulf in 1950s,222 few attacks 
were reported until the 1990s. The opposition movement in the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Somali National Movement, often generated income from hijacking vessels for ransom and/or 
reselling the cargo.223 However, in most cases at the time, the pirates did request a ransom. 
They mostly attacked fishing vessels and stole catches. Hijackings for ransom effectively 
began at the turn of the 21st century and has since reached epidemic proportions. As noted 
above, the rampant attacks occur close to the Somali coast and coastline of India, along the 
Arabian Sea, and down in to the Gulf of Aden which has been termed the ‘pirate alley.’224 
However, the entire region surrounding Somalia is now plagued by piracy. The area of 
operation relates to an ‘ever-expanding triangle.’225 This triangle stretches from Yemen and 
Oman to Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania, and even to Mozambique. This is 
because the pirates use hijacked vessels as ‘mother ships’ to carry out other attacks further off 
from the coast of Somalia, in the region of less than 200 nautical miles from India and 120 
miles from Maldives.226 As such, they operate well beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any 
of the States in the Gulf of Aden. This was initially a Somali problem given that the pirates 
initially focused on attacking ships in the Western Indian Ocean, off Somalia’s 
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Eastern coast. However, the ships which operated on that part of the sea moved further out to 
the high seas in order to avoid these attacks. The pirates then shifted their focus to the wider 
Gulf of Aden which is close to Somalia’s northern shoreline, this being a vital waterway of 
the world economy where there is a very high concentration of merchant ships transiting. The 
reasons why piracy suddenly reached epidemic proportions at the turn of the 21st century may 
only be understood in the full context of political and economic factors. These factors are 
more poignant in the case of the piracy in the Gulf of Aden, when compared to piracy in the 
Gulf of Guinea, which is loosely connected to political factors. These factors point to the fact 
that the participation of the Somalian Government is imperative for the development of any 
durable solution to the problem of piracy in the Gulf. The next section discusses these factors 
and shows how they constitute the proximate and root causes of the sharp rise in piracy at the 
turn of the 21st century. 
5.4 Proximate and Root Causes 
In 1991, the ousting of President Said Barre did not only mark the end of a totalitarian and 
regime but also marked the onset of the gradual fragmentation of the Somali Democratic 
Republic along tribal lines, and the genesis of a prolonged and very violent civil war.227 The 
country was subsequently largely split into three entities, namely Puntland, Somaliland and 
Southern Somalia. Puntland is in the north-east and occupied by the Hartri/Darood clans. It is 
governed from the city of Garowe. The former President belonged to these clans, as well most 
members of the cabinet until 1991. Somaliland on the other hand is in the North-West and 
occupied by the Isaaq and Dir clans and governed from the city of Hargeisa. Southern 
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Somalia is the most disorganised of the three entities. There are no state structures and 
designated political decision-makers. Local war lords determine education, health and 
security policies.228 The UN Security Council noted that even though Puntland was more 
stable and had better structures, its government comprised some rogue elements who profited 
from piracy rather than support efforts to eradicate the phenomenon.229 The state of Puntland 
was set up in 1998 with General Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed as leader. He later on became the 
President of the patched up Transitional Federal Government of Somalia between 2004 and 
2008. He took pride in a building a strong military and police force. However, many subjects 
of these security forces became rebels and pirates at night, thereby enabling pirates to enjoy a 
high standing in the community.230 Within the same period, the country’s navy fell apart and 
disbanded. As a result Somalia's coast line was left unprotected, and fishing vessels from 
other countries started to partake in illegal fishing in the unprotected region. In light of the 
encroachment by foreign fishing vessels, piracy in the region has in some instances been 
described as ‘a reactive expression of self-defence against international illegal fishing that 
robs Somali fishermen of the means to make a living.’231 This description is favoured by 
many Somalians but disputed in many quarters on the grounds that although illegal fishing by 
foreign trawls was occurring at an economically relevant scale, it is uncertain whether fishing 
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represents an important source of income to local communities. Also, there are other 
alternative sources of income; fishing accounted for just 2 per cent of the country’s Gross 
National Product (GNP) in 1990 when the number of piratical attacks became alarming.232 
As such, a combination of political and economic factors, including overfishing by foreign 
vessels, high unemployment, corruption, civil war, and the neglect of coastal regions by 
political authorities led to the unprecedented surge in piratical attacks. Somalia is therefore a 
very good example of a failed State that is unable to offer security, healthcare, and security to 
its citizens. It is also unable to collect taxes from foreign fishing vessels, thereby drastically 
limiting its resources and undermining its legitimacy. Given that there are not any rules, 
pirates have more control even than the ruling Transitional Federal Government. The law 
enforcement agencies are small and the judicial systems face a severe lack of assets. Not only 
are the number of lawyers and judges and even imprisonment facilities limited, there is no 
access to even primary items and machinery such as communications systems, computers and 
printers; actually in many situations even the essential office supplies are also not present. 
Due to the sudden existence of an unprotected territorial water space, ships from other 
countries began dumping toxic waste, including radioactive nuclear waste in the area233. As 
such, in this case, the State with territorial jurisdiction was literally unable to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction and it became imperative for the international community to step in 
and deal with the pertinent and growing problems of illegal fishing and dumping. However, 
given that this was a slow process, some local fisherman resorted to taking up arms and 
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attacking commercial ships passing through the region. This was done as an attempt to stop 
the dumping of toxic waste in their territorial waters and the illegal fishing. However, the 
resultant effect was that violence was understood to be the proximate solution to problems. 
Moreover, the only people generating income were soldiers being paid by the Transitional 
Federal Government, members of the terrorist group, al-Shabbab, and pirates that engaged in 
hostage taking. 
Although the nexus between piracy, illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping has not been 
satisfactorily established, piracy has in essence become an organised, lucrative and attractive 
criminal activity undertaken for heinous ends within the war economy of Somalia. Illegal fishing 
and piracy were the most lucrative businesses in addition to human, drugs and arms trafficking, 
and roadblocks.234 As noted above, this is good example of a case where the State with territorial 
jurisdiction is unable to enforce both its domestic laws and international law to arrest and 
prosecute pirates. In fact, senior members of the government allegedly profited enormously from 
the war economy and foot-soldiers either became part-time pirates or joined local militia in order 
to ensure a stable income.235 Thus, the only way in which piracy in the area, which is quite an 
important trade route, could be contained was by the invocation of universal jurisdiction by other 
States with more resources. However, even in such an instance, a single State with sufficient 
resources to combat the pirates on the high seas would certainly be unable to provide the requisite 
comprehensive solution to the intricate and complex problems. The solution must necessarily 
deal with the displacement and wave of refugees, the collapse of social and family structures, and 
culture of violence. Thus, although a State invoking universal jurisdiction may provide security 
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to the merchant ships at sea, it would not address the root causes, and the pirates would 
simply move their enclave. In other words, until southern Somalia and Puntland are stable, 
the heavy-handed intervention by another State or the international community will not 
provide a durable solution. This implies that the State with territorial jurisdiction, the Federal 
Government of Somalia or the three entities, must be involved in the process. It equally 
implies that universal jurisdiction does not ensure a viable outcome since the consent of the 
State with territorial jurisdiction is imperative. 
5.5 Primary Actors 
There is so much confusion and chaos in Somalia that it is difficult to identify and categorise 
pirate groups according to political motives or regional enclaves as it is the case in the Gulf 
of Guinea. There are several enclaves, diverse motives and a wide variety of actors. These 
also make it difficult to characterise piracy in the region in light of a steadfast definition. 
Some of the attacks occur in internal waters, while others occur on the high seas but are 
coordinated from the mainland. Nonetheless, this analysis is limited to piratical attacks 
committed for private ends on the high seas or within the contiguous zone or EEZ. 
There are more pirate groups in Puntland and Central Somalia than in Southern Somalia that 
is controlled by warlords and terrorist organisations. The pirate groups are usually small and 
supported by investors who may hail from other parts of the country or even abroad. The 
most important pirate groups in Central Somalia are from the Hawiye Habar Gidir clan, and 
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specifically from the Sacad and Saleeban sub clans.236 The groups that dominate this 
criminal industry have ties to insurgent and terrorist organisations. Sometimes they use the 
same fighters and/or share the ransom proceeds. Thus, these proceeds have allegedly financed 
the operational and logistical needs of terrorist organisations in the country.237 
Given that none of the ransom demands have had a political dimension, it has been concluded 
that piracy in the Gulf of Aden is devoid of ideological and political motives.238 Also, the 
pirates are not Islamists since they are not reluctant to attack ships owned or controlled by 
Muslims and carry out attacks during Islamic holidays or Ramadan. Nonetheless, in some 
cases, the pirates attack vessels based on directives from insurgent and terrorist organisations. 
They then share proceeds with these organisations and require permission from the latter in 
order to carry out attacks in given areas. As such, although the terrorist organisations are not 
pirate groups per se (they do not perpetrate attacks for private ends), they largely support the 
disparate pirate groups across the country and sometimes require a fee from the pirate groups. 
5.5.1 Al-Shabaab 
This is a Somalian terrorist group that has pledged allegiance to the international terrorist 
organisation, al-Qaeda. Also known as the Mujahedeen Youth Movement and Party of the 
Youth, it is part of the Islamic Courts Union that disbanded after it was routed by the 
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Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in 2006.239 It was somehow able to maintain a 
group of about 9000 militants under a single command and was also able to hold parts of the 
Somalian capital city, Mogadishu for about 5 years. It now currently holds only a few rural 
villages.240 
The leaders of the group hail from different clans and regions and were mostly trained in 
Afghanistan and the Middle East. However, the foot soldiers were trained locally and 
sometimes recruited by force. Nonetheless, the latter are mostly concerned with local 
problems and nationalist issues. This may explain why piracy was said to be linked originally 
to illegal fishing. Many local fighters sought to stop overfishing by foreign trawls went on the 
seas with arms and attacked these trawls. Given al-Shabaab’s extensive network, many 
warlords and criminal gangs have forged alliances with the terrorist organisation. This 
facilitates land-based kidnappings of expatriates and air workers. It has been noted that since 
2008, members of the al-Shabaab have not engaged in sustained combats with individual 
pirate groups and have instead cooperated in many areas.241 Al-Shabaab has for example 
acted as a secondary market for hostages of pirates that happen to have a political value. On 
the other hand, al-Shabaab uses pirate groups to perpetrate political violence by hijacking 
ships flying the flags of certain countries.242 Also, al-Shabaab trains some pirates and allows 
the latter to use the ports they control. Portions of the ransom are then paid to the terrorist 
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organisation. However, Bahadur has argued that the Islamic Courts Union (al-Shabaab’s 
predecessor) had forbidden piracy on the grounds that it was contrary to Islamic law.243 
Sharia law forbids abduction, violence against hostages and extortion. Nonetheless, Bahadur 
does not state that al-Shabaab has interpreted Islamic law in a similar manner since breaking 
away from the Islamic Courts Union. 
There is evidence that there have been violent conflicts between pirate groups and al-Shabaab 
where the former have without permission hijacked vessels in ports controlled by the latter or 
have attacked ships owned by suppliers and financiers of al-Shabaab.244 However, there is 
also evidence that al-Shabaab has trained pirate groups and benefited financially from the 
piratical attacks they perpetrated.245 One of the pioneers in piratical attacks in Somalia, 
Mohamed Abdi Hassan Afweyne, for example negotiated an agreement with al-Shabaab in 
2009, whereby the terrorist organisation agreed not to interfere with the activities of pirate 
groups within the Harardheere area in exchange for the payment of $100,000 per vessel that 
was successfully ransomed.246 As such, MV Albedo was hijacked in November 2010 while 
anchored at Haradheere and did not move far away from its original position during the 
prolonged ransom negotiation, implying that al-Shabaab and the pirates were working 
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together or the latter had obtained permission from al-Shabaab to keep the hijacked vessel 
within the area.247 The pirates in the area and al-Shabaab are said to have sub clan ties.248 
From the above, it may be contended that ties between pirate groups and terrorist 
organisations such as al-Shabaab enabled the pirate groups in Somalia to develop both 
horizontally and vertically. The terrorist organisations have enabled the pirate groups to 
acquire sophisticated weapons and gadgets to enable them attack vessels deep into the Gulf 
of Aden and even the Indian Ocean. They are able to use satellite phones and rocket-
propelled grenades and convert fishing vessels into ‘mother ships’ that can freely survey the 
coast and target cargo vessels or bulk carriers. They have also developed vertically in regard 
to the number of attacks they are able to perpetrate. As noted above, the allied terrorist 
organisations turn a blind eye to the pirate groups allowing the latter to attack not only cargo 
vessels and bulk carriers but also fishing trawls, tugboats and even ships from the World 
Food Programme (WFP) of the UN.249 The WFP ships roughly around 30,000 to 40,000 
metric tons of food assistance every month to the Horn of Africa. Due to piracy, it became 
very expensive and dangerous to send food assistance to Mogadishu. In July 2007, the IMO 
and WFP issued a joint report expressing serious concern over the collapsing maritime 
security situation along the Somali coast and calling on the UN to act to prevent and suppress 
acts of piracy in the region. Before the 1990, vessels were relatively safe when they kept at 
least 50 nautical miles from the coast. However, with the horizontal and vertical expansion of 
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piracy, vessels were advised to keep at least 200 nautical miles from the coast;250 that is out 
of the EEZ. 
5.6 The Question of Multilateralism 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden provides a good case for multilateralism given that the State with 
territorial jurisdiction, Somalia, is a completely failed State with no political leadership and 
war lords governing different zones. However, the piratical attacks adversely affect 
international trade and no durable solution may be had from the State of Somalia. In fact, the 
international insurance company, Lloyds, suggested that companies all around the world 
would have to pay a ‘piracy tax’ in order to maintain the global trading networks and prevent 
an international economic meltdown.251 This shows that the economies of different countries 
are interdependent, and if Somalia is unable to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, other 
countries are going to suffer. Property and ships of companies operating in other States are 
threatened, as well as important sea lines and the free flow of trade. With more than 200 ships 
passing close to the Somali coast every day, piracy in the area is a concern to major players in 
the global economy. Many industries have been negatively impacted, including oil and gas 
and fishing. Also, the lives of the citizens of several countries are put in jeopardy. 
However, no State has been able to invoke universal jurisdiction in order to arrest and 
prosecute the pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
surge of piratical attacks in the region is a symptom of a very complex set of problems that 
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requires the input of Somalia (at least the Transitional Federal Government) before any 
durable solution may be had. The initial response by other States (who do not have territorial 
jurisdiction) was to establish a strong military presence on the high seas and protect 
vulnerable commercial vessels passing close to the Somalian coast.252 In December 2008, 
the European Union (EU) for example set up the EU NAVFOR Atalanta. This was the first 
maritime deployment by the EU under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
The primary role of this operation was to protect World Food Program shipments and other 
commercial ships. Participants were given authorization to ‘employ the necessary measures, 
including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of 
piracy and armed robbery which may have been committed in the areas where they were 
present.’ The European Council continued the official order for Operation ATALANTA for 
another year to December 2010. The operation was to consist of up to twenty ships and in 
terms of personnel, over 1,800 staff. 
From September 2009, a number of countries including Spain, France and Sweden provided 
permanent personnel and support. The EU NAVFOR was able to set up an online command 
Centre called the Maritime Security Centre- Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) to monitor any 
ships passing though the waters and provide live information on possible threats to the ships. 
The type of tracking system employed by the MSC-HOA is similar to a system employed by 
the US Navy’s Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain and the United Kingdom’s Maritime 
Trade Operations office in Dubai. 
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In January 2009, the US set up the Combined Task Force that was part of the Combined 
Maritime Forces with a mandate to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Eight months later, 
NATO set up Operation Ocean Shield. Representatives of these three forces held meetings in 
Bahrain to coordinate their efforts. These were called Shared Awareness and De-confliction 
(SHADE). What is interesting about SHADE is that it was open to all the stakeholders in 
operations in the Indian Ocean. Thus, not only the EU and US participated in SHADE. 
A maritime security patrol area was created in the Gulf of Aden by the Combined Task Force 
in August 2008 to ensure safe passage for ships carrying cargo. This security zone comprises 
routes going both eastwards and westwards in order to ‘to de-conflict commercial transit 
traffic with Yemeni fishermen, provide a measure of traffic separation, and allow maritime 
forces to conduct deterrent operations in the Gulf of Aden with a greater degree of flexibility.’ 
All US ships traversing the waters in the area surrounding the Gulf of Aden are urged to 
travel using the recommended routes to increase the chances of a safe journey. This 
minimised the attacks and the need to arrest and transfer pirates to Somalia. The Combined 
Task Force operated together with the United States Coast Guard Law Enforcement 
Detachments (LEDET) in assisting and providing advice on operations which include 
boarding. The LEDET has also helped in training personnel on how to gather evidence, 
interpret maritime legislation and other issues which are relevant to their presence on the 
gulf. Other countries such as Russia and India have also provided naval assistance in the 
region to anti-piracy campaigns. Although these countries do not operate in accordance with 
the policies of the Combined Task Force, there are ongoing efforts to integrate their efforts 
with force. However, the operations are coordinated under SHADE. 
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It is also important to mention NATO’s ‘Operation Allied Provider’ that has provided 
temporary security to the WFP shipments to the region. After three months of operations 
NATO recalled Operation Allied Provider and handed over the protection responsibilities to 
the EU’s naval force which is a part of Operation Atlalanta. NATO then launched Operation 
Allied Protector in March 2009 under the control of the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1. 
NATO subsequently deployed Operation Ocean Shield under the control of Standing NATO 
Maritime Group 2 to take over the reins from Operation Allied Protector in August 2009. 
Operation Ocean Shield’s main role was to prevent piratical attacks and engage pirates in any 
attacks that occurred whilst they were on patrol. They also helped States in the Gulf of Aden 
in capacity building. In this regard, the flagship of the fleet made visits to the Puntland 
government as well as the Bosaso port in Somalia to discuss security and maritime shipping 
with the officials there. By August 2009, there were ships from the UK, Greece and Italy 
amongst others participating in Standing NATO Maritime Group 2. 
It is important to note that although proving burdensome on global costs and efforts, all of 
these coordinated naval efforts have likely contributed to the present reduction in the total 
number of reported and attempted attacks. In fact, naval forces apparently ‘thwarted 126 
attacks in 2008, 176 in 2009 and 127 in 2010.’253 
Furthermore, no WFP ship has been hijacked since the ships began receiving escorts from the 
above navies. Also, ships travelling through the Gulf of Aden corridor have not been 
successfully attacked and ransomed since naval forces began organizing commercial shipping 
vessels into transit groups. This process has allowed the navies to closely watch a designated 
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number of ships and have promptly responded when they received distress calls. The naval 
forces have also successfully captured pirates who have attacked or attempted to attack ships 
at sea. Reports indicate that between January and August 2009 alone, the foreign naval forces 
encountered more than 500 pirates, 10 of whom were killed, 282 of whom were disarmed and 
released, and 235 of whom were transferred for prosecution.254 
The anti-piracy naval patrols, however, simply do not have the capacity to secure the safe 
passage of every transiting ship. In many cases, pirates are able to board and take hostages 
within fifteen to thirty minutes of being sighted. This amount of time is too short for a naval 
ship to respond unless it is only a few miles away. Major General Howes for example said 
that ‘83 [ships] would be needed in order to provide response conditions of half an hour.’ On 
the other hand, William Wechler, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Global 
Threats (for the US) said that pirates were now able to cover an area as large as 2.9 million 
nautical miles and took the rather cynical view that it would not be possible to regulate such a 
large expanse.255 There are also fears among States that the pressures of lowering costs and 
budgeting will reduce the amount available for piracy defence. This has led to considerations 
of the use of private military companies to take on the burden of ensuring the safety of ships 
against pirates.256 
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Resolution 1816 of the UN granted member States the right to treat Somali territorial waters 
as the high seas. States cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government were allowed, 
for a period of six months, to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use ‘all necessary 
means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with relevant 
provisions of international law.’ Although this resolution provided a proximate and effective 
solution against piracy off the Horn of Africa, it did not address the root causes. That is why 
despite the fact that over $1 billion has been spent annually, the issue of piracy is still very 
much part of the region’s most crucial problems.257 It is interesting that the provisions of 
UNCLOS providing for universal jurisdiction in the case of the arrest and prosecution of 
pirates were unable to provide an effective solution here given that attacks on the high seas 
were coordinated from Somalia; or vessels were hijacked on the high seas and then moved to 
Somali ports. Thus, the UN resolution had to specifically grant the right to treat Somali 
territorial waters as the high seas to States cooperating with the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia. This shows the importance of territorial jurisdiction and also the 
futility of universal jurisdiction when the consent of the State with territorial jurisdiction is 
not obtained. 
EUNAVFOR’s Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and the US-led 
Combined Task Force have no doubt been instrumental in increasing collaboration and 
information-sharing between maritime stakeholders. The broad aim of these operations is to 
detect, disrupt and suppress pirate activity launched from Somalia. Although initial efforts 
were concentrated in the Gulf of Aden, as attacks began to take place further away from the 
coast of Somalia and into the Indian Ocean, warships with helicopter capacity began to patrol 
an area of approximately 2.5 million square nautical miles, encompassing the Gulf of Aden, 
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the Somali Basin, the Arabian Sea and the stretch of Indian Ocean from East Africa to the 
Indian coast and as far south as Madagascar. Successful patrols are also carried out 
unilaterally, including by the Russian, Chinese and Indian navies, particularly within the 
internationally recommended transit corridor (IRTC) to ensure that the busy shipping route 
through the Gulf of Aden operates securely. 
There has been a significant decline in the number of piratical attacks as a result of 
international navies patrolling the Gulf of Aden.258 However, many Somali pirates have 
simply shifted focus to the Indian Ocean, and are now able to operate hundreds of nautical 
miles from the Somali coastline, often with the support of terrorist organisations like al-
Shabaab. This explains why attacks still take place, although less frequently. Their mother 
ships tend to operate out of the Somali ports controlled by terrorist groups or corrupt 
government officials such as the ports of Bosaso, Mogadishu, as well as the Yemeni ports of 
Al Mukalla and Ash Shihr. 
The presence of several countries working together makes a valuable case for multilateralism. 
The success of the concerted military operations became a strategic interest for many 
countries that were adversely affected by piracy in the Gulf of Aden. However, the relatively 
successful SHADE operation has not affected other root causes of the surge in piracy such as 
high unemployment, endemic corruption, and the influence of war lords. This may be due to 
the fact that the States in the Gulf of Aden did not fully participate. On the other hand, the 
fact that the States that set up the strong military presence in the Gulf and directed operations 
did not have territorial jurisdiction certainly raises many legal issues. Hence, the Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) set up a special working group on legal 
issues to this effect. Since 2009, the working group has held 15 meetings during which legal 
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guidance was provided to all States and private organisations involved in the implementation 
of counter-piracy measures. The objective was to determine a common legal approach to 
piracy given the ambiguity of UNCLOS as shown in Chapter 2. The working group also 
sought to develop a legal and practical framework through which pirates may be arrested and 
prosecuted. It was however uncertain whether the convicted pirates have to be transferred to 
Somalia to serve their sentence. That requires strong local ownership of the legal process. At 
the time of setting up the Working Group, it was thought that pirates caught and transferred to 
Somalian authorities were released immediately due to the absence of a prosecution system. 
The UN Special Adviser on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia noted in 
2011 that Somalia did not have an effective system for prosecution and thus could not 
prosecute pirates. As such, it was important to establish a regional or International Tribunal 
for piracy outside Somalia. This implies that other States would commit to prosecute 
suspected pirates until Somalia would have the capacity to establish a viable system for 
prosecution. This no doubt imposes a financial and political burden on the other States that 
are required to fund the prosecution, as well as the stay of the pirates in their penitentiary 
institutions. The UN Special Adviser however recommended that it may be best for the 
convicted pirates to serve out their sentences in institutions that are close to relatives. Thus, 
the Working Group sought to set up a system whereby convicted pirates could serve part of 
their sentence in the State in which they were convicted and then later on transferred to 
Somalia to serve out their sentence. This is referred to as the Post Trial Transfer mechanism. 
As such, States like Seychelles have arrested, prosecuted and convicted pirates and then 
transferred to prisons in Somalia. 
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5.7 Summary 
This Chapter has examined the unique case of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, with emphasis on 
piratical attacks off the coast of the failed State of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. It was noted 
that the Gulf of Aden has been the transhipping point for trade via the Red Sea since the 1st 
century. It remains a strategic shipping route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian 
Sea in the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal with traffic estimated at about 21,000 vessels 
each year. Since the early 1990s, there has been a consistent increase in the number of 
piratical attacks in the gulf. In fact, by the turn of the 21st century, they had reached epidemic 
proportions. Rampant attacks occur close to the Somali coastline in the Indian Ocean, and 
along the Arabian Sea, and down into the Gulf of Aden which has been termed the ‘pirate 
alley’. Following a prolonged civil war, Somalia was split into three entities, namely 
Puntland, Somaliland and southern Somalia. The country’s navy fell apart and disbanded. Its 
coast line was left unprotected, and fishing vessels from other countries started to partake in 
illegal fishing at unprecedented levels. The law enforcement agencies of the Federal 
Transitional Government are small and the judicial systems face a severe lack of assets. 
However, piracy has become an organised, lucrative and attractive criminal activity 
undertaken for heinous ends within the war economy of Somalia. 
In light of the above analysis we have a good example of a case where the State with 
territorial jurisdiction is unable to enforce either its domestic laws and international law to 
arrest and prosecute pirates. In fact, senior members of the government allegedly profited 
enormously from the war economy and foot-soldiers either became part-time pirates or joined 
local militia in order to ensure a stable income. What is interesting here is that although the 
piratical attacks adversely affect international trade, no State has been able to invoke 
universal jurisdiction in order to arrest and prosecute the pirates operating in the Gulf of  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Aden. Nonetheless, there have been coordinated naval efforts of several countries that have 
contributed to the significant reduction in the total number of reported attacks. Resolution 
1816 of the UN granted member States the right to treat Somali territorial waters as the high 
seas. However, the right is granted specifically only to States cooperating with the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. This shows the importance of territorial 
jurisdiction and also highlights the deficiencies of universal jurisdiction in cases where the 
consent of the State with territorial jurisdiction is not obtained. A consent based approach is 
surely the way to increase the likelihood of successful operations and to optimise the effect of 
measures aimed at alleviating root causes of the surge in piracy such as high unemployment, 
endemic corruption, and the influence of war lords. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PROSECUTION OF PIRATES AND THE CASE OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 
‘Pirates are generally described as sea robbers. They are deemed hostes humani generis, 
enemies of mankind, warring against the human race… Pirates are highwaymen of the sea, 
and all civilized nations have a common interest, and are under moral obligation, to arrest 
and suppress them.’259 
6.1 Introduction 
It has been shown in the previous Chapters that the States with territorial jurisdiction in the 
Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden have generally been ineffective in prosecuting alleged 
pirates. This is attributable to a variety of reasons including the lack of political will, lack of 
the appropriate infrastructure, and the non-existence of penal laws specifically criminalising 
piratical acts. Thus the response of the criminal justice system of these States remains a major 
handicap. Where alleged pirates are arrested by the navies of other States within the Gulf of 
Aden, what becomes of them when handed over to the Somalian authorities is very much 
uncertain. The fact that the country is split into (at very least) three distinct regions, with 
several war lords controlling different parts makes it difficult to contend that the central 
government would be able to control the process. Also, the States that arrest the pirates are 
sometimes unable to prosecute them because the attack occurred, or arrest was made, in the 
contiguous zone or EEZ which, technically, is considered as the territorial waters of the home 
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State. Moreover, where they are prosecuted and imprisoned in the States that make the arrest, 
the pirates become a burden to their taxpayers. Another issue that cannot be overlooked is 
that of returning them to Somalia when they are likely to be tortured and killed. This Chapter 
discusses the above impediments with the objective of showing that there is a strong case for 
the establishment of an International Tribunal. 
In summary Chapter 6 aims to: 
• Discuss the impediments to the prosecution of pirates in States with territorial jurisdiction
• Examine international efforts at enhancing the prosecution of pirates
• Develop the argument for the establishment of an International Tribunal
6.2 The Prosecution by States with Territorial Jurisdiction 
We saw in previous Chapters that for the purposes of consistency and coherence, pirates 
ought to be prosecuted and sentenced by the States with territorial jurisdiction or with the 
consent of the latter. However, there are important jurisdictional, logistical and ethical 
difficulties related to the prosecution of alleged pirates in the States with territorial 
jurisdiction. It is therefore unsurprising that it has been reported that over 90 per cent of the 
alleged pirates captured at sea have been released because the States of the Gulf of Aden 
were not prepared to detain and prosecute them.260 Thus, many foreign navies capture the 
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pirates, seize their weapons and vessels and send them away.261 Also, due to the confusion 
and uncertainty as regards the outcome of the process, more than 1000 alleged Somali pirates 
captured in the Gulf of Aden were said to be awaiting trial in 20 States.262 
There is so much to be done to improve the capacity of the States of the Gulf of Aden or Gulf 
of Guinea in order to enable them to prosecute and imprison pirates on a consistent basis that 
it is difficult to see how the processes of collecting and preserving evidence and sharing of 
information may be enhanced. Moreover, the laws of these countries do not make piracy a 
universal offence in light of the provisions of UNCLOS. Thus, persons that perpetrate 
piratical acts in their internal waters (including within the EEZ that may be 200 nautical miles 
from the shore) cannot be arrested and prosecuted by any other State, whose navy may be 
present in the area.263 Despite the fact that UNCLOS (specifically Article 100) provides for 
universal jurisdiction, it has been pointed out that prior to the exponential increase in the 
number of piratical attacks off the Somali coast or in the Gulf of Guinea, there were few cases 
in which the alleged pirates were arrested and prosecuted by a State that was unconnected to 
the ship that was attacked or the victims on board the ship.264 This reinforces the argument 
developed in Chapters 2 and 3 that universal jurisdiction fuels uncertainty and 
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confusion and may even provoke conflict between the prosecuting State asserting universal 
jurisdiction and the State with territorial jurisdiction. 
6.2.1 International Efforts 
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65/37 of December 7, 2010 called upon 
member States ‘to take appropriate steps under their national law to facilitate the 
apprehension and prosecution of those who are alleged to have committed acts of piracy.’265 
In this light, it advised member States to adopt national laws that reflect the provisions of 
UNCLOS.266 The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the United Nations 
Office of Legal Affairs and the IMO have published guidelines geared towards helping States 
interested in enacting new statutes on piracy or amending existing legislation.267 They would 
ensure that the provisions of the statutes of these States are consistent with those of UNCLOS 
relating to piracy. In the same vein, the United Nations Security Council has passed a number 
of resolutions calling on member States to enact laws criminalising piracy. The States are 
enjoined to enact laws with a broader scope than UNCLOS in order to facilitate the 
prosecution and sentencing of pirates. However, it is only logical that international efforts 
would not be sufficient unless they are enforced within a regional security infrastructure. 
What was required by the United Nations Resolution 65/37 was something in the mould of 
the East Asian Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
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against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which had very successfully provided a regional 
infrastructure for the implementation of consensual solutions in East Asia.268 
However, in the absence of such a structure in the Horn of Africa or Gulf of Aden and Gulf of 
Guinea, an attempt was made in a first instance to work within existing regional organisations 
such as the African Union (AU),269 the East African Community (EAC), the 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the South African Development 
Community (SADC). This attempt proved to be unfruitful for a wide variety of reasons, 
mostly political, which would not be discussed here. It was then thought that it might be best 
to establish an independent structure outside of these extant organisations. This led to the 
creation of regional structures to govern the processes in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of 
Guinea. The efforts in both regions are not coordinated from the same platform. They are 
conducted in parallel despite the fact that they have similar objectives and focus on piracy in 
Africa. As regards the Gulf of Aden, consensual solutions were implemented through the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea Areas Process. It is 
referred to here as the Djibouti Code of Conduct. The next section examines the process of 
implementing a consensual counter-piracy policy through the Code. 
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6.2.1.1 The Djibouti Code of Conduct 
The Code was developed following a number meetings sponsored by the IMO between 2005 
and 2008. They were held in three countries in the Gulf of Aden and East Africa: Yemen, 
Oman, and Tanzania. As noted above, the goal was to set up a regional structure through 
which a common counter-piracy policy would be implemented.270 A draft memorandum of 
understanding and a Code of Conduct were tabled at the meeting in Tanzania in April 2008. 
On January 29th of the following year, the Code was formally adopted by representatives of 
the governments of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea States, as well as Jordan, France, and South 
Africa, and observes from UN specialised agencies, and other IMO member States. Unlike 
the ReCAAP, the Djibouti Code is not open to accession by any State. Article 16(1) of the 
Code provides that it is open to accession only to participants of the meeting of January 29, 
2009. Thus, it is open only to 21 States, most of them in the Gulf of Aden or with a Western 
Indian Ocean coast. It was originally signed by 9 of these States271 but by March 2010, 13 
States had signed the Code, including some of the States that act as enclaves of pirates in the 
Gulf of Aden, namely Somalia, Djibouti, and Yemen.272 The objective of Code is stated as 
follows: 
to promote greater regional co-operation and thereby enhance their effectiveness in 
the prevention, interdiction, prosecution and punishment of those persons engaging in 
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piracy  and  armed  robbery  against  ships  on  the  basis  of  mutual  respect  for  the 
sovereignty, sovereign rights, sovereign equality, jurisdiction and territorial integrity 
of states.273 
In spite of the fact that the Djibouti Code was borne out of the inability of coastal States such 
as Somalia and Djibouti to combat piracy off their shores, it is interesting to note the 
emphasis placed on ‘mutual respect for the sovereignty, sovereign rights, sovereign equality, 
jurisdiction and territorial integrity of states.’ This shows that these States still prioritise their 
sovereign rights and would only accept a solution that involves the recognition of these 
rights. Given that the Djibouti Code is modelled on ReCAAP,274 it seeks to enhance a 
coordinated flow of information through a system of focal points in the different signatory 
States and piracy information exchange centres in Tanzania, Kenya, and Yemen.275 Also, 
Article 9 of the Code provides for the development of common reporting criteria. This is to 
ensure that the threat of piracy across the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden is 
accurately accessed. The Code is generally divided into three parts. The first part elaborates 
on the signatories’ willingness to cooperate and implement the provisions of the Code. The 
second part discusses the core components of the Code and provides parameters of the 
technical contributions required from some key States; and the third part provides parameters 
for the joint training of maritime security forces at the Djibouti Regional Training Center. The 
Project Implementation Unit (PIU) has been charged with coordinating and steering the 
process since April 2010. It is based at IMO’s headquarters in London. The PIU also 
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manages the voluntary trust fund. Several members of the United Nations and IMO have 
made contributions to the fund, including France, Japan, the Netherlands, and the Republic of 
Korea. This demonstrates that the Code has received wide support. The UN Security Council 
Resolution 1918 welcomed the progress being made to implement the Code and called upon 
the signatory States to implement it as fully as possible.276 
Nonetheless, it seems the Code’s success is limited to the originality or novelty of the approach 
rather than effective results on the ground in terms of the number of arrests and prosecutions of 
pirates. Thus, Geiss and Petrig note that the Code may be referred to as ‘a milestone 
development’ and ‘a central instrument in the development of regional capacity.’277 This implies 
that it is a commendable starting point for the successful cooperation and coordination in the Gulf 
of Aden, although the results of the cooperation and coordination are not yet obvious. 
Notwithstanding, six years on and it was uncertain whether the Code may develop a robust 
infrastructure that can cope with the wider broader security challenges. However, only recently in 
2015, 6 years after it was formally adopted, the Djibouti Code has announced amendments to 
include tackling other illicit maritime activity that threatens the safety and security in the region. 
The expansion includes other crimes such as marine terrorism, human trafficking, illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing and environmental crimes. Moreover, the expansion of the 
Code includes capacity building programmes to counter the threat of piracy in order for the 
sustainable development of the maritime sector.278 
There is yet to be a regional maritime security force. This may be due to the fact that there is 
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some confusion as regards whether the Code binds signatory States. It was designed as a 
nonbinding agreement but is deemed to be legally binding on States that have committed to 
implement its provisions.279 Nonetheless, the participating States have not expressed the 
willingness to sacrifice some part of their sovereignty in favour of a multinational operational 
force. The fact that they insisted on the emphasis on their sovereign rights indicates that the 
creation of such a force may be uphill task. It worth mentioning that the States could not 
agree on having a single information sharing centre and three had to be set up in three 
different countries. They could not equally agree on having a political oversight body that 
would determine the future of the Code. Thus, they have to turn to the IMO to act as such a 
forum. Also, the fact that none of the regional organisations such as the AU or EAC is 
involved is quite indicative of the level of political cooperation between the participating 
States. It is equally uncertain why two influential States that share the Western Indian Ocean, 
India and Pakistan, were not part of the process. Both countries are quite experienced in 
fighting piracy and would have made significant contributions to the joint effort 280. 
As such, the Djibouti Code will continue to be the first step of a journey of a thousand miles 
that has only really just begun. As of now, what is most frustrating is that there is no 
multinational force patrolling the Western Indian Ocean and arresting pirates. Also, there is 
no multinational structure through which pirates arrested on the Western Indian Ocean coast 
may be prosecuted and sanctioned. The participating States are required to amend their 
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national laws to ensure that they criminalise piracy but there is nothing within the Code to 
compel them. It is expected that they would refer to the guidance documents on the elements 
of national legislation. Nonetheless, many States in the Gulf of Aden have adopted the 
definition in UNCLOS; some have incorporated the words of the Convention, while others 
refer to the obligations enshrined in the Convention in relation to piracy offences. These 
disjointed approaches may frustrate the joint efforts in prosecuting and sentencing pirates. It 
may for example be difficult for a country with a civil law (continental European) system to 
gather evidence for the prosecution of alleged pirates in a country with a common law system 
where the state attorney must prove all elements of the criminal offence beyond reasonable 
doubt or where the criminal law requires all elements of the offence to be described for 
enforcement purposes.281 However, what is important to note is that the laws of many States 
that have signed the Djibouti Code are still less developed than expected. This makes it 
difficult to ensure that acts of violence at sea against are investigated and prosecuted on a 
consistent basis. Also, the fact that some of the key States in the Gulf of Aden such as Eritrea 
and Somalia (enclaves of pirates) opted to stay out of the SUA Convention makes it even 
more difficult to ensure that piratical acts were prosecuted and punished on a consistent basis. 
6.2.2 Prosecutions in the Gulf of Aden 
Despite the size of the task to establish consistent prosecution of alleged pirates through an 
established infrastructure, a number of States in the Gulf of Aden have committed to 
investigating and prosecuting pirates. Some of them include Seychelles, Tanzania, and 
Mauritius. The strongest commitment has been made by Kenya which has prosecuted 
 
281. Shnider, fn. 249 supra  520. 
!155
hundreds of alleged pirates. It received assistance from the United Nations Office of Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) to strengthen its judicial structures and penitentiary institutions. Thus, 
in 2006, when the US Navy captured pirates that had taken over an Indian registered vessel, 
the Safina al-Bisarat, about 300 miles of the coast of Somalia (out of the EEZ), the alleged 
pirates were transferred to Kenya in spite of the fact that neither the pirates nor the victims 
were from Kenya. A Kenyan court tried, convicted and sentenced them to seven years 
imprisonment in Kenya.282 Shnider states that between 2009 and 2010, over 50 pirates were 
convicted and sentenced in Kenya.283 However, Kenyan courts at the time were grappling 
with inconsistencies between different provisions of their penal code as regards piracy. 
Section 5 of the Penal Code of the Laws of Kenya (Chapter 63) for example provides that 
‘The jurisdiction of the courts of Kenya for the purposes of this Code extends to every place 
within Kenya, including territorial waters.’ However, section 69(1) (which was later on 
repealed by the Merchant Shipping Act 2009) provided that every ‘person who in territorial 
waters or upon the high seas, commits any act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of the offence 
of Piracy.’ In Hashi,284 the High Court held that both provisions were inconsistent and 
section 5 limiting the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts took precedence over section 69 as 
regards the definition of piracy. Notwithstanding, given that section 69 had been repealed in 
2009, its provisions could not be considered. 
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However, the Merchant Shipping Act 2009 (section 369) adopted the definition of piracy in 
UNCLOS. Thus, it provides that piracy is any act of violence or detention on the high seas 
committed for private ends. Interestingly, it does not specify that Kenyan courts would have 
jurisdiction even where the offence was committed on a ship outside of the Kenyan territory, 
and irrespective of the nationality of the alleged pirates. Mutoka nonetheless argues that this 
statute (when read together with the Constitution of Kenya, 2010) expands the jurisdiction of 
Kenyan courts in that regard.285 Her interpretation is strange since nothing in the provisions 
indicate that this is the case. Article 165(3) of the Constitution notes that the High Court has 
unlimited original jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters; and section 430(1) of the 
Merchant Shipping Act provides that any offence under the statute shall be deemed to have 
been committed in any place in Kenya where the accused may be for the time being. It is 
difficult to contend both provisions expand the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts given that 
unlimited original jurisdiction does not imply that Kenyan courts may assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Thus, it is logical to agree with the High Court in Hashi that had argued that the 
controlling provision as regards the definition of piracy is Section 5 of the Penal Code. 
It is therefore unsurprising that an International Crimes Division was later on created at the 
High Court in Kenya. However, the argument put forward by Chief Justice Willy Mutunga to 
justify the creation of this special division was more political than legal. He noted that 
international crimes constituted a ‘mortal threat’ to the Kenyan economy.286 Nonetheless, the 
division was tasked with dealing with transnational offences, including money laundering, 
terrorism, human trafficking, and piracy. The division was expected to be modelled on the 
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International Criminal Court and adopted the rules and procedures of the latter court.287 It 
must also be noted that Kenya is the exception, since very few States outside the Gulf of 
Aden have accepted to prosecute and sentence pirates; and this has only been in cases 
involving Somali pirates and where the interests of these States were directly involved. The 
trials of pirates in France have been for attacking French vessels such as the attack on the 
Carre D’As in 2011, and Le Ponant in 2012. Equally, the trial of pirates in Germany has been 
for the seizing of a German registered vessel, the MV Taipan; and the prosecution of pirates in 
Italy was for the hijacking of a cargo ship flying the Italian flag, the Monte Cristo.288 
Nonetheless, although alleged pirates have been detained by French, Spanish, German and 
Dutch authorities, only the latter had exercised universal jurisdiction and prosecuted the 
alleged pirates in a court of law in the Netherlands. In May 2010, 5 pirates were tried and 
convicted in a Dutch court and then sentenced to five years imprisonment.289 The reason for 
the approach adopted by the Netherlands may be the broad scope of its national law on 
piracy. Article 381 of the Dutch Penal Code defines a pirate as a person who enters into 
service or is serving as a master on a vessel with knowledge of the fact that the vessel is 
intended for the commission of acts of violence against other vessels on the high seas. Thus, 
Dutch courts are empowered to entertain cases of piracy on the high seas. Article 4 of the 
Dutch Penal Code also provides for the universality principle of jurisdiction when criminal 
acts of piracy are committed. This may be contrasted with Germany that does not have any 
provisions that specifically refer to ‘piracy’. Section 316(c) of the German Criminal Code 
punishes attacks on air and maritime traffic. Spain on its part had no rules governing piracy 
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until 2010. The Organic Law of 10/1995 was amended in 2010 to include the definition of 
piracy as any person using violence, intimidation or deception to seize or destroy a ship or 
other vessels or platform at sea. Lastly, the Belgian legislator has empowered the Belgian 
Public Prosecutor to prosecute any person suspected of piracy outside of Belgium where the 
vessel that was attacked is registered in Belgium or where the alleged pirates were arrested by 
the Belgian navy. This was recently demonstrated in the case of Mohamed Abdi Hassan who 
was suspected of organising an attack on a stone dumping vessel called “Pompeii” in 2009 
whereby ten crew were held ransom for over 70 days for demands of two million euros. In 
October 2013, Abdi, also known as “Afweyne” or “Big Mouth” in English was enticed into 
visiting Belgium for a fictional film project. The operation came about after the Belgian 
authorities gave the Public Prosecutor the green light to arrest and prosecute those involved 
in piracy, as mentioned above. The operation was a success with Abdi receiving twenty years 
imprisonment and a strong message to anyone involved in such crimes.290 The Belgian 
authorities have made it clear that they will go to extraordinary lengths to ensure these crimes 
will not go unpunished and justice need not be limited to a particular location where there are 
inadequacies or limited infrastructures in dealing with such crimes.  
The above provisions show that ironically, it is the States whose vessels or nationals are 
attacked on the high seas that are more likely to adopt laws providing for universal 
jurisdiction rather than the States from where the pirates operate. It seems the latter States are 
more concerned with violations of their sovereign rights by the former States, thus making it 
difficult to adopt a common approach to combat piracy.  
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Nonetheless, where the attack occurs on the high seas, it is less likely that the sovereign 
rights of any coastal State may be violated by the navy of another State that intervenes and 
arrests the pirates. It is the rights of the State in which the vessel is registered or the State 
where the victims are domiciled that may be violated by the intervening State. The State in 
which the vessel is registered has territorial jurisdiction, while the State were the victims are 
domiciled has personal jurisdiction. For the purposes of consistency, the intervening State 
must be either of these States or must act with their consent. 
6.2.3 Prosecutions in the Gulf of Guinea 
Although the States in the Gulf of Guinea are less splintered than those in the Gulf of Aden, it 
is surprising that the rate of prosecution of alleged pirates in the Gulf of Guinea is much 
lower. This is especially the case with Nigeria, which has a well-established criminal justice 
system that dates back to the 19th century.291 The low rate of prosecution of pirates may be 
attributed to a variety of reasons, including the failure to completely incorporate relevant 
international instruments such as UNCLOS and SUA into domestic laws.292 Also, it is 
uncertain which government body is responsible for maritime security, whether the federal 
police, the navy, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), or the 
private security forces employed by shipping companies. There is also confusion as regards 
the court with subject matter jurisdiction. Section 251(1) of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 and section 21 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1991 provide that 
the Federal High Court, and not the state High Court, has exclusive jurisdiction for maritime  
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or admiralty and related criminal matters. However, it does not specify the procedure for 
trying maritime crime in the Federal High Court. It is uncertain which law this court should 
apply. This is because local laws do not define the term ‘piracy’. Section 1 of the Terrorism 
[Prevention] Act 2011 for example does not make mention of the term. Given that section 
36(12) of the Constitution provides that a person shall not be convicted of an offence unless 
the offence is defined in a written law, it is difficult to even charge many alleged pirates. The 
Federal High Court may not rely solely on UNCLOS definition because this definition is 
restricted to the crimes committed on the high seas for private ends. Thus, attacks perpetrated 
by rebels of the Niger Delta within Nigeria’s territorial waters do not constitute piracy as 
regards UNCLOS. 
In light of the above shortcomings, the Security Council issued a resolution that stated as 
follows: 
States of the region of the Gulf of Guinea to take prompt action, at national and regional 
levels with the support of the international community where able, and by mutual agreement, 
to develop and implement national maritime security strategies, including for the 
establishment of a legal framework for the prevention, and repression of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea and as well as prosecution of persons engaging in those crimes, and 
punishment of those convicted of those crimes and encourages regional cooperation in this 
regard.293 
The Security Council thus promotes a two-pronged approach that involves building regional 
maritime security architecture, and enhancing the security governance of the littoral States in 
the Gulf of Guinea. This led to the Yaoundé summit in June 2013 whereby the coastal States 
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in the Gulf Guinea joined member States of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Economic of 
West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) to issue a memorandum on maritime safety and security in Central and West Africa. 
The Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) was set up to implement the regional strategy 
for maritime security. They also issued a Code of Conduct governing the fight against piracy, 
armed robbery against ships, and illicit maritime activity in West and Central Africa. The 
Code of Conduct came to be known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, mirroring the Djibouti 
Code of Conduct, which as noted above, is modelled on the ReCAAP. However, despite the 
shortcomings of the Djibouti Code, the Yaoundé Code has failed to achieve a higher rate of 
prosecution of pirates that were captured by navies of non-coastal States in the Gulf of 
Guinea. Article 4(4) of the Yaoundé Code provides that the signatory States undertake to 
prosecute, in their local courts and in accordance with local laws, perpetrators of all forms of 
piracy. Article 4(5) also emphasises that the organisation and functioning of the system of 
prosecution and sentencing is the exclusive responsibility of each signatory State. Thus, 
despite the fact that Article 6(1)(a) notes that the signatory States should accept to cooperate 
in arresting, investigating and prosecuting alleged pirates, the Code has simply reiterated the 
status quo. The status quo as shown above is quite problematic given that many coastal States 
have not incorporated relevant international instruments into their domestic laws, making it 
difficult for their justice departments to prosecute allege pirates. The outcome of the Yaoundé 
summit is therefore intriguing given that one of the reasons for holding the summit was the  
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increase in maritime insecurity in the region and the failure of coastal States to prosecute and 
imprison arrested pirates. Hence, there is good reason to wonder why the outcome of the 
summit is a statement emphasising the exclusive responsibility of the same coastal States to 
arrest, prosecute and imprison alleged pirates.  
6.3 The Rationale for an International Court 
It was shown in Chapters 2 and 3 that piracy is a transnational crime that is not limited to a 
geographical location. That is why UNCLOS is not effective in addressing the offence of 
piracy. The transnational nature of the offence also explains why relying on the national laws 
of a littoral State has proved to be ineffective. The offence often has a long start-to-end 
sequence that extends beyond territorial waters or the high seas. Thus, the pirates may 
sometimes attack and hijack vessels in the high seas and move the vessels into the internal 
waters of a coastal State in order to achieve a position of relative safety from law 
enforcement. Nonetheless, despite its transnational nature, it is the national courts of the 
States with territorial jurisdiction that have generally tried and sentenced alleged pirates. This 
explains the very low rate of prosecution in both the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea. Most 
of the coastal States do not have a sophisticated criminal justice system that could ensure the 
collection and storage of evidence and respect of the rights of the accused. Where the alleged 
pirates have been prosecuted in States with more reliable systems, the prosecutions have 
proved to be a logistical nightmare. Also, it is uncertain whether the court of a non-coastal 
State should be able to assert universal jurisdiction without the consent of the State with 
territorial jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. Article 105 of UNCLOS provides that “the 
courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, 
and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, 
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subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.” In other words the State that seizes 
any vessel on the high seas ought to be the one that actually prosecutes and sanctions the 
suspected pirates. This provision has largely been ignored as many States only arrest the 
pirates and “dump” them in the coastal States. For example, on February 19, 2012, four 
suspected Somali pirates captured by the Danish naval troops were taken to Kenya after 
being rejected by the government in Seychelles.  
Kotnorovich and Art estimate that ‘universal jurisdiction was used in prosecuting only 0.53 
per cent of clearly universally punishable piracy cases between 1998 and 2007, with the 
figure increasing to 2.5 per cent between 2008 and June 2009.’ 294 They also note that Kenya 
accounts for all but three cases of invoking universal jurisdiction over piracy in the past 12 
years, with responsibility for 79 per cent of cases.295 The State that arrests the alleged pirates 
may also be constrained by the international law principle of ‘non-refoulment’ whereby a 
State is forbidden from rendering a true victim of persecution to his or her persecutor. Article 
3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) for example states that ‘no one shall 
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’296 Hence, 
sometimes the pirates cannot be returned to Somalia or Eritrea, and the trial State may be 
obliged to offer them asylum. This is because these countries are notorious for practices such 
as those prohibited by the ECHR. As such, besides the difficulties and costs associated with 
the prosecution of pirates, there is evidence that many States, and particularly Western States, 
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are trying to avoid their duty to prosecute pirates because of fears that, if convicted, those 
pirates will then seek political asylum for themselves and their families.297 Middleton, a 
researcher for Chatham House, the London-based think tank, explains, ‘These countries don’t 
want to be bombarded by claims of asylum from the pirates, who would ask not to be 
deported to Somalia, a country at war.’298 In April 2008, the British Foreign Office warned 
the Royal Navy that arresting suspected pirates at sea could be potentially being a violation of 
their human rights. They were further warned that this could also lead to asylum claims by 
pirates seeking to relocate to Europe.299 The fears about asylum claims might not necessarily 
be hearsay. There have been reports which indicate that at least two of the pirates on trial for 
attacking a Dutch vessel have declared their intention to try to stay there as residents.300 
However, it is shown above that the laws in many coastal States in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf 
of Guinea are not suited to deal with piracy, and thus ‘dumping’ pirates in these countries 
only compounds the problem. In the meantime, piracy is becoming a subculture in the African 
regions with devastating effects on the security of ships, crews, and cargo passing through 
international and territorial waters. Something needs to be done to ensure that the pirates are 
arrested, prosecuted, and punished. Some commentators have proposed the creation of an 
international court for the prosecution of pirates from poor developing countries.301 
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Such a court may be a solution to the problem of the violation of the human rights of the 
alleged pirates in their home States, as well as the uncertainty as regards the legal status of 
alleged pirates transferred to a third country for prosecution. A good example is a Somali 
pirate captured by the US Navy and transferred to Tanzania for trial. In setting up the 
international court, the international treaty could expressly recognise such transfers. This also 
provides the unique scope for creating the jurisdiction for the prosecution of pirates who 
attack and hijack vessels in the high seas and move the vessels to the internal waters of a 
coastal State. It will also create jurisdiction for the prosecution of pirates who attack vessels 
with the intention of obtaining a ransom that will then be used to fund a rebel or terrorist 
movement. In the 2010 Report of the UN Secretary-General on the prosecution of pirates, the 
idea of an International Tribunal is discussed. It is proposed that such a Tribunal may be 
modelled on the Special Court of Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
Nonetheless, it was noted that the State with territorial jurisdiction must enter into an 
agreement with the UN to this effect.302 This once again shows that universal jurisdiction 
does not provide any credible solution to the problem of piracy. 
Although an International Tribunal may not be established in Somalia, it may be established 
in another country in the region. However, previous UN-supported International Tribunals 
were established with clear geographical and temporal jurisdictions. This may be a problem 
here given the nature of the crime of piracy and the fact that an effective strategy must extend 
to the long-term. 
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6.4 Summary 
This Chapter has shown that despite the fact that pirates ought to be prosecuted and sentenced 
by the States with territorial jurisdiction, or with their consent, the states of the Gulf of Aden 
and Gulf of Guinea exhibit important jurisdictional, logistical and ethical difficulties in this 
regard. In addition, the laws of these countries do not make piracy a universal offence in light 
of the provisions of UNCLOS making arrests impossible even where there might be a naval 
presence in the area in question from other capable states. 
It was noted that international efforts would not be sufficient unless they were to be enforced 
within a regional security infrastructure. However, despite wide support, the success of the 
Djibouti and Yaoundé Codes is limited to the originality or novelty of the approach rather 
than effective results on the ground in terms of the number of arrests and prosecutions of 
pirates. The participating States have not expressed the willingness to sacrifice part of their 
sovereignty in favour of a multinational operational force. Neither could they agree on having 
a political oversight body that would determine the future of the Codes. It is the non-coastal 
States whose vessels or nationals are attacked on the high seas that are more likely to adopt 
laws providing for universal jurisdiction in order to facilitate the arrest and prosecution of 
alleged pirates by all States. There are however other problems with regard to the prosecution 
of pirates by States other than the States with territorial or personal jurisdiction. These 
include the uncertainty of the legal status of alleged pirates transferred to a third country for 
prosecution, and the possibility of the pirate seeking asylum in the prosecuting State due to 
the principle of non-refoulement. This is because they are likely to be tortured or killed if 
they are returned to their home States. 
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It is submitted, therefore, that an International Tribunal for the prosecution of pirates in the 
Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea might well serve as a solution to these problems. The 
tribunal would also provide scope for creating the jurisdiction for the prosecution of pirates 
who attack and hijack vessels on the high seas and move the vessels to the internal waters of 
a coastal State. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
‘It dawned on the states that piracy is trans-national and nothing that could be handled by 
one nation alone. The sea doesn't respect borders.’303 
7.1 Summary of the Thesis 
In this thesis I set out to propose an appropriate mechanism for the arrest, prosecution and 
sentencing of convicted pirates captured in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea. I sought to 
do this by endorsing a multilateral approach that places particular emphasis on a 
cosmopolitan consent/ auto-limitation model whereby enforcement jurisdiction may accrue as 
described in Chapter 3. Three central issues arose: 
The first concerned the approach to the definition of the term ‘piracy’ in a maritime context 
for analytical purposes. The second concerned the problem of resource deficiency and 
corruption in the coastal States in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea. The third examined 
the consequences of the impossibility of bringing a pursuit to a close within the territorial 
waters of coastal States. In some cases ships are pursued across the high seas and across 
borders ending up in territories incapable of feasible arrest and prosecution. Some key 
international instruments provide for universal jurisdiction on the high seas to facilitate the 
arrest and prosecution of pirates in such cases. However, this raises the question of whether 
 
303. Nazery Khalid, senior fellow at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur as cited in Michael 
Schuman ,’How to Defeat Pirates: Success in the Strait’, Time World, 14 November 2012 
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such jurisdictional shifts depart too dramatically from Westphalian principles of sovereignty, 
and whether such departures can be regarded as justified. 
7.2 Key Findings, Recommendations and Contribution 
Respectively, I concluded that (a), regarding definition of the offence, the issue boiled down 
to questions of jurisdiction. Piracy is defined as an offence that takes place on the high seas, 
in which it is implied that piracy is exclusively the concern of international law. But as 
Fakhry says, the definitional problem stems from the fact that there are two sources of legal 
understanding: international law and municipal law. I thus proposed that consistency and 
clarity in the definitional approach may best be achieved by returning to the consent or auto-
limitation approach whereby jurisdiction is essentially territorial and can be exercised only by 
a State outside its territory if it obtains the consent of the territorial State derived from 
international custom or convention. The definition ‘piracy’ ought then to be defined in 
accordance with laws of the territorial State or States with enforcement jurisdiction, and the 
provisions of UNCLOS where necessary. 
On question (b), I sought in this study to put forward that the biggest challenge amounting to 
the rise in piratical attacks in Gulf of Guinea is one of security. This security challenge 
hinders the suppression of attacks and allows for the sharp rise of attacks and the levels of 
attacks. I noted that it is often suggested that, therefore, the most appropriate response would 
be to immediately invoke automatic universal jurisdiction as the most immediate and 
effective way to supress the increasing number of attacks. However, I argued for the view 
that this doctrine of universal jurisdiction might be problematic - a double edged sword - that 
can lead to dangerous encroachment on the sovereignty of a State and create conflict since it 
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is not premised on the idea of State consent. Thus my strongest point in favour of a solution 
and the central contention of my work is that a cosmopolitan consent or ‘auto-limitation’ 
approach would be likely to produce coordinated action conducive to a more comprehensive 
solution whereby a flag State would have jurisdiction if the attack occurred in a place where 
no other State has territorial jurisdiction, especially given the nature and geographical nature 
of the attacks in Gulf of Guinea. A good example of the cosmopolitan approach is the case of 
Benin. The sharp increase in numbers of attacks led to the implementation of a regional 
framework. The president of Benin showed political willingness by entreating the Secretary 
General of the United Nations to request the support of the international community. 
Operation Prosperity had been created involved a joint patrol being set up patrolling the 
Benin seas. In the outcome it a few months after the operation had been set up followed that 
the number of attacks had been decreased drastically. 
In respect of (c) the suggestion that we establish an International Tribunal for prosecuting 
pirates is a solution to the issue of piracy, I noted that, first and foremost States with territorial 
jurisdiction in the Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden have generally been ineffective in 
prosecuting pirates which has led somewhat to continuing acts of piracy. This is because there 
has been a lack of a fear of punishment for committing this crime. Thus one of the strongest 
points in favour of an International Tribunal is that, in addition to establishing a standardised 
definition, establishing single presiding body for scrutiny of the offence would remove 
uncertainty of “what will happen next”. For example where alleged pirates have been arrested 
by navies of other States in the Gulf of Aden, it is difficult to say whether the pirates will be 
punished or let go upon return in Somalia. This is made worse by the fact that Somalia is 
divided into three main segments, each controlled by war lords. The likely outcome is that 
when pirates are returned, they will be tortured or killed which is a serious violation of 
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Human Rights legislation. Other problems can also arise such as where pirates are returned to 
States where there is a non-existence of penal laws which criminalise piracy. 
Further to the above, an International Tribunal would be an effective means of prosecuting 
pirates because 90 per cent of the alleged pirates captured at sea have been released because 
the States of the Gulf of Aden were not prepared to detain and prosecute them. This would set 
a precedent for other would-be offenders by showing that there are consequences to their 
actions. Having an International Tribunal would also be a clearer method of dealing with 
piracy cases because it would mean cases can be allocated to the specialist court rather than 
pirates awaiting trials in a number of different States. The idea of having an International 
Tribunal can also be developed as a positive contention because international efforts have 
proven successful. The East Asian Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was able to provide a regional 
infrastructure for the implementation of consensual solutions in East Asia. The Inter-regional 
Coordination Centre (ICC) is another body which has also been set up to implement the 
regional strategy for maritime security. They have also issued a Code of Conduct governing 
the fight against piracy. Given that justice cannot be done without a means of enforcement 
(and many coastal States suffer from a lack of adequate security forces), this certainly 
provides good guidance and sets a precedent for States to begin arresting suspected pirates, 
once they are in a position to do so. Once arrested, the accused can then be brought before the 
International Tribunal. The enforcement aspect however is currently seen as a difficulty given 
that a number of States are ill equipped to patrol and make the necessary arrests to stop 
offenders on the high seas. 
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7.3 Concluding Remarks 
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction is a precarious alternative to a cosmopolitan consent/ 
auto-limitation theory. It is a prelude to potentially dangerous encroachment upon the 
sovereignty of a State with territorial jurisdiction, however impoverished and troubled that 
State may be. Extending jurisdiction in the form of extraterritoriality is a less formal way of 
invoking universal jurisdiction in effect. 
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction did, however, prove a good case for the multilateral 
approach that was adopted in Somalia for the reason that the State with territorial jurisdiction 
was a dramatically failed State with no unified political leadership, and thus no durable or 
viable prospect of solving the problems at hand. Intervention that envisaged co-operation and 
an aspiration to gain consent of the Trans-Federal Government allowed for the legitimate 
implementation of Resolution 1816 by the UN: in effect granting member States the right to 
treat Somali territorial waters as the high seas. It did not address the root causes of piracy, but 
provided an effective and immediate solution to the situation on the seas. This resolution thus 
brought about the first response ever to piracy in precisely the condition described in my 
argument for the cosmopolitan consent /auto limitation approach.304 A military presence was 
set up to operate in and out of waters and conduct deterrent operations in the Gulf of Aden, 
and were able to exercise territorial jurisdiction because of the consent that was given by the 
Trans-Federal Government. Even this military presence, however, was not sufficient to secure 
safe passage of every transiting ship, thus a fortiori, we see the need for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and the endorsement for a multilateral approach that places particular emphasis 
on the cosmopolitan model. 
 
 
304. See Chapter 3 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
Compilation of the Official response from the FCO (UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office) Maritime Security Unit; supporting the importance of sovereign rights, and any 
intervention to deter piracy must be borne by consent of the State with territorial 
jurisdiction 
‘The UK takes threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea including armed robbery at 
sea and piracy very seriously, and we recognise that States in the region, including Cote 
D’Ivoire currently lack the maritime capacity to tackle these crimes. However, sovereignty is 
as important at sea as it is on land. As a maritime law student you will be aware that foreign 
flagged ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters of other states, 
but do not enjoy general enforcement jurisdiction there over criminal law. Piracy is a crime 
committed on the high seas and Article 105 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) provides states with enforcement powers only on the high seas. Therefore if the 
UK was to consider entering the territorial waters of a state such as Cote D’Ivoire this could 
not be done without prior agreement for specific law enforcement capabilities. Given the 
geography of the maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea such activity would require 
agreements with a number of States and many of these would not be supportive of the idea of 
having foreign warships active in their territorial waters. 
The UK has played a key role in joint naval operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean 
to tackle Somali piracy and has worked with international partners to establish regional 
agreements and capacity to prosecute Somali pirates in the region. The situation in the Gulf 
of Guinea is very different to that in Somalia and therefore the solution to tackling maritime 
crime here will be very different. Whereas Somalia did not, the coastal States in the Gulf of 
Guinea have functioning governments and judicial systems. Although in many their 
governance and capacity is not yet capable of tackling these crimes the solution is not for a 
foreign state to step in to provide that policing and prosecuting capability. The States in the 
region are demonstrating political will and working together to build capacity and tackle 
these crimes as illustrated by the Heads of State Summit in Yaoundé in June where 23 States 
signed The Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against 
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa and approved joint regional 
strategies for joint naval patrols. 
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The international community, including the UK are working with the States in the region to 
develop their judicial, governance and maritime capabilities in order to address these threats 
and effectively tackle maritime crime. This includes providing training and support to judicial 
systems, navies, coastguards and police and where possible contributing to building maritime 
patrol capacities. In addition, we are working with the regional economic communities as 
they develop and prepare to implement joint regional strategies and patrols. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Figures in support of the increasing and decreasing nature of piracy 
  
  
!   
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APPENDIX 3 
A short 10 minute email Question and Answer session with Person X, a Navy member 
working on the flight deck of Ship Y in Somalia, at Branch Z. (Consent has been given for 
personal details to be obtained upon request) 
1. What are the major problems that these pirates are causing? 
This question really depends on the category of persons you are asking. If you were to ask a 
holiday maker on a cruise liner, it is obvious that they would complain about their holiday 
being ruined. On the other hand if you were to ask the owners of oil refineries around the 
world they would talk about the economic impact and the amount of money their companies 
are losing due to the pirates commandeering their ships through the Gulf of Aden. I think 
personally with the economic impact, if every company in the world that runs ships through 
this area then they have to employ armed personnel, or invest in protective measures as a 
deterrent on board or they could risk losing their ship, goods and also some personnel as the 
pirates are known to be ruthless. You might ask why do these pirates even risk attacking ships 
in the Gulf of Aden at all, but if you look at a world map you can see that the Sea of Aden/ 
Red sea leading to the Suez Canal saves an awful long journey around the bottom of South 
Africa . 
The Pirates are not always interested in the value of the cargo as a few billion pounds worth 
or crude oil is useless to them, it is more about hostages and ransoms. They will not always 
hijack large ships as was shown when a British couple were taken hostage last year on their 
tiny yacht on a world cruise. 
Concentrating on the economic side of things and looking at what it could change is the value 
of things for us, i.e. pretty much everything you can make from crude oil, e.g. plastic, and 
also the cost of goods and food being transported. These companies do have armed personnel 
to help the transporting of goods but require funding and this has a knock on economic effect. 
2. As it can be seen the law is not really effective in the area of piracy, what do you feel 
could be done in order to stop these sea crimes from happening? 
I will digress here and explain why nothing from within Somalia can or has been done and 
how it all started. I'm not sure if you know or not but Somalia is actually split in two, much 
like Korea. North Somalia which is rarely mentioned is a government lead and fairly stable 
country with very little crime as I'm aware of. When the country became separated, the South 
was mainly populated on the coast as small fishing villages which became lead by gangs or 
militias and this is when they started hijacking ships. In order to combat piracy and for it to 
be stopped it really has to come from within Somalia itself. 
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3. When you may have caught pirates from committing a crime where have you taken 
them?  
We can't arrest them. When caught they have all weapons seized and are released. From here 
they sail back to port, re-arm and then sail back out and look for ships. Most pirate vessels 
spotted by the Navies patrolling the waters off Somalia will ditch over board or do their best 
to conceal their weapons. They disguise themselves as fishing vessels most of the time so it is 
very hard to actually catch them attempting to hijack a ship. 
4. Common things that pirates do and rare things that you have only come across a 
couple of times? 
Common things…pirates aren't afraid to die and it has been known for them to open fire at 
navy ships. This tends to be rare as the sight of military aircraft and ships is normally enough 
for them to throw their weapons over the side and claim they're fishing even though 
sometimes they are over 200miles off the coast. The Ships that deal with piracy tend to be the 
faster destroyer and frigates (Type 45s and Type 23s) with one helicopter spot (usually a 
Royal Navy Lynx) 
5. How do you feel about piracy? 
Obviously, something does need to be done about it. The Navies across the world are doing a 
great job at providing a deterrent but they are not the answer to solving it. The Sea of Aden 
and the Arabian sea are huge areas and it's impossible to police it all as pirates have been 
spotted as far as India and as south as Madagascar. As I said earlier it really has to be from 
within Somalia. 
6. Main areas of the world you think it takes place? 
Somalia is probably the most publicised in the media and news networks on our side of the 
world but Malaysia has a huge and very similar problem with pirates around the busy 
shipping lanes in the Java Sea and Malacca strait. 
Pictures to accompany anti-piracy works carried out by the Navy in Somalia 
!   
Royal Marines Interception Vessel  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 Royal Navy Lynx 
    
!   
Navy Lynx Aids Capture of Suspected Pirates- A Royal Navy Lynx helicopter has helped 
arrest 12 armed suspected pirates who attempted to launch an attack on a merchant vessel 
sailing 260 miles off the coast of Somalia.  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Flight 217 from 815 Naval Air Squadron is currently deployed on board the French frigate 
FLF Surcouf as part of Operation Atalanta, the EU’s counter-piracy mission off the Horn of 
Africa. 
   
This is after the Navy received a distress call from a merchant vessel reporting she 
was under attack from six men armed with RPG's (rocket propelled grenades). Also it 
claims ‘men’ but these pirates can be as young as 12.  
   
..........Mini Gun MK44 Used against Pirates and also... 
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 GPMP (General purpose machine gun) used on 
pirates. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Table of Countries in the Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden which Show 
Signatories to UNCLOS and the SUA Convention as well as Showing Which 
States Have Their Own Domestic Laws Against Piracy as of 2016 as Noted by 
the International Maritime Organization and Oceans Beyond Piracy 
Organization.  
!182
List of Countries in 
Gulf of Guinea
Signatory to UNCLOS Signatory to SUA Domestic Law for 
Piracy
Angola Yes No No
Benin Yes No Yes
Burkina Faso Yes No No
Cameroon Yes No Yes
Cape Verde Yes No No
Congo (Democratic 
Republic)
Yes No No
Congo (Republic) Yes Yes Yes
Gambia Yes No Yes
Ghana Yes No Yes
Guinea Yes No Yes
Guinea Bissau Yes No No
Ivory Coast Yes Yes Yes
Liberia Yes No Yes
Mali Yes No No
Mauritania Yes Yes No
Niger Yes No No
Nigeria Yes Yes No
Sao Tome & Principe Yes No Yes
Senegal Yes No Yes
Sierra Leone Yes No No
Togo Yes No Yes
List of Countries in 
Gulf of Aden
Signatory to UNCLOS Signatory to SUA Domestic Law for 
Piracy
Burundi No No No
Djibouti Yes Yes Yes
Eritrea No No No
Ethiopia No No No
Kenya Yes No Yes
Rwanda No No No
Seychelles Yes No Yes
Somalia Yes No No
Yemen Yes No Yes
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